Developing a Generic Architecture for Autonomic Fault Handling in Mobile Robots by Doran, Martin
Developing a Generic Architecture
for Autonomic Fault Handling in
Mobile Robots
Martin Doran
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment








I, Martin Doran, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own.
Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has
been indicated in the work.
Abstract
The Autonomic Computing paradigm was first presented almost 18 years ago as a
20-30 year long research agenda. Organizations like NASA, have explored the pos-
sibilities of using autonomic systems in their future missions due to vast distances
experienced in space exploration. Planetary and mobile robots operate in hostile
environments and because of their remote location, human intervention for repairs
is not possible. Hardware devices, like mobile robots, are susceptible to internal
and external environmental changes, which can lead to faults occurring. Some re-
search has been conducted in terms of handling faults in mobile robots but there is
no generic autonomic model that can be used for any type of system fault, in any
type of mobile robot. This Thesis describes a generic autonomic architecture for
use in developing systems for managing hardware faults in mobile robots. Using
autonomic principles, this Thesis focuses on how to detect faults within a mobile
robot and how specialised algorithms can be deployed to compensate for the faults
discovered. The initial design of a generic architecture is developed using inspi-
ration from the MAPE-K and IMD architectures. Case studies are presented that
show three different fault scenarios that can occur within the effectors, sensors and
power units of a mobile robot. The results from each of the Case Studies is used
to create and refine a generic autonomic architecture that can be utilized for any
general mobile robot setup for fault handling. A further Case Study is presented,
which exercises the generic autonomic architecture in order to demonstrate its util-
ity. This Thesis addresses the fundamental challenges in operating remote mobile
robots with little or no Human intervention. If a fault does occur within the mobile
robot during field operations, then having a self-managing strategy as part of its pro-
Abstract 4
cesses may result in the mobile robot continuing to function at a productive level.
Research in this Thesis has provided insights into the shortcomings of existing robot
design which is also discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the research topic of this thesis. Section 1.1 discusses the
context within which the research problems are recognized. Section 1.2 discusses
the problem statement. Section 1.3 presents the overall aim and objectives of this
research. Finally, Section 1.4 presents the Chapter outline.
1.1 Research Context
In the late 1960’s the world’s first mobile robot ’Shakey’ was developed by re-
searcher’s at Stanford Research Institution (now SRI International) [18]. The com-
ponents attached to ’Shakey’, i.e., range finders, vision camera and bumper sensors,
are typical of components you would find on present-day mobile robots. In the 21st
century, mobile robots can be found in factories, warehouses, laboratories and office
spaces. These modern-day mobile robots are not just the proverbial ’pack mule’ but
contain on-board intelligence and real-time adaptive capabilities [19]. However, it
is in the space industry that mobile robots are pushed to their limits in terms of reli-
ability and robustness. These types of mobile robots or planetary rovers, operate in
hostile environments; and because they are in a remote location, human intervention
to make any repairs is impossible.
When a fault occurs in a mobile robot, there are various ways the operator can
become aware that there is a problem. The mobile robot may sound an alarm or
send a message to main operations. Other scenarios may include the mobile robot
becoming motionless or perhaps veering off from its normal operating area. In any
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event, human operators are there to examine, fix or replace any faulty component
found on the mobile robot. If a fault occurs in a component on a planetary rover,
then the robot may lose a degree of functionality depending on the extent of the
fault. Human intervention is limited to ’software updates’ or shutting down some
on-board systems in-order to preserve other components. Each component can be
subjected to various fault scenarios, i.e. intermittent, permanent or non-functioning
(total failure). However, maintenance cannot be employed, and parts cannot be re-
placed or repaired [20]. It is therefore important that the planetary rover can adapt
to new situations if an error occurs. Authors in [21], explained that faults that oc-
curred in NASA’s Spirit Rover, where due to unknown factors or environmental
interactions. Fault tolerance strategies where limited, as faults in the motor system
could not be resolved due to the performance degradation imposed when the Spirit
Rover switched to a system fault mode. In 2018 NASA reported issues with the
Opportunity Rover in [22]. They reported three main faults low-power fault, clock
fault and uploss fault. When ’Opportunity’ experienced a problem, it can go into so
called ”fault mode” where it automatically takes action to maintain its health. How-
ever, NASA could not resolve the issues with ’Opportunity’, and it was declared
’lost’ in February 2019.
The term ’Autonomic’ is described as occurring involuntarily or sponta-
neously, resulting from internal stimuli [23][24]. The Autonomic Computing
Paradigm is a concept that has been inspired by the human autonomic nervous sys-
tem. Its main objective is that computer and software systems can manage them-
selves with only high-level guidance from humans [25]. One of the main aspects of
autonomic computing described in [26], is that an autonomic system must perform
something comparable to healing, it must be able to recover from routine or ex-
ceptional events that might cause some individual parts to malfunction. In the case
of mobile robots (planetary rovers), operating in remote destinations, [27][28] have
described the need for future NASA missions to be autonomic by necessity, owing
to the complex nature of the software and hardware systems involved.
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1.2 Research Problem
In the last decade, several research approaches have been taken in fault handling
for mobile robots. A representative list of such approaches can be found in research
such as [29][30][31]. These approaches utilize fault tolerance and FDI (Fault Detec-
tion and Isolation) techniques to detect, analyse and recover from hardware faults
in mobile robots. Although these techniques provide fault-handling solutions in
mobile robots, they are constrained by the fact that early design decisions must be
applied to fault tolerance systems. This results in a lack of flexibility if roles and
strategies need to be altered when the system is operating in the field. Autonomic
fault handling offers self-adaption and the ability to use a generic software approach
when designing a system that can react to behavioural changes [32].
In 2003, IBM presented a white paper that described an autonomic reference
model in the form of the MAPE-K (Monitor, Analyses, Plan, Execute - Knowledge)
feedback loop [1]. The MAPE-K architecture assumes the availability of sensors
and effectors in order to gather data for managed resources. Within its feedback
loop, there is functionality to monitor the sensed data, to analyse the current state,
to plan corrective actions and to execute these actions via the effectors. The MAPE-
K is a popular model when building self-adaption into current systems but its orig-
inal form is normally altered, so that researchers can adapt it to their own specific
requirements [33][34][12][13]. It therefore begs the question whether the MAPE-K
model, in its original configuration [1], goes far enough for developers to design
an effective self-adaptive solution? Research reported in [35], proposed that there
are sources of uncertainty in the MAPE-K which may affect its components. The
MAPE-K monitoring component may be affected by inherent imperfections of sen-
sors. These imperfections may be a result of sensing latency: by the time analyses
occurs the information is outdated. Other imperfections could be a result of sen-
sor inaccuracy: the sensor cannot distinguish deviations between the actual reading
and the ideal reading. The authors in [36], state that within the MAPE-K the role
of knowledge is unclear. In their Formal Reference Model (FORMS), they elabo-
rate on knowledge by making distinctions between (1) architectural model (struc-
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tural and behavioural data); (2) goal model (action policies and utility functions);
(3) environmental model (in which the managed autonomic element is situated).
In robotics, research reported in [4][5], discusses the IMD (Intelligent Machine
Design) as a model where computing systems should be designed to operate au-
tonomously, unattended and be highly robust. The IMD consists of three levels
with ’intelligence’ increasing from the lower to the higher level. The lowest level
(Reaction), is in direct contact with sensors and motor elements. The highest level
(Reflection), makes decisions based on knowledge and experiences. Research in
[6], makes a case for integrating the autonomic MAPE-K model to operate on each
level of the IMD architecture. But does the IMD design go far enough for the de-
velopment of self-adaption in robots? Is there a case for using both MAPE-K and
IMD to create a hybrid architecture for fault handling in mobile robots?
1.3 Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to develop a generic autonomic architecture for fault
handling in mobile robots. Using the autonomic MAPE-K and IMD models as a
basis, the generic autonomic architecture is gradually developed through case study
interrogation. The motivation is that developers can use the generic autonomic ar-
chitecture as a reference when designing future mobile robotic systems. The pro-
posed approach is intended to retain the important elements found in autonomic
computing but also to improve upon current autonomic models.
The following are the set of objectives:
1. Research the main attributes associated with the MAPE-K and IMD models
and establish if they do enough within the autonomic robotic community or
is there areas that can be improved upon.
2. Develop self-awareness (i.e. becoming aware), when establishing a fault sce-
nario within a mobile robot.
3. Using case study methods, identify common design patterns in-order to de-
velop an autonomic generic architecture for handling component faults in mo-
bile robots.
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1.4 Chapter Outline
The structure of this thesis is as follows:
Chapter 1 - Introduction.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review: the origins of Autonomic Computing are dis-
cussed and why its introduction is an attempt to address the growing complexity
of computer systems we find today in modern computing. An alternative model is
also discussed in the form of the Intelligent Machine Design (IMD) and how it can
be integrated with IBM’s MAPE-K architecture. Further discussions are centred
around Organic Computing and how it differs from the original autonomic comput-
ing concept to form its own architectural development. This chapter also describes
fault handling in mobile robots and how autonomic systems compare to traditional
fault tolerance systems. Finally, current research in the autonomic computing field
is discussed and how researchers have used the autonomic MAPE-K and the robotic
IMD in their work.
Chapter 3 - Research Hypothesis and Overview: in this chapter the thesis
goals are presented and how design patterns can be used in analysis of faults in
robots. The Research Method is also presented in this chapter showing how case
study Methodology is used as a means to develop the autonomic generic architec-
ture. Further discussions in this chapter explain how the MAPE-K and IMD models
can be integrated to form the basis of a new architecture. Finally, SDLC (Software
Development Life Cycle), is discussed as the methodology used within the case
studies of this thesis.
Chapter 4 - Self-Adaptive Mobile Robot Wheel Alignment - case study: this
chapter demonstrates how an autonomic management system can be implemented
to handle a ’wheel alignment’ fault in a mobile robot. The SDLC model is used
to analyse, design, implement and test each stage of the case study. This chapter
also presents the initial development of the autonomic generic architecture and how
it can be designed to handle a ’wheel alignment’ fault in a mobile robot. Finally,
testing and evaluation methods are used to demonstrate the compensation policy
applied to the ’wheel alignment’ fault and how it improves its performance over
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distance and time.
Chapter 5 - Autonomic Sonar Sensor Fault Management for Mobile Robots -
case study: in this chapter, methods are discussed for how to handle sonar sensor
faults in a mobile robot. The SDLC methodology is used for the analysis, imple-
mentation and testing of the sonar sensor fault. The autonomic generic architecture
is further developed by introducing Knowledge Base attributes to identify, analyse
and finally, compensate for the fault. The chapter concludes with an evaluation pro-
cess to test the compensation policy and how it affects the performance of the robot
in terms of detecting objects.
Chapter 6 - Autonomic Management for Mobile Robot Battery Degradation -
case study: in this chapter, methods are discussed on how to handle battery degrada-
tion within a mobile robot. This case study uses SDLC methods for designing, im-
plementing and testing. The autonomic generic architecture is further developed by
incorporating control loops (reactive and proactive), in identifying the fault (aware-
ness), processing the fault (analysis) and compensating for the fault (adjustment).
The chapter concludes with testing the compensation policy and how it affects the
performance of the mobile robot in relation to power consumption and task com-
pletion.
Chapter 7 - Generic Architecture for Fault Management (AIFH): in this chap-
ter the findings accumulated from the case studies (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), are used to
design a fully fledged generic autonomic architecture for handling faults in a mobile
robot. A High-level design is introduced, explaining the elements found in the Au-
tonomic and System Managers. This chapter then explorers the self-healing module
(the module that handles the feed-back control loops) and the knowledge-base mod-
ule (which includes attributes such as policies, tolerance values and historical data).
This chapter then presents the low-level design of the AIFH (Autonomic Intelli-
gent Fault Handling) architecture. Each layer of the AIFH architecture (Awareness,
Analysis and Adjustment) is discussed, and how those layers play a role in detect-
ing, processing and compensating for faults. Finally, in this chapter, the generic au-
tonomic architecture (AIFH) is evaluated by introducing a further case study (Stereo
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Camera Vision Fault). The main goal in this Section is to demonstrate the utility of
the generic architecture in a new fault scenario.
Chapter 8 - Conclusions and Future Work: provides conclusions to the re-
search discussed in this thesis and what future work is under proposed.
1.5 Overview of Publications
The research presented in this thesis produced six publications and one submission.
These publications and submission, span over the six years of part-time study.
The first publication was presented and published for the 11th IEEE Inter-
national Conference and Workshops on the Engineering of Autonomic and Au-
tonomous Systems [15] (2014). Using indoor GPS, a mobile robot was tracked
to discover wheel alignment faults. This paper introduced to the research, an au-
tonomic strategy to compensate for the wheel alignment fault. This publication
contributed to research carried out in Chapter 4.
The second publication was presented and published for the 13th Symposium
on Advanced Space Technologies in Robotics and Automation [37] (2015). This
publication introduces a high-level concept of robotics based on the autonomic
computing paradigm, with the aim of developing self-managing and autonomous
software for space missions. The three main areas of research included autonomic
architecture, cooperation between robots and development of middle-ware.
The third publication was presented and published for the Eighth International
Conference on Adaptive and Self-Adaptive Systems and Applications [38] (2016).
This publication detailed how an Autonomic Management System (based on the
MAPE-K [1]), could be applied for detecting, evaluating and compensating a wheel
alignment fault on a mobile robot. This publication relates to research carried out
in Chapter 4.
The fourth publication was presented and published for the 19th International
Conference on Autonomic Computing and Computer Engineering, [39] (2017). In
this publication, an extension of the MAPE-K architecture is introduced as the AAA
(Awareness), (Analysis) and (Adjustment) model, to handle sonar sensor faults in
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mobile robots. This publication relates to research carried out in Chapter 5.
The fifth publication was presented and published for the 20th International
Conference on Autonomic Computing and Computer Engineering, [40] (2018). In
this publication, research was conducted on how battery degradation can affect task
performance on a mobile robot. Autonomic principles where applied to handle
the battery degradation fault, so that the mobile robot could still operate in some
capacity. This publication relates to research carried out in Chapter 6.
The sixth publication was presented and published for SMC-IT (Interna-
tional Conference on Space Mission Challenges for Information Technology),
IEEE/NASA, in Pasadena, California (2019). In this publication, the AIFH archi-
tecture was presented as extension to the MAPE-K and IMD models and how it
could be implemented for fault handling in mobile robots.
Finally, the seventh paper was published by Innovations in System and Soft-
ware Engineering, NASA Journal, (2020). This journal represents a summary of
the research completed by the author over the duration of the PhD. Journal title,




The following literature review concerns itself with origins of Autonomic Comput-
ing and how it can influence how we develop computers systems now and in the
future. The review further explorers how hardware faults in systems can be han-
dled using an autonomic approach and the importance of an generic architecture is
in delivering these goals. This Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 deals
with the fundamentals in Autonomic Computing, the types of attributes and various
interpretations that have been employed by researchers in developing autonomic
models. Section 2.3 deals with an Autonomic approach to handling faults in mobile
robots and the influence of Organic Computing in this area of research. Section
2.4 looks at how a generic architecture based on current autonomic models can be
adapted to fault handling in computing systems. Section 2.5 contains a summary of
the literature review.
2.2 Autonomic Computing
2.2.1 Origins and Motivations
The Autonomic Computing Initiative (ACI), was promoted by IBM in 2001, to ad-
dress the ever-increasing complexity of computer systems [41][42]. Technological
advances in computer and software systems have resulted in legacy systems being
constantly updated to a point where management of these systems is becoming un-
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tenable. To further the complexity, there is increased need to distribute data, appli-
cations and system resources across international and national business boundaries
[43]. However, updating current systems in terms of self-* management properties
[41], is a difficult task because of the dependencies and limitations that are tied to
the system’s earlier design strategies [44].
IBM’s ACI, is inspired by the human body’s nervous system. The nervous sys-
tem acts and reacts to stimuli which are independent to the individual’s conscious
input. Just as the human body functions without interference from the individ-
ual (e.g., temperature rises and falls, breathing rate etc), the autonomic computing
environment operates and reacts in response to the information it retrieves [45].
However, there are important distinctions between the autonomic activities within
the human body and the activities performed in an autonomic computer system.
Many of the decisions made within the human body regarding autonomic activity
are involuntary, whereas decision making within a autonomic computer system, is
often carried out by a Autonomic Manager which in-turn, will communicate with
the System Manager to carry out tasks and the polices [46][47].
IBM proposed self-management, where functions could be accomplished by
taking appropriate action based in the current state of the surrounding environ-
ment. Computer systems with self-managing components could potentially reduce
the cost of owning and operating such systems. These attributes are defined as fol-
lows [1]:
• Self-configuration - the ability to dynamically adapt to changing environ-
ments. when changes occur, policies can be enforced that result components
being deployed or removed (with minimal human intervention). Dynamic
adaption can increase both growth and flexibility within an IT organization,
when faced with future changes.
• Self-healing - has the ability to detect improper operations. It can analyse and
make changes when faced with disruptions. The components operating within
a self-healing environment, can deploy policies that can correct the computer
system without affecting the surrounding environment. If components fail,
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a self-healing system can initiate corrective action to adapt to environmental
changes.
• Self-optimizing - the ability of the IT environment to maximize resource
allocation and utilization when faced with dynamically changing work-
loads. Self-optimizing components can learn from experience and thus make
changes to themselves in-order to achieve the overall business objectives.
Self-optimization helps provide a high standard of service for Users and busi-
ness clients.
• Self-protecting - system components have the ability to detect hostile threats
and take corrective action to make themselves less vulnerable to attacks. Self-
protecting capabilities allows businesses to enforce security policies that will
ultimately affect productivity and customer satisfaction. Self-protection is
also about monitoring the system as a whole and reacting to any changes that
could affect its integrity.
2.2.2 Autonomic Model
According to IBM [48], the Autonomic attributes, referred to as self-CHOP (Con-
figure, Heal, Optimize and Protect), are the foundations for self-managing systems.
These autonomic concepts can be orchestrated using an Autonomic Manager [47],
in which the Autonomic Manager implements a feedback loop. The autonomic
feedback loop is integrated into the MAPE-K model (Monitor, Analyse, Plan, Exe-
cute - using a Knowledge base) - see Figure 2.1.
The MAPE architecture divides the feedback loop into four separate parts.
Each part has access to the knowledge resource.
• Monitor - processes information from managed resources (sensors etc). The
monitor function processes the data until it recognizes a symptom that needs
to be further investigated. The autonomic system has two types of monitoring:
passive and active monitoring. Passive monitoring involves using a third party
monitoring function. For example, in a LINUX, VMSTAT is used to monitor
CPU utilization. The Autonomic Manager can directly access third party









Figure 2.1: Autonomic MAPE-K model proposed by IBM [1].
monitoring tools [49]. Active monitoring means the Autonomic Manager
has a direct connection with its surrounding environment, in particular with
sensors. The active monitoring process can be affected by the goals set by
Administration. These goals can allow the monitoring process to transform
the data selected using operations such as analyzing, filtering and aggregation.
• Analyse - takes the symptoms identified by the monitoring process and per-
forms data analysis. The analyses process draws on the knowledge store to
make comparisons and assist with decision making. The knowledge store can
contain policies, which can be implemented to investigate symptoms passed
down from the monitoring function. The analyse function is responsible for
determining the extent of the fault and if required, make a decision if changes
are required.
• Plan - takes the symptom data from the analyse function and determines what
action is needed to compensate for the fault. The Plan function can utilize
policies that allow it to initiate an alteration within managed resource. A plan
of action can either be static or dynamic. A static plan would consist of a
set of steps that must be carried out in sequence, when a particular condition
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has occurred. A dynamic plan would require choosing the best plan (from
an existing collection of plans), by iterating through various fault scenarios.
Therefore, the Plan function is making a hypothesis on the effect a planned
action might take.
• Execute - provides the managed resource to execute the policies that where
instigated by the Plan function. This is achieved by using the appropriate
effectors. The Execute function has no ability to modify the surrounding
environment.
Although knowledge is shared by all the ’parts’ within the Autonomic Man-
ager, Monitor and Analyse use the knowledge store extensively in order to make
decisions regarding the discovery of symptoms or faults and how best to deal with
them. In an autonomic computing system, knowledge captures data, renders it in
a standard way so that it can be used by the Autonomic Manager, and that in turn
enables new knowledge to be discovered and learned [50].
2.2.2.1 Feedback Loop Application
In the MAPE-K, the feedback loop orchestrates the interaction between the different
attributes within the Autonomic Manager. The feedback loop can be described as
a closed loop system. The feedback loop can determine whether an environmental
change requires the need for adaption or not [51]. The autonomic systems use
feedback loops to achieve self-management [52].
Research conducted in [53], shows how the MAPE-K feedback can be applied
in adaptive systems as three distinct categories.
Independent loop - in this category, the agents possess all the main attributes
within the MAPE-K. If changes occur to the local environment, then agent will
become aware of these changes. However, these types of independent feedback
loops are not usually found in a collective system.
Interacting loop - within a collective system, there are many interactions be-
tween agents that possess autonomic self-properties. Even though the MAPE-K
loop exists within each agent, there is interaction between agents as each loop is
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executed.
Distributed loop - as typical distributed system can contain different types of
agents. These types of agents may include intelligent controllers or agents. Some
distributed systems may also contain human operators.
Research reported in [25], describes the autonomic element as having a local
loop and a global loop. The local loop is only aware of environment states that re-
sults from knowledge base that is embedded within the element. However, the local
loop is ignorant of the overall behaviour of the entire system and therefore can-
not affect any global changes. The global loop can handle unknown environmental
states which can manifest as artificial intelligence, machine learning and human in-
teraction. The global loop can initiate changes in behaviour, which can be triggered
by a fall in the overall system performance levels.
Real autonomic systems require multiple management feedback loops. In re-
search conducted by [2], the autonomic MAPE (plan/execute) is replaced with a
transition function, which in-turn triggers the actuators - see Figure 2.2..
Figure 2.2: Autonomic coordination for feedback loops [2].
These types of multiple loops can be arranged in an hierarchical framework
where the top layer AM (Autonomic Manager) coordinates the lower-level AM’s.
The hierarchical system allows each feedback loop to perform its own function-
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ality but at the same time coordination of strategy and polices are enforced using
controlled interfaces.
2.2.2.2 Autonomic Policies
In autonomic computing, policies play an important role as they describe how the
system is guided in terms of decision making and actions taken. In general, policies
are described as three types, action, goal and utility [54].
• Action Policy - determines what action is taken depending on a given current
state. This type of policy typically takes the form of (IF, THEN) conditions.
The condition will specify a specific state or a set of possible states. It is pre-
sumed that the design author, knows what state will be reached depending on
the actions taken. This is deemed necessary, to ensure the system is exhibiting
rational behaviour.
• Goal Policy - rather that specifying an exact current state, Goal policies rather
specify a desired state or set of desired states. The system responsible for
initiating a particular action, can in-turn make a transition from a current
state to some desired state. Rather than relying on a human to create a specific
behavioural pattern (i.e. Action policy), the system generates is own rational
behaviour itself, using Goal policies. Goal policies allow a greater flexibility,
which frees human policy makers from necessarily having to learn about the
low-level details of a system function.
• Utility Function Policies - this type of policy is a function that expresses
the value of each possible state. Utility Function policies provide more fine-
grained and flexible specification in terms of behaviour, that you would find
in Action and Goal policies. For example, in a situation where multiple Goal
policies would conflict (i.e. they could not all be achieved simultaneously),
Utility policies allow for unambiguous, rational decision making by specify-
ing an appropriate trade-off.
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2.2.2.3 3 Tier Model - Inspiration
The Autonomic Nervous System was a topic discussed in [55], in the late 1960s.
In this research, observations where being made of that human behavioural charac-
teristics where conspicuously absent from any current computer system. However,
human activity can be described as a set of goals and at any time, can be inter-
rupted by environmental changes. Goal priorities can be changed by generating
interrupts and therefore, affects intelligent behaviour. Research conducted at the
end of the 90s in [3], suggested a ’three tower’ model to describe perception, cen-
tral processing and action. Within this model, there is a provision for ’information’
storage and recording of results - (see Fig. 2.3(a)). Further research in [4], intro-
duces the concept of a 3-tier model that has at its lowest level, reactive mechanisms,
and at its highest level, reflective processes. Within the reactive layer, external or
internal actions are performed immediately. The reflection or meta-management










Figure 2.3: Virtual Machine Architectures - 3 Towers (a) and 3 Layers (b) models [3][4].
Research conducted in [5], acknowledges the work carried out in [4], as they
also proposed a human information processing model operating on three levels.
However, although the ’reaction’ level is shared by both models, there are funda-
mental differences between the ’Reasoning’ and ’Routine’ layers and the ’Reflective
Meta Management’ and ’Reflection’ layers (see Figure 2.4).
The 3-Tier modal (Figure 2.4), described in [5], implies that computer systems





Figure 2.4: Affect and Cognition modal - (three levels of behaviour) [5], adapted from [4].
need to be designed in such a way that they can run autonomously, unattended and
maintain high reliability. The three levels proposed are the Reaction level, Routine
level and Reflection level. The Reaction level (the lowest level), contains the imme-
diate responses coming from data supplied by sensory systems. The Routine level
(mid-level), is complex and involves considerable processing for behavioural selec-
tion and guidance. Inputs comes from sensory systems, the Reaction level and the
Reflection level. The Routine level can also perform assessments. The Reflection
level (highest level), deliberates about itself. It performs operations based on expe-
riences and knowledge. This level has no direct link to ’sensory’ or ’motor’ systems
but relies on input from the lower levels. These ’layers’ are explored further in
Section 2.2.2.4.
The 3 Tier modal or IMD (Intelligent Machine Design) architecture was then
integrated into an ’autonomic computing expression’ by research conducted in [5];
in their paper, they state that the IMD modal (integrated with self* properties at
each level), is more closely related to biological systems and therefore better suited
to certification as opposed to the MAPE-K model. There is increase in ’intelligence’
when moving from the lowest level (Reaction) to the highest level (Reflection). The
’response’ speed increases when moving from the highest level (Reflection) to the
lowest level (Reaction).
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2.2.2.4 IMD and MAPE-K
IMD is significantly different from the MAPE Architecture, both structurally and
behaviourally. In this alternative model, behaviours are differentiated in terms of
urgency and responding to changes in the environment [6]. The IMD architecture
closely relates to how the intelligent biological system works. The IMD architecture
proposes three distinct layers (see Figure 2.5) as follows:
Figure 2.5: An Autonomic Computing expression of the IMD [6].
• Reaction Layer - the lower layer, the Reaction layer, is connected to the
sensors and effectors. When it receives sensor information, it reacts rela-
tively faster than the other two layers. The main reason for this is that its
internal mechanisms are basic, direct and normally hard-wired, therefore, its
behaviour is an autonomic response to incoming signals. The Reaction layer
takes precedence over all other layers and can trigger higher layer processing.
• Routine Layer - the Routine layer is more intelligent and skilled compared
to the Reaction layer. It is expected to access working memory which con-
tains a number of policy definitions that can be executed based on knowledge
and self-awareness. As a result, it is comparatively slower than the Reaction
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Layer. The Routine layer activities can be activated or inhibited by the Re-
flection Layer. If the Routine layer is unable to find a suitable policy for an
immediate objective, it hands control over to the Reflection layer. The Re-
flection layer, the highest level, helps the machine deal with deviations from
the norm.
• Reflection Layer - the Reflection layer has the responsibility of developing
new policies and therefore this layer consumes a larger number of computer
resources. The Reflection layer can deal with the abnormal situations, using
a combination of learning technologies, specialized algorithms, knowledge
databases and self-awareness. The Reflection Layer can analyse current data
or historic data and identify when to change and selects a policy to decide
what to change. The Reflection layer can inhibit or activate processes be-
longing to the Routine layer through new policy definitions.
All layers in the IMD architecture can implement the four common self-CHOP
properties - see Figure 2.5.
2.2.2.5 Autonomy and Autonomicity
Autonomy in the context of computing systems, can achieve its goals without the
need for human intervention and therefore can be regarded as self-governing. Ex-
amples of autonomy can be seen in space missions conducted by NASA from the
mid-1980s on-wards [56]. Autonomicity is regarded as being self-managing. From
an autonomic perspective, this would embrace self-configuring, self-optimizing,
self-healing and self-protecting. Autonomicity differs from Autonomy in that it
can adapt to changing environments. Autonomy relies on a pre-set of routines that
have been previously designed and cannot be changed. Autonomicity allows for
changes to be made when in operation. If a instrument fails then another instrument
can be re-configured to take over from the failed component. From a (IMD) per-
spective (reaction, routine and reflection), autonomicity would be associated with
the reaction layer whereas autonomy would correlate with the reflection layer [37].
In Machine Learning techniques, autonomicity is described as levels of automation.
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Level 0 is described as having no autonomic characteristics (data is provided by the
human developer), where level 4 (the highest autonomicity), is described as being
fully autonomic with no human interference [57].
2.2.3 Autonomic Developments
IBM’s Architectural Blueprint for Autonomic Computing (2003-2006) [1][47], pro-
vided a platform for corporations, researchers and developers to integrate autonomic
principles into existing systems or to consider those principles when designing fu-
ture systems.
In 2003, the Microsoft Corporation instigated its interest in autonomic comput-
ing with the Dynamic System Initiative (DSI). Window Server tools such a Resource
Management [58], promised to give more control over CPU and memory utilization
for managing storage area networks. NASA’s interest in Autonomic Computing
was evidenced by research conducted in 2005 regarding the ANTS (Autonomous
Nano-Technology Swarm) mission [59]. It proposed the use of autonomic proper-
ties to organize the behavior of swarms of pico-class satellites; self-configuration
(loss of communication for one satellite, causes its role to be switched to another
local satellite), self-optimization (collecting information on asteroids of particular
interest, reducing wasted resources), self-healing (if a satellite is lost due to environ-
mental forces, then it can be replaced by another), self-protection (collisions data
reported by individual satellites is shared with the rest of the group, therefore action
can be taken to adjust orbits and trajectories). In 2008, research conducted in [60],
proposed a method of organizing a Web service-based environment as a collection
of agent-based Web services with self-managing features. The autonomic manager
would be responsible for handling the ACL’s (Agent Communication Language)
messages from the agents and would guarantee the best web-service for the client.
Autonomic Management has also been investigated by Cloud Computing de-
velopers. In 2012, research carried out in [61], proposed that because Cloud sys-
tems are large scale and contain multiple distribution centres, they need to be au-
tomated and integrated with intelligent strategies for dynamic provisioning of re-
sources in an autonomic manner. In their Cloud system architecture, they introduce
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an Autonomic Management system to deal with resource provisioning, application
scheduling and security/attack detection. Cloud autonomics is the use of autonomic
computing to enable organizations to more effectively harness the power of cloud
computing. This is achieved by automating management through business policies.
Investigations written in an article in 2015 in [62], envision a future where sys-
tems are continuously monitored and if the environment goes out of compliance,
the autonomic manager is able to make necessary changes to bring it back in line.
With the ever-expanding scale of the Internet and new devices and technologies
being introduced in both wired and wireless environments, network management is
a continuing challenge to both industry and the academic world. Research proposed
in 2017 in [63], made the case for introducing autonomic system engineering into
networks (wired and wireless), and the implementation of self-managing functions
and self-adaptability. It introduces an Autonomic Network which contains AN’s
(Autonomic Nodes). Each AN provides a common set of capabilities across the
network called Autonomic Networking Infrastructure (ANI). The main goal is to ac-
quire self-knowledge, discovery, and the information needed for network operations
without external configuration. Research in [64], conducted an extensive survey on
the possibility of adapting autonomic principles for communication networks. For
network security management, autonomic self-protection and self-healing can be
deployed to enforce denial of service detection and defense, using the CPN (Cog-
nitive Packet Network) paradigm [64]. There is a comparison between traditional
security models (centralized) and autonomic system models (decentralized), where
the use of multiple agents can allow for the autonomic identification of irregular
network activity.
Social Networking has become popular as a means of initiating collaborative
work and a method of helping people maintain contacts and communicate up-to-
date information. However, it is not in real-time, as it does not rely on event trig-
gers to inform the interested parties. In 2018, research in [65], proposed a Generic
Autonomic Social-Collaborative Framework (GASCF) and an Autonomic Adapter
(AA), within the Health Care system. This framework can be used to implement
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a social-collaborative application that will enable self-managed and adaptive func-
tionality. Multiple AA’s will work in cooperation to monitor the systems behavior,
track changes and make any necessary changes to hardware and software resources,
or send notifications to network nodes. The objectives of this work, in providing
an autonomic framework, are similar to some of the research aims outlined in this
thesis, where a autonomic generic framework is proposed in Chapter 7.
The future development of Autonomic Computing is very much alive as an arti-
cle from car manufacturer Ford in 2018 proves [66]. The Ford company is working
with Autonomic, a Silicon Valley based company, to build an open cloud-based
platform, i.e. Transportation Mobility Cloud (TMC). This platform will be able to
manage information flow and basic transactions between a variety of components in
the transportation ecosystem (service providers, personalized cars, bicycles, pedes-
trians, transit systems and city infrastructure including parking and traffic light man-
agement). An example of TMC capabilities, is to employ real-time location updates
in cities to control traffic flow by dynamically rerouting cars to reduce congestion.
A city can ensure that no empty self-driving vehicles are driving on the most im-
portant arteries used by people during rush hour. Within the automotive industry
the use of customizing is now so well established that popular magazines such as
’CAR’ [67], regularly contains reports referring to a vehicle’s autonomy level as
between 1 and 5.
2.2.4 Organic Computing
Organic Computing [68][69], can be viewed as an extension of the autonomic vision
of IBM [1], as it also incorporates self-* management properties. It is a form of
biological inspired computing with organic properties. Organic Computing is based
on a large collection of autonomous systems, which are equipped with sensors and
actuators. Autonomic computing focuses on removing the human users from the
system control loop, whereas Organic computing emphasizes the interaction with
human users and respecting their needs.
Figure 2.6 shows the Organic System Controller [7]. The SUOC (System
under Observation and Control), contains a set of interacting elements and agents
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Figure 2.6: Organic Computing - System Controller [7].
which do not depend on the existence of an observer/controller. The Observer will
contain pre-processor, aggregator, data analyzer, predictor and log file. The Con-
troller contains mapping, action selector, history evaluation, goals, objectives, sim-
ulation model and adaption model.
Organic Computing has been the inspiration for software architectures such
as ORCA (Organic Robotic Control Architecture), developed by researchers in [8].
The ORCA architecture is built from Organic Computing Units (OCUs) and Ba-
sic Computing Units (BCUs). The characteristics of the ORCA architecture are
the scalability and flexibility to property changes of the constituent OCU and BCU
units. The BCUs, implement tasks concerned with the robot’s control. These tasks
can be defined as ’sensor’ processing, such as wheel motor movement, sonar sensor
control and robot arm control. OCUs on the other hand are responsible for moni-
toring the correct behavior of the BCUs and to influence their outputs or to change
their behavior in the case of malfunctions - see Figure 2.7.
Research presented later in this thesis concentrates on specific aspects of robot
control, including both sonar sensors and ’wheel’ motor movement. In Section
2.3.4, Organic Computing is explored further, regarding the research that has been
conducted in relation to fault handling in mobile robots.
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Figure 2.7: Schematic representation of standard ORCA architecture [8].
2.3 Autonomic Fault Handling in Mobile Robots
Mobile Robots are devices that rely on commands that provide instructions for ’mo-
tion’ and sensor data capture, that report the physical world around them. Mobile
robots can either operate in a closed environment such as an industrial factory or
hospital; or can operate remotely, such as a pipe inspection vehicle or as a planetary
rover. In the case of robots operating in remote regions, it may not be convenient
or possible to intervene in order to repair faults. A hardware fault like a damaged
wheel on a mobile or planetary robot, can disrupt mission objectives. NASA’s JPL
Center reported faults on all six wheels from the current Curiosity Rover Mission
on Mars [70]. Each of the six rubber wheel casings on the Rover had been punc-
tured by sharp rock material from the planet surface. Consequently, NASA’s Mis-
sion Control was forced to plan alternate routes for the Curiosity Rover, in order
to avoid certain rock types that had caused the damage to the wheels. Autonomic
computing implementation can help address the common failure modes found in
mobile robots. Planetary rovers would obvious recipients for implementation of
self-managing systems [71].
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2.3.1 Fault classification
Mobile robots like all mechanical devices, eventually succumb to some sort of hard-
ware fault or hardware defect. The severity of the fault will dictate the available
functionality that the mobile robot can provide. Typical faults for mobile robots
are loss of sensors, motorized faults, damaged wheels or power faults. A fault in a
system is a variance from the expected behavior of the system [72]. Faults can be
classed as follows:
• Permanent (which exists until repaired).
• Transient (which disappear on their own).
• Intermittent (which repeatedly appear).
Component faults don’t always show themselves as simply being non-
functional or disabled. In [31] , the authors use Evidence, Fault and Value nodes to
identify hardware faults, by recognizing changes in sensor data over time.
In research conducted in [73], robotic failures in relation to NASA missions
where investigated. They categorized systems failures as follows:
Wheel Failures - track slippage failures are a frequent occurrence. Self-
optimization can be applied to slow down the drive system and minimize further
damage.
Control System Failures - [73] stated that these are the most common types
of physical failure. If the robot became unresponsive, then recycling the operating
system was normally the best course of action to fix this type of issue.
Sensor Failures - the example given in [73], relates to video sensing, where a
remote robot could encounter an environment in which dirt particles could inhibit
the sensor. Using a self-repair protocols, where a simple sensor wash could re-
instate the sensor to full functionality.
Power Failures - when power is low, the autonomic properties engaged pro-
tocols that would redirect the robot to the nearest charging station. In the case of a
NASA mission, the robot would temporarily power down until the Sun would be in
a favourable position to allow a solar panel re-charge.
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Although investigations carried out in [73], identify key failure areas in mo-
bile robots, there is little to offer in terms of identifying the failure and processing
the data available, in-order to formulate a strategy to compensate for the error. In
Chapters 4 to 6 in this thesis, we offer case studies on hardware failures in mobile
robots. The key strategy for each case study, is Awareness (how is the failure/fault
identified?), Analysis (evaluating the extent of the problem through using historical
and current data) and Adjustment (Is it possible given the fault data, to establish an
compensation strategy to allow the mobile robot to continue to function?).
2.3.2 Fault Tolerance in Autonomic Computing
Traditionally Fault-tolerant systems in robots has become increasingly important
especially for robots that operate in remote or hazardous environments. In order
to perform tasks without human intervention, mobile robots would require the abil-
ity to tolerate and detect internal faults [74]. Many legacy and current systems
employ traditional fault tolerance approaches. However, with information systems
growing in size, many resources are now connected through complicated networks.
Systems configurations can change dramatically, even during real-time operations.
With information systems now seemingly boundary-less in nature, a single cen-
tralized system manager has become less feasible. Autonomic computing offers
managed units over a distributed network. Cooperation and collaboration can ex-
ist among ’computing’ units where there is no requirement for a centralized man-
agement mechanism. Autonomic Management systems can also share computing
power with different sites, even across enterprises [75].
In Research conducted in [76], implies that dependability and fault tolerance
can perhaps be aligned to AC’s principle for self-healing. However, systems that are
incorrectly configured and/or optimized inefficiently, are likely to lead to failures in
the future.
Fault Tolerance Control Systems (FTCS), are defined as control systems which
can automatically maintain the system stability and maintain an acceptable degree
of performance when component failures occur [77]. There are four main FTCS
principles:
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• Fault Detection: to detect that there is something wrong in the system and
that a fault has occurred somewhere.
• Fault Isolation: to decide which component is faulty and its location within
the system.
• Fault Identification: to identify the fault and how severely the fault will
affect the system.
• Fault Recovery: To adapt the system controller structure according to the
identified fault. To maintain the system’s stability and to continue to operate
at an acceptable performance level.
2.3.3 Autonomic Management for fault handling
As part of IBM’s original Autonomic concept, self-diagnosis and self-healing are of
particular importance when dealing with system problems. One of the main goals
was to create systems that could self-manage and take appropriate action when fac-
ing system failure [48]. Self-diagnosis is not only concerned with the discovery of
potential faults but also the severity and consequences relating to the fault. Self-
healing is concerned with recovery and repairing itself when dealing with unex-
pected faults. The main challenge in designing an autonomic system is that all
possible fault scenarios cannot be anticipated, it is preferable to design a system
that can detect and resolve problems at run-time [78].
Research conducted in [79], investigates that detection of abnormal behavior
in a sensor is not always sufficient evidence that the sensor is actually faulty. They
proposed to use correlation between sensors as an indication of failure. If one sensor
displays faulty behavior due to a faulty component, then is it reasonable to assume
the other sensor is not affected by the fault and its reported data still reflects the
robot’s behavior? However, the same cannot be said about correlated sensors that
share the same component, as both sensors can ultimately be affected by the same
fault. Research in [78], describes how robotic failure detection, failure recovery and
system reconfiguration can be achieved through their Distributed Integrated Affect
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Reflection Cognition (DIARC) architecture. Using an ADE (Architecture Develop-
ment Environment) multi-agent framework, they propose a system that can request
information about the current state of components within the network. If a failure
occurs, for example, in the navigation system, then they can locate a component to
take the place of the failed component.
In AC, self-healing is the ability to diagnose and re-configure system func-
tions, so that a degree of reliability is maintained. Autonomic Management can be
employed to orchestrate dealing with system failures. Giving the Autonomic Man-
ager more decision-making abilities will lessen the need for human intervention.
Investigations carried out in [9], proposed the idea of using an AC system to con-
trol current AACS (Autonomous Automatic Control Systems). Fault diagnosis and
mitigation’s are conducted at the control layers. They propose that policies are put
in place to deal with different types of robotic failure. In Figure 2.8, researchers
in [9], create a table of possible fault scenarios within different parts of the robotic
system. Depending on the ’cause’ of the fault and the ’type’ of fault discovered i.e.
(1) or (3) vehicle problems, (2) or (4) environmental conditions, they choose a pol-
icy that can handle that particular fault situation. Using an Autonomic Management
strategy, they apply the following autonomic policies:
Figure 2.8: Faults Diagnosed and Mitigated at the CONTROL layers [9].
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1. Autonomic Healing - self-healing is done by defining and isolating possible
faults, diagnoses and applying a mitigation plan at the control layer.
2. Autonomic Optimization - the implementation of self-optimization deals
with the efficiency and effectiveness of the AACS, in order to decrease the
energy consumption, e.g., applying a strategy that extends battery duration
and therefore energy consumption becomes critical in longer missions.
3. Autonomic Configuration - the implementation of self-configuration princi-
ples, deals with the adaption of AACS in order to improve requirements and
goals.
4. Autonomic Protection - the implementation of self-protection deals with in-
ternal and external AACS network security. Detection, anticipation and iden-
tification of attacks to guarantee high security at all times.
The arguments set out in [9], are effective in categorizing how to apply the AC
concepts to managing mobile robots and robotic systems. However, this is a high
level approach and there is no detail on how to systematically deal with faults in a
mobile robot; for example, one of their fault diagnoses policies discusses how in
discovering a hardware failure, they simply activate a redundant system to replace
the faulty one. Research conducted in this thesis, is concerned with analyzing the
performance of hardware components within a mobile robot and therefore creating
the conditions for anticipating hardware faults, rather than waiting for them to oc-
cur. If a fault is discovered, then several policies may be required to analyze and
implement a strategy to handle and compensate for the fault. However, research in
[9], does make some excellent arguments concerning energy efficiency; as part of
the case studies conducted in this thesis, there is in-depth analysis conducted on the
effects of lead-acid battery degradation on mobile robot tasks and performance.
In research carried out in [80], their proposal states that in order to handle faults
within a network, an implementation of an Autonomic Fault-Management (AFM)
control loop is used to assist network personnel. The AFM contained within a
network node would be responsible for detecting the presence of a fault, finding the
2.3. Autonomic Fault Handling in Mobile Robots 48
cause of the fault and finally, removing the root cause. To increase self-management,
they have formulated a set of criteria in which network personnel should be brought
into the loop, if the fault demands it.
• Criterion 1 (The AFM should raise an alarm if incidents reported on the net-
work exceed a predefined threshold).
• Criterion 2 (If the AFM manager is unable to resolve an incident, then this
situation should be escalated to network operation personnel).
• Criterion 3 (If an incident is reported but is unknown to the CS (Causality
Model) of the network, then Fault-Removal cannot be triggered and therefore
should be escalated to network personnel).
• Criterion 4 (The AFM cannot identify the root cause of a fault, then an alarm
should be raised to network personnel).
• Criterion 5 (The AFM should raise an alarm if the same type of incidents
are repeatedly being reported. This could indicate a failure in clearing down
reported faults. If this is the case, then network personnel should be notified).
• Criterion 6 (If the AFM executes a Fault-Removal and it fails, then this should
be escalated to the network personnel).
• Criterion 7 (An alarm should be raised by the AFM if a particular component
in the network has failed. This should be escalated to the network personnel).
Research conducted in [80], shows that Autonomic Management is not re-
stricted to only detecting/handling faults but also can prove to be a useful tool in
reporting to network personnel if the automated systems are not capable of deal-
ing with a fault. This is an interesting concept as Autonomic Management Systems
cannot possibly cover all aspects of fault handling. The ’human’ presence cannot be
entirely removed from the ’loop’ and therefore totally automated systems at present,
are not achievable.
2.3. Autonomic Fault Handling in Mobile Robots 49
Resource Management in mobile robots is important, especially for those
robots that operate remotely. Poor Resource Management can then lead to the
mobile robot developing faults or in a worst-case scenario, complete shutdown.
Research proposed in [10], presents a model-based, utility approach to autonomic
management of mobile robot resources. Mobile robots can be setup in various con-
figurations. Some configurations may reduce the time a robot has to complete tasks
before a battery recharged is required. Other configurations may require that the
robot has full connection to a wireless network. The Autonomic Manager is re-
sponsible for monitoring the state of the system, analyzing the current state, plan
changes required to achieve objectives and to execute these changes. Using various
Utility Functions, researchers in [10], attempted to make the best use of bandwidth
available to the mobile robot. The size of the bandwidth available, will determine
the amount of resources that the mobile robot can access. The autonomic manager
will select a particular Utility Function policy, which will result in greater band-
width being made available to the mobile robot.
Figure 2.9: Utility Function policies for controlling bandwidth resource [10].
Figure 2.9 shows how different Utility Function policies allow for different
uses of bandwidth. Depending on the task the robot needs to perform, certain com-
ponents are turned ’off’ so that band-width is preserved. If the bandwidth available
is low, then the robot is put into an operating mode in which the range of tasks it
can execute is significantly reduced.
Research carried out in [10], proposes a Autonomic Management system to
handle resource allocation for a mobile robot. This type of resource management is
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significant especially if the mobile robot is operating remotely. The research carried
out in Chapter 6 of this thesis, focuses on how a mobile robot can complete tasks
when dealing with battery degradation. If power resource is low, then some tasks
may not be achievable. Reducing the power required for other components within
the mobile robot will provide more resources to allow tasks to be completed.
2.3.4 Organic Computing - fault handling in robots
Although work conducted in this thesis is mainly concerned with Autonomic Com-
puting, much can be learned by investigating other fields such as Organic Comput-
ing (OC), which relates to this research. Using the architectural model ORCA [8],
first discussed in Section 2.2.4, research carried out in [81], shows how a robot sys-
tem can apply self-adaptive techniques even when faced with a major hardware fail-
ure. The ORCA architectural model was employed for developing hexapod robots.
The researchers in [81], experimented in developing a robot that could sense mal-
function within its leg support mechanism. In order to make fault detection more
adaptive, they introduced RADE (Robot Anomaly Detection Engine). If a servo in
one of the legs was showing a ’high’ current reading, then RADE could detect the
anomaly and report it as a malfunctioning leg. If a malfunction was detected, then
the robot was capable of initiating a leg amputation routine to discard the faulty leg:
a system re-configuration was performed, which would enable the hexapod robot to
continue with its mission despite losing a leg. Data was carefully analysed from the
robot’s individual ’leg’ components to establish if there was a possible fault. They
then used re-configuration algorithms to compensate for the missing limbs. The
research in [81], is very relevant to the work carried out in this thesis. One of the
main objectives common in all the case studies in this thesis, is to establish possi-
ble compensation algorithms, that will allow a mobile robot to continue to function
even with a faulty component or sensor.
2.4 Generic Autonomic Fault Architectures
Research conducted in this thesis is not only concerned with autonomic fault detec-
tion and handling, but also with the question of how common elements found in the
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experimental case studies, can be brought together to form a generic autonomic fault
architecture. This generic architecture is based on the MAPE-K Autonomic Archi-
tecture described in [1] and the IMD Architecture in [5] - (see Section 2.2.2.3). This
Section of the Literature Review discusses how researchers have applied the Auto-
nomic MAPE-K architecture to their field of work and identifies areas of published
work which are applicable to research carried out in this thesis.
2.4.1 Using and Adapting the Autonomic Model: MAPE-K
In remote areas, collaboration between mobile robots is particularly important. Re-
search in [82], has implemented autonomic control loops to coordinate actions
between different mobile robots. Using the MAPE-K control loop, knowledge is
passed between nodes (robots), such as vision processing and communication pro-
tocol. On each robot, the Autonomic Manager needs process data supplied locally
and information supplied as (knowledge) from the collective. Researchers in [82]
have employed the Autonomic model to great effect by creating a sensor network
using corroborative mobile robots. They can now monitor a large area using reduced
power capacity but at the same time, increasing performance.
Resources for Cloud computing are made available through networks or
through the internet itself. In Cloud Architectures, the cloud server will manage
and control all applications [34]. Research conducted in [11], shows how the Cloud
Controller implements a utility function that involves end-users and providers. The
key property of the Controller is robustness. The Controller needs to deal with ac-
tivities such as erratic workloads, resource congestion, multi-tier applications and
scalability. They have adapted the MAPE-K architecture (feedback Loop), as a
means of managing their Cloud System - see Figure 2.10.
Monitor workloads provided by applications, Analyse the input data as a
means to discover possible faults, Plan a strategy for initiating an action policy
for resource management, Execute the plan or policy for a specific platform and
incorporate any shared Knowledge. Research conducted in [11], shows how the
MAPE-K architecture can be incorporated into an existing Cloud architecture. This
gives the existing architecture a robustness and the ability to use feedback as a
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Figure 2.10: MAPE-K Control Loop for the Cloud [11].
means of error correction.
Smart Cites [83], are an example where Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
can provide a basic infrastructure for collecting information such as traffic flow,
pollution and weather monitoring, Research conducted in [12], shows that WSNs
are expected to be self-managing systems in order to tackle the increasing complex-
ity of modern-day smart environments. Research in [12], put forward a framework
based on the MAPE-K architecture as a means of self-healing sensor data supplied
online.
1. Monitoring - monitoring and analysis as a function of the monitoring pro-
cess. Monitoring collects data such as topology and configuration properties.
The Monitoring process is also responsible for collecting real-time readings
from sensors and retrieves historical data from previous sensor readings. The
Monitoring process uses a filter process to isolate the symptoms. If ’symp-
toms’ are found, then this information is passed to the Analyse stage.
2. Analyse - fault detection, diagnosis of faults and finally, classification of
faults. Sensor data received from the Monitor process is analyzed to detect
faulty readings. Symptoms are process and if changes are required, the fault
data is passed to the Plan stage.
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3. Plan - initiate system recovery and fix any outstanding faults as a function of
plan/execute. The Plan process determines an action plan to recover from the
fault. The Plan process can either take the form of a complex work-flow or it
might be as simple as a single command instruction.
4. Execute - alerts the user of changes to the system as a process of plan/execute.
The Execute process changes the behavior of the managed resource based on
the recommendations supplied by the Plan process.
Sensor data received from the Monitor process are analysed to identify fault read-
ings within the sensor data. In the case of a sensor reading being detected as faulty,
a shared Knowledge Base is implemented to classify the fault type. A fault model
relating to the classification, is initiated at the Plan stage. During this process, the
readings from faulty nodes are corrected. After the fault is diagnosed, the Analyze
process will update the Knowledge Base. The aim is to make sure all the sensors
across the framework are synchronized and consistent. The Analyse process will
then send self-healing requests to the Plan process. The Plan process will then de-
cide if appropriate action is needed to either heal the fault or to notify Users to take
any further action. Figure 2.11, shows how the researchers in [12] have adapted the
MAPE-K model for self-healing of sensor data within a WSN.
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Figure 2.11: The MAPE-K-based framework for self-healing of online sensor data [12].
Although research conducted in [12] relates to WSNs, the fundamentals em-
ployed for fault detection are also relevant to the work carried out in this thesis.
Using the Monitoring process and combined with historical data, the awareness of
a possible fault can be identified. When a fault is identified, a classification pro-
cess is used to identify what policy plan can be implemented to handle the fault.
The policy is executed in-order to correct the discovered fault. If a fault cannot be
healed, then the User is notified to take some action.
Aggregate Computing is a recently proposed framework to build CASs (Col-
lective Adaptive Systems). Research conducted in [13], presents a proposal to
bridge the gap between the MAPE autonomic manager and a fully distributed self-
organizing CASs. It presents an example model of collective-adaption that is built
around the concept of ensemble, which is a collection of autonomous agents which
collaborate to perform tasks. Each agent implements a MAPE loop that allows for
the interaction with other agents. Figure 2.12, shows how two agents can commu-
nicate via their MAPE loops. Each agent is in a Monitoring state, while executing
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its tasks and monitoring the environment through active handlers. If an issue is trig-
gered between agents (1) or an agent is asked to solve an issue (4), then the Analyze
state is activated. Based on the triggered issue, the corresponding Analyzer is called
(2) and (5). The Planning state is then activated, where all agents involved in the
issue provide a resolution process (Agents A and B). The best resolution is selected
(6), and the Execute process commits the request as being completed (7-9).
Figure 2.12: Collective Planning using the MAPE architecture [13].
Research in [13], has proposed the possibility of modelling CAS systems as an
aggregation of multiple MAPE loops. In future work, they propose to extend their
experiments by adopting the MAPE-K model, where the K (Knowledge) component
can be used to share knowledge among agents and therefore make more context-
aware decisions.
The generic fault autonomic architecture in this thesis, can be applied to the
operation of Cognitive Robots. A cognitive robot possesses the abilities to solve
problems, plan its own tasks and learn from experience just as intelligent systems
in nature do. Research conducted in [14], has put forward an plan for a robust
planning framework for cognitive robots. Using the MAPE-K architectural model,
their framework contains six modules - Planning module, Scene/Object module,
Execution module, Monitoring module, Reasoning module and Learning module.
These modules are connected to sensor and motor interfaces of a robot system - see
Figure 2.13.
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Figure 2.13: Robust Planning Framework for Cognitive Robots [14].
The Planning module constructs high-level plans for given tasks. It uses the
Knowledge Base to aid in the generation of valid plans. If a plan for a given state
is found, then the Execution module can execute the actions within the plan. The
Scene/Object module is responsible for updating the Knowledge Base, based on
data gathered from the environment. The Plan and Monitoring modules receive
information from the Execution module, which monitors the execution of the plan
and if appropriate, detects any failures. The Reasoning module reasons about any
failures that are discovered and alters the parameters of the failed action if required.
The Learning module is responsible for the robot to adapt itself based on experience
gained through actions and how the environment may be affected by those actions.
The research conducted in [14], shows that it is not always necessary to treat
the MAPE feedback back loop as one step after the next. After analyses, it may
be required to return back to the monitoring process if circumstances have changed
within the environment. Updating the Knowledge Base may result in parameter
changes and thus tolerance values to detect faults can also change. Tolerance Adap-
tion is an important part of the generic architecture proposed in this thesis. Toler-
ance values need to be dynamic so that faults are not reported unnecessarily.
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2.5 Summary
This Literature review set out to introduce the concept of Autonomic Computing
and how AC has developed over the years since its conception by IBM in 2001 [41].
The Autonomic Architecture (MAPE-K) has been reviewed as well as alternative
architectures such as Intelligent Machine Design (IMD) and Organic Computing.
Fault classification plays a key role in how faults are interpreted. By their
very complex nature, mobile robots will likely suffer some type of hardware failure
during their lifetime. With mobile robots that operate remotely, faults become par-
ticularly challenging, as these robots are not easily retrieved for repair (for example,
if the vehicle is a planetary rover), and the fault may affect how the robot performs
its tasks. The Autonomic Manager can provide a method for self-diagnosis and self-
healing. Using the autonomic MAPE-K feedback loop as a basis, many researchers
have developed various methods for detecting and handling fault scenarios. How-
ever, there is a noticeable lack of the employment of ’early detection’ methods. In
most research cases, there is a reaction to the fault, rather than a prediction that a
fault may occur. The use of the MAPE-K Knowledge Base is fundamental in using
historical and current data to establish if a fault has occurred or if a fault may be
pending.
Section 2.4.1 in this Literature review, examined how researchers have ex-
tended the MAPE-K architecture and integrated into their existing architectures. A
generic autonomic architecture can be implemented to handle general system ac-
tivities but also handle various types of violations and faults. A common theme
proposed by researchers are the use of policies to handle the various fault scenarios.
Detecting the fault is only part of the problem; finding a policy to compensate is a
key part, as this can restore the system to its original state or at least to a functioning
state. However, policies are only useful if the type of fault occurring is predictable.
Not all fault scenarios are possible to predict; therefore, policies need to be dynamic
so that they can process data that is produced by unpredictable faults.
One of the main objectives of this thesis, is to investigate and experiment with
faults scenarios within a mobile robot system through case studies. Common ob-
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servations and solution elements are then drawn from each case study and used to
design a generic autonomic fault architecture. The motivation here is to not only to
detect faults and provide compensation policies but also to highlight that designers
of mobile robots should endeavour to allow more programmatic access to compo-
nents within the robot, so that if a fault occurs, compensation strategies can be more
effective.
Chapter 3
Research Hypothesis and Method
This chapter presents the overall research directions of this work through guiding
Research Hypothesis. It also presents the method used to shed light on the guiding
research hypothesis.
3.1 Goals
1. Research the main attributes associated with the MAPE-K and IMD models
and establish if they do enough within the autonomic robotic community or
is there areas that can be improved upon.
2. Identify self-awareness (i.e. becoming aware), when establishing a fault sce-
nario within a mobile robot.
3. Using case study methods, identify common design patterns in-order to de-
velop an autonomic generic architecture for handling component faults in mo-
bile robots.
3.1.1 Design Patterns
What design patterns can be identified when defining a solution for fault detection,
analysis and compensation in mobile robots? A design pattern is a reusable solu-
tion to a recurring problem [84]. Re-usability: reusing existing knowledge from
previous designs can reduce development time and decrease complexity. Software
patterns can be applied at three levels: analysis level, design level and implementa-
tion level [85]. This type of design pattern configuration can be applied within the
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Methodology.
3.2 Research Method
3.2.1 Case Study Methodology
A case study methodology allows an investigation to be carried out relating to a
event within its real-life context. In this thesis, case study attributes are as follows:
Resources - are provided by a fully working robot (Pioneer P3-DX), which is
fitted with multiple sensors. The robot has an internal computer board which can be
assessed remotely in order to run tasks.
Units of Analysis - data from multiple tasks is used to establish if ’threshold’
values are exceeded. Using multiple tasks ensures that evidence gathered reflects
the behaviour of components and sensors accurately.
Generalization and Reliability - Through experimentation, establish that sen-
sors are reporting correct data. Compare the sensor results with established pa-
rameters, so that faults identified are legitimate. Validate ’fault’ data with actual
observations.
Internal Validity - establish patterns within and between each case study. Are
there distinct relationships in the results produced from each case study? It is im-
portant when developing a generic architecture to find common elements. The final
generic architecture, while performing its goals, must remain as simplistic as possi-
ble.
A successful case study demonstrates the potential of the generic architecture
in providing evidence of how faults in robots can be identified, analysed and if pos-
sible repaired. In this thesis, three case studies will be used assist the development
of an autonomic ’generic architecture’; each case study provides a component fault
scenario within a mobile robot. To validate the ’generic architecture’, a further case
study will be implemented. The case studies will form part of a 3 phased structure
- see Figure 3.1.
Creation Phase - the outline proposal of taking elements from the MAPE-K
and IMD models to create a new generic architecture.
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Evolutionary Phase - as each case study (1-3) is investigated, results from
using awareness, analysis and adjustment methods will contribute to developing
the autonomic generic architecture.
Validation Phase - will demonstrate how the fully formed autonomic generic
architecture can be applied to a further case study (4).
MAPE-K and IMD 
Case Study 1 
Generic Architecture V1 
Case Study 2 
Generic Architecture V2 
Case Study 3 
Generic Architecture V3 
Final Generic Architecture 








































Figure 3.1: The proposed autonomic generic architecture phase development using a case
study approach.
3.2.2 Generic Architecture (awareness)
In robotic research, the notion of self-awareness is still a major topic of discussion.
Can a machine develop self-awareness and by doing so, understand its environment,
be in control of its own actions and be responsible for those actions [86]? In research
carried out in [87], a self-simulator was created that allowed a robot arm to self-
model itself by collecting multiple trajectories, each comprising of one-hundred
pointers. The researchers in [87], deliberately created a 3D deformed part of the
arm and the robot was able to detect the ’change’ and re-train its self-model.
Self-awareness forms a fundamental part of the ’generic architecture’ re-
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searched in this thesis. In Autonomic computing, self-aware is a system’s ability to
’know itself’. A self-aware system must have knowledge of internal components,
their current status and their historical journey.
3.2.3 Generic Autonomic Fault Architecture (Creation Phase)
For the purposes of this thesis, the Generic Autonomic Fault Architecture will be
referenced as AIFH (Autonomic Intelligent Fault Handling) architecture.
The AIFH (Autonomic Intelligent Fault Handling) architecture developed for
this research takes elements from the MAPE-K and IMD architectures. The MAPE-
K architecture can be modified so that subsets of monitor, analyse, plan and execute
functions can be utilized [1]. The AIFH architecture can also adapt attributes from
the IMD architecture. The IMD architecture uses a layer design but only the Routine
layer and Reaction can communicate with the sensors and effectors. Knowledge is
only accessible through the Reflection layer [5] - see Fig. 3.2.
AIFH Architecture MAPE-K Architecture IMD Architecture 
Figure 3.2: AIFH Architecture contains attributes from both the MAPE-K [1] and IMD
models [5]
In Section 3.1, a research question was proposed ”Does the MAPE-K and IMD
models do enough to guide the development of autonomic systems for robots or can
they be improved upon?”. The MAPE-K architecture follows a series of steps -
monitor, analyze, plan and execute (using a feedback loop), which could form the
basis of a fault-management architecture. However, does simply monitoring events
and declaring an incident fulfil the demands for an autonomic system? The IMD
architecture uses ’intelligence’ in its decision making in terms of reflection. There-
fore, to attain the desired autonomic performance, intelligent monitoring would be
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preferable. Not only are reactive incidents reported but also trends in component
behavior is also reported. If a component or sensor can be identified as a possible
risk to the robot’s operational status, then this could prevent a system failure in the
field. Therefore, in this thesis, intelligent monitoring will aid in answering the ques-
tion, ’Becoming ’aware’, what does it mean and how does it work?’. In other words,
not simply reporting a fault but making intelligent decisions about impending faults.
3.2.4 SDLC Methodology
To design the generic architecture, the SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle)
methodology will be applied within each of the case studies (see Chapters 4, 5
and 6). SDLC promotes a well-structured approach to defining each stage of the
case study. SDLC is a standard process of the methodology to structure all steps
necessary to analyse, design, implement and test the system. In general, SDLC
methodology contains the following steps:
1. The system requirements are defined. In particular, what goals are expected
and what resources are needed to achieve those goals.
2. The proposed system is designed. The plans are laid out for the architec-
tural design and what operating systems, software programming and report-
ing mechanisms are required. Design patterns identified.
3. The system is implemented. Analysis performed on collected data by devel-
oping specialized Algorithms.
4. The system is tested. The analysed data is evaluated to produce reports and
specialized algorithms are developed that can alter system parameters if re-
quired.
5. The system is evaluated. Test results should be evaluated for consistency.
Have the goals laid out in the requirements been achieved? What lessons
where learned during the SDLC process?
The main objective in each case study is to develop the AIFH basic model
(see Fig. 3.2), into an autonomic generic architecture that can be used to handle
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component faults in a mobile robot. The case studies are specific to certain systems
within a mobile robot. The first case study is centred around the drive system of
the robot and how a wheel fault can affect navigation objectives. The second case
study is centred around object detection sensors; this case study explores how faults
in sonar sensors can limit the ability of the robot to detect objects. The third case
study is centred around the power resource within the mobile robot; this case study
examines how degradation in the battery power supply can affect how the robot
performs in completing its tasks. Using the SDLC Methodology, each case study
will be laid out as follows:
Requirements: - sets outs the research objectives for the case study and what
goals are to be achieved. The fault scenario (experiment), is explained and what sys-
tems in the robot will be affected. Laboratory setup is explained and what parame-
ters are used to carry out the experiment. Resources required for the experiment are
identified, i.e. hardware and software requirements.
Design: - will show the outline design of the generic architecture and how it
can be applied to evaluating sensor data from a mobile robot. How the evolution of
the AIFH model can identify design patterns and layers within the architecture can
be identified.
Implementation: - shows how data from the sensor/effector/power system
data can be monitored and therefore implement self-awareness. The development
of specialized algorithms to process the data and evaluate the extent of the fault.
Testing/Evaluation: - When the fault data has been analysed, test strategies
can be implemented to establish a method of compensation for the fault. Evaluating
the results will establish if the case study objectives have been achieved.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter, the Goals of the thesis research where identified. The Research
Method chosen was based on case study Methodology. The case study phases
where identified so that the autonomic generic architecture can be developed as each
case study is completed. The basic generic architecture was designed based on the
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MAPE-K and IMD architectural models. Finally, SDLC Methodology is proposed
as means to develop each case study. SDLC offers a well-structured approach, as it
defines each stage of the case study. Chapters 4 - 6 will contain a unique case study
for a fault scenario within a mobile robot. These case studies will help to contribute
to the final Autonomic Generic Architectural design explored in detail in Chapter 7.
Chapter 4
Self-Adaptive Mobile Robot Wheel
Alignment - Case Study
4.1 Introduction
Physical failures in mobile robots can affect hardware components such as effec-
tors, sensors, power units and communication. Section 2.3 discussed Autonomic
Fault Handling and showed how self-diagnosis was concerned with discovery and
evaluation of a fault and self-healing was concerned with recovery and repair from
a fault. In this Chapter, a case study is presented which involves the processing of
sensor data and how that data is interpreted as an indication of a hardware fault. The
case study research example, shows how a fault in the wheel component of a mo-
bile robot can affect how the robot performs regarding dead reckoning. Using the
AIFH autonomic model as a base (see Section 3.2.3), the architecture is expanded
to handle hardware fault diagnosis in mobile robots. Processes are implemented to
establish if a fault exists (Awareness), evaluate the extent of the fault (Analysis) and
finally, to compensate for the fault (Adjustment). These processes are put in-place
so that the mobile robot can still perform at an operational level.
Wheel Fault detection in mobile robots has been the subject of some investi-
gation. Research conducted in [88], shows how wheel faults on mobile robots can
be detected using LMN’s Local Model Networks. Comparisons are made between
the actual wheel parameter output with the LMN model output. If the values are
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significantly different, then the presence of a wheel fault is greatly increased. The
use of a Kalman Filter for detecting wheel faults is explored by researchers in [89].
They can detect when a mobile robot is experiencing wheel slippage, due to contact
with an object in the local environment. Research conducted in [90], explores the
use of mathematical models to generate residuals. The mathematical model of a
system process is run in parallel to the real system generated by the robot itself.
The difference between the measured process variable and the variable estimated
through the mathematical model, provides the residual values; the goal is to detect
faults as early as possible and provide the User with an adequate warning. Further
research conducted in [91], explores the use of multiple robots that implement a
common shared co-operation algorithm to track the trajectory of individual robots.
The trajectory of the robots is verified using beacons placed within the area in which
the robots operate. If the trajectory of a robot does not follow the desired path, then
a fault is declared against the offending robot. However, their research has yet to
develop a compensation strategy for the estimated fault.
Although there has been considerable research in the detection of wheel faults
on mobile robots, there is very little research concerning the application of the Au-
tonomic Model to detect wheel faults. There is also a lack of research conducted
in the form of compensating for wheel damage in a mobile robot when a fault is
detected. For the case study presented in this Chapter, wheel faults are introduced
into real robots and handled using the Autonomic Management approach.
This case study is organized as follows: Section 4.1.2 describes how the Re-
search Methods is implemented by utilizing the SDLC (Software Development Life
Cycle) model. Section 4.2 presents Conceptual Requirements which describe the
Research question, goals and resources needed to complete the case study. Section
4.3 presents the Conceptual Design and describes how the Autonomic Manage-
ment System has been adapted to provide self-awareness, self-analysis and self-
adjustment, when dealing with mobile robot faults. Section 4.4 presents Imple-
mentation of the wheel alignment fault scenarios and how Awareness, Analysis and
Adjustment have been used to evaluate and compensate for a fault. Section 4.5
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demonstrates through testing, how the compensation algorithm for the wheel align-
ment fault performs; results from the testing are then analyzed. Section 4.6 presents
an evaluation of the case study. Section 4.7 concludes the case study with a sum-
mary statement.
4.1.1 Introducing the basic AIFH model
The AIFH architecture consists of two sections: the System Manager and the Au-
tonomic Manager. The System Manager provides the communications between the
hardware components (i.e. sensors and effectors), to the Autonomic Manager. The
System Manager also provides the interface between the robotic system and the
human interface. The Autonomic Manager contains 3 main elements: Awareness,
Analysis and Adjustment. Each of these elements are connected via a feedback loop
which orchestrates the flow of data within the Autonomic Manager. As each case
study is developed, the AIFH architecture will evolve, as different fault patterns are
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Figure 4.1: The basic AIFH model.
4.1.2 Research Method
The SDLC model approaches solving a given problem in well-defined steps. Figure
4.2 shows how the SDLC Model can be applied to the Autonomic Self-Adaptive
Robot Wheel Alignment case study.
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Requirements  Design  Implementation Testing 
Research Question:  can 
Autonomic Management  
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made?.   
Figure 4.2: SDLC Model used in the research methodology for Autonomic Wheel Align-
ment
For the purpose of this case study, the SDLC model from Figure 4.2 is em-
ployed. SDLC model ensures that all the work carried out within the case study is
documented and results generated.
• Requirements - lays out the broad research objectives of the particular case
study. It is a detailed investigation of the system and is carried out in ac-
cordance to the objectives proposed. It involves a detailed study of various
operations performed by the system and their relationships within and out-
side the system [92]. To develop the research question successfully, physical
components such as the Pioneer P3-DX robot and LMS 200 laser are required.
The robot will also require wheels that are in optimal condition and wheels
that are damaged (damaged wheels are achieved by altering the internal foam
structure of the robot wheel, thereby causing the effect of a ’flat’ tyre).
• Design - based on the information collected at the requirements stage. The
logical system design is arrived at as a result of system analysis and how it
is converted into physical system design. The SDLC process moves from the
what in the requirements phase to the how in the design phase [92]. For this
case study, the design is concerned with applying the Autonomic Model to
handle how the robotic system can adapt to the discovery of a component
fault. In Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3, the initial concept of the AIFH architecture
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was introduced. In this case study, the findings accumulated in the autonomic
wheel alignment research, will provide a means to develop the AIFH archi-
tectural model. The layers contained in the AIFH architecture are Awareness,
Analysis and Adjustment. Self-Awareness is the most important, as it is an
indicator to the mobile robot autonomic manager that there is a fault within
the system. Self-Analysis is used to evaluate the extent of the fault. Self-
Adjustment takes the analyzed data and applies a specialized algorithm to
compensate for the fault.
The design phase is also concerned with how a State Machine design, which
is based on the MRDS (Microsoft Robotics Development Studio) CCR (Con-
currency Co-ordination Runtime) [58], can be implemented to handle the
complicated process of fault analyses and fault compensation on the mobile
robot.
• Implementation - the system design needs to be implemented to make it a
workable system. To create the wheel alignment experiment, the robot is first
fitted with two wheels working at optimal performance. The robot tasks are
performed, and the wheel alignment data is collected. The second phase of
the experiment involves fitting the robot with a damaged wheel. The robot
tasks are then run again, and the wheel alignment data is collected. In this
case study, programming is implemented to allow the Autonomic Manager
access to the sensor data in the AIFH Knowledge Base. Further programming
is implemented to evaluate any fault data that supplied by the Monitoring
process. When the fault has been identified, then additional programming is
required for formulate a possible compensation strategy.
• Testing/Evaluation - involves system integration and system testing of the
programs and procedures coded at the implementation phase. Testing is a
method of testing the system against the requirements and design. For this
case study, testing will involve evaluating the P3-DX robot on how wheel
alignment performs with ’no wheel damage’ and ’with wheel damage’. Test
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Strategy:
1. Run the robot tasks with the robot fitted with two fully operational
wheels.
2. Does the robot arrive at the expected destination when operating with
no wheel damage?
3. Is the wheel alignment data for the ’no wheel damage’ test, within tol-
erance values?
4. Does wheel alignment data suggest that there could be a possible wheel
fault in the future?
5. Run the robot tasks with the robot fitted with one damaged wheel.
6. Does the robot arrive at the expected destination when fitted with a dam-
aged wheel?
7. How much is the alignment tolerance value compromised with the robot
fitted with a damaged wheel?
8. With the wheel alignment fault identified, run the robot tasks using the
compensation algorithm.
9. Is the wheel alignment data for the ’wheel damage’ test, within tolerance
values?
10. How did the compensation algorithm perform when adapting intervals
during the robot tasks?
4.2 Conceptual Requirements
The Requirements phase in a SDLC model is the most crucial step in creating a suc-
cessful case study. Requirements define the problem, objectives and the resources
needed to complete the study.
4.2. Conceptual Requirements 72
4.2.1 Research Question
4.2.1.1 Goals
Using AIFH model (see Fig. 3.2), as a baseline, the AIFH architecture is further
developed in this case study to establish if an autonomic architecture can be used to
detect and compensate for robot component faults.
• Awareness - can Monitoring past and present experimental data, allow the
Autonomic Manager the ability to decide if there is a wheel fault on the robot?
• Awareness - can Monitoring past and present experimental data highlight any
trends that the wheel alignment data may be suggesting an impending fault?
• Analysis - can Analysis provide the means to establish the extent of the fault?
• Adjustment - can Planning/Execute provide a policy that will compensate
for the fault in the wheel component?
4.2.1.2 The Experiment
Using the Pioneer P3-DX robot fitted with the LMS 200 laser. The LMS 200 laser
is used to measure the distance from the P3-DX robot to the laboratory wall. The
laser is important in this experiment as it can accurately measure distance values
and therefore wheel alignment values can be calculated.
In laboratory conditions, the robot is driven on a parallel course at a fixed dis-
tance from the wall for not more than 2 meters. This robot is then turned 180 ° and
the procedure is then repeated several times. Before the robot begins each ’run’,
the laser is used to record the distance the robot is from the laboratory wall. This is
repeated when the robot comes to a stop and before it is rotated for the next run. The
distance data collected by the laser component, is stored on a database for analysis.
The first experiment is conducted with both wheels on the robot are fully opera-
tional - data is then collected and ’wheel alignment’ performance is then evaluated.
The second experiment is conducted with the robot fitted with one damaged wheel.
Fitting the mobile robot with one damaged wheel is significant, as it shows how a
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wheel fault will affect wheel alignment performance. The third experiment is con-
ducted using a slightly damaged wheel. This experiment is concerned with flagging
to the User or Mission Control, of a possible impending fault. Although the wheel
alignment data will be within tolerance values, the aim of the experiment is to show
that even slight changes to wheel alignment readings could mean a possible wheel
fault in future operations.
4.2.2 Resources required
4.2.2.1 Hardware setup
Experiments carried out in this case study are conducted using a Pioneer P3-DX
robot. The Pioneer P3-DX robot has two independent drive wheels, plus an addi-
tional caster wheel for stability. The internal drive uses a Proportional Integrated
Derivative (PID) system with wheel encoder feedback to adjust a pulse-width mod-
ulation (PWD) at the internal motor drivers to control the power to the motors [93]
- see Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Pioneer P3-DX research mobile robot.
The P3-DX mobile robot is fitted with an LMS 200 Laser. The LMS 200 is a
laser that is capable of measuring distances out to 80m over a 180° arc. The sensor
operates by shinning a laser via a rotating mirror. As the mirror spins, the laser
scans 180° , effectively creating a fan of laser light. Any object that breaks this fan,
reflects laser light back to the sensor. Distances are calculated based on how long
the laser light takes to bounce back to the sensor - see Figure 4.4.




Figure 4.4: (a) The LMS 200 Laser has 180 ° field of view. (b) The laser creates a fan of
laser light that scans from right to left. (c) Objects are detected by breaking the
laser fan projection.
4.2.2.2 Laboratory setup
For the laboratory experiment (as described in 4.2.1.2), the P3-DX robot is setup
parallel to the laboratory wall. The laboratory wall is used as a reference marker.
The LMS laser fitted on the P3-DX robot is used to measure the distance the robot
is from the laboratory wall. In Figure 4.5, points A1 and A2 represent the distance
(using the laser), the robot begins a task from the wall. Points B1 and B2 represent
the distance the robot is from the wall at the end of the task. The tolerance value is
set and stored in a database for reference when tasks are executed. If the B2 value
exceeds the tolerance limit, then this would represent a wheel alignment fault.
B2 







Figure 4.5: Pioneer P3-DX wheel alignment laboratory setup.
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4.3 Conceptual Design
The Requirements in Section 4.2 have provided a mechanism to fulfil the case study
experiment. This Section is concerned with conceptual design and how the auto-
nomic principles can be applied to dealing with ’wheel alignment faults’.
4.3.1 Developing the AIFH Architecture for wheel alignment
fault handling
Using the basic AIFH architecture introduced in Figure 4.1, the Autonomic Man-
ager and System Manager are expanded to form the elements required to process
faults in mobile robots. The three processes discussed in Section 4.1.1, Awareness,
Analysis and Adjustment, are arranged in 3 layers. The Autonomic Manager man-
ages the communication between each layer and how the knowledge base is shared.
In the MAPE-K architecture [1], the Autonomic Manager implements an intelligent
control loop that is made up of four parts. Each part communicates and collaborates
with one another and share appropriate data (knowledge). For the AIFH (Auto-
nomic Intelligent Fault Handling) model, two separate control loops are required -
Reactive Loop and Proactive Loop.
• Reactive Loop - this control loop is concerned with making decisions based
on the current component state. The Reactive Loop is initiated by the Sys-
tem Manager, as tasks are been carried out by the robot. The Reactive Loop
passes through each Layer within the Fault Handling Architecture. This con-
trol loop is responsible for passing fault data between each layer. Finally, the
Reactive Loop will communicate and provide data to the System Manager, if
task adjustments are required to compensate for a fault.
• Proactive Loop - this control loop is concerned with processing historical
data with current data. The Proactive Loop can make decisions based on
performance trends from sensors and effectors. This control loop is based in
the Awareness Layer and reports unusual readings to the User Interface which
is based in the System Manager.
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Figure 4.6: Autonomic Management System for Wheel Alignment case study.
Figure 4.6 shows the Autonomic Manager and System Manager for the Wheel
Alignment case study. The System Manager is responsible for handling task pa-
rameters, sensor control and effector control. While the System Manager is running
a task, the distance readings taken by the LMS 200 laser (from the mobile robot
to the laboratory wall), are recorded into a database as Knowledge. As each task is
completed, the Autonomic Manager Reactive control loop is executed. The distance
data contained in the database table provides the Autonomic Manager with ’knowl-
edge’ of how the robot is performing regarding its wheel alignment accuracy. The
Awareness Layer is responsible for checking the distance readings from each task
against a known tolerance value (stored in the database and calculated when setting
up the laboratory experiment - see Section 4.2.2.2). If the robot alignment data is
above expected tolerance value, then the task data is passed to the Analysis Layer.
The Proactive control loop that is initiated in the Awareness Layer, will process dis-
tance readings that are within tolerances but are showing a trend that may suggest
that a fault may be impending. These ’suspect’ readings are flagged to the System
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Manager User Interface. The Analysis Layer is responsible for evaluating fault data
sent by the Awareness Layer. The Analysis Layer uses policies contained in the
knowledge base to establish the how much the robot has strayed from its expected
destination; this is known as the error offset angle value. The data gathered in the
Analysis Layer is then passed to the Adjustment Layer. In the Adjustment Layer,
the angle of turn value is then calculated. The angle of turn is important as it pro-
vides the mobile robot a rotation angle value that will allow the robot to slew back
towards its intended path. The Adjustment Layer uses a wheel alignment compen-
sation policy from the knowledge base, which implements the angle of turn value.
This policy (algorithm), adapts a stop-rotate strategy to allow the robot to slew back
towards its intended path. The System Manager uses the fault compensation data
from the Adjustment Layer to control the robot’s movement via the effectors.
The Autonomic Management System for the Wheel Alignment case study
shows how autonomic self-awareness, self-analysis and self-adjustment is integral
in establishing if there is a fault in the wheel alignment of the mobile robot. It is
important that the robot is Aware that there could be a possible fault and that it re-
quires investigation. Self-awareness is also key, as it not only reports faults that are
obvious (like a severely damaged wheel) but it also reports any subtle changes in the
wheel alignment data that could predict a possible fault in the future. With a wheel
alignment fault identified, then the autonomic self-adjustment process is important
for the robot to continue to function. When the fault data has been analysed, then
this data can then be applied to a compensation policy. The compensation policy is
dynamically designed so that various faults scenarios can be handled depending on
the severity of the wheel damage. When the compensation policy is applied to the
wheel alignment fault, then the System Manager will initiate the autonomic reactive
control feedback loop and therefore will trigger the Awareness Layer to check that
the robot is within expected tolerance values.
4.3.2 State Machine
Software development for this case study was carried out using the MRDS frame-
work. MRDS is a service-oriented programming model that allows the creation of
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asynchronous and state-driven applications [94]. Code implementation is carried
out using the C# language in Microsoft Visual Studio. Database work was engi-
neered using Microsoft SQL Server and User defined stored procedures. To create
the robot tasks for the case study, requires the design of an event driven and state-
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Figure 4.7: State Machine Design for the case study Wheel Alignment Error.
In the MRDS framework, as each state is executed, transitions are added.
These transitions are triggered by notifications received from Partner services [95].
The System Processing ’state’ (see Figure 4.7), is executed after the robot has com-
pleted a series of tasks. If necessary, the System Processing can initiate the ’Wheel
Alignment Adjustment’ state.
4.3.3 Knowledge Base - applied to AIFH
In IBM’s Autonomic Blueprint [47], Knowledge source is described as containing
different data types such as symptoms, policies, change requests and change plans.
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This knowledge can be stored and shared among autonomic managers. For auto-
nomic fault handling, knowledge base is important not only to store historical data
but also, data such as tolerance values, real-time component data, adjustment poli-
cies and symptoms. In research conducted in [96], they use the Knowledge Base to
store Recovery Patterns. When a component failure occurs, the autonomic will then
select the appropriate recovery pattern(s) to compensate for the fault. Knowledge-
based approaches can use SDG (Signed Direct Graph), to represent the topology
of the robotics system. Faulty expressions can be associated with both hardware
and software faults. These expressions can be represented as nodes such as sensors,
actuators and feed-back. Each node stores a value and a limit/above within the node
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Figure 4.8: Knowledge Base - how knowledge is partitioned to reflect autonomic fault han-
dling in a mobile robot.
Figure 4.8 shows how the knowledge base can be implemented in autonomic
fault handling for a mobile robot. Sensors data (provided by the System Manager),
is filtered by the Autonomic Manager, so only relevant information is available to
the knowledge base.
• Real-time data - is available to the Awareness Layer, so that any anomalies in
the data can be quickly identified.
• Tolerance Values - these values are used by the Awareness Layer to check
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that sensor data is within threshold limits. Tolerance Values can also be up-
dated by the Analysis Layer if behavior changes require threshold limits to be
adjusted.
• Dynamic Parameters - used to compare a component value with a ’dynamic’
value stored in the Knowledge Base. If they are equal, then action can be
taken within the Awareness Layer or Analysis Layer.
• Historical Data - over time, sensor data is recorded into the Knowledge Base
for evaluation. This data can be used to evaluate the performance of each
sensor as the robot completes its tasks.
• Symptoms - if sensor readings are trending towards tolerance limits, then
’symptoms’ data can be stored here and made available to the User Interface
or Mission Control, to alert of possible impending faults. ’Symptoms’ data is
the responsibility of the Awareness Layer.
• Policies - these are specialized algorithms used to analyze data that has been
flagged in the Awareness Layer to indicate a possible fault. The policies con-
tained in the Analysis Layer can evaluate the extent of the fault. This ’evalu-
ated’ data is then passed to the Adjustment Layer. The policies contained in
the Adjustment Layer are used to compensate to the fault.
4.4 Implementation
The Conceptual Design in Section 4.3 provided the architectural Autonomic Model
for handling the alignment fault. The Implementation Section will show how the
fault data is analyzed and how an adjustment algorithm can be formulated to com-
pensate for the fault.
4.4.1 Robot Task Data Evaluation
Using User input values, the robot performs a series of tasks. The readings from
each task are recorded in the SQL database. After a series of tasks are completed,
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the evaluation algorithm is executed to establish if the data received is within tol-
erance limits. This evaluation algorithm contains a Standard Deviation equation
(non-grouped data), which produces a performance value that can be compared to
the expected tolerance value. Table 4.1 shows testing carried out using the P3-DX
robot and LMS laser finder. Test Scenario A represent the robot operating with both
drive wheels at optimal performance. Test Scenario B represents the robot operat-
ing with one damaged wheel. A ’damaged’ wheel is simulated by removing some
of the inner packing structure of the wheel. The means the wheel cannot support
the robot fully and causes the robot to slew to one side.
Table 4.1: Pioneer P3-DX wheel alignment testing - the numbers represent the amount in
millimetres (mm) that the robot was from its required destination point, after
each task.
Pioneer P3DX Wheel Alignment Testing
Test Scenario A: for a Robot with two wheels in optimal condition (tasks 1-50) SD
1-10 2 9 -9 -4 -5 -7 -22 -7 -6 -5
11-20 -8 -13 -13 11 -14 4 -13 2 -6 -6
21-30 3 -11 -12 -10 4 -10 9 -11 -4 -2 8.57
31-40 -5 -10 -8 2 -7 -12 3 -5 -14 10
41-50 6 -2 -7 4 -13 5 8 3 -4 7
Test Scenario B: for a Robot with one slightly damaged wheel (tasks 51-60) SD
51-60 -35 -49 -56 -61 -54 -69 -55 -64 -31 -45 12.16
Significant changes to the standard deviation (SD) value shown in Table 4.1
indicated that there was an error with the ’wheel alignment’ on the Pioneer P3-
DX robot. The Autonomic Manager (Monitoring) process identifies that there are
significant changes in the SD values by comparing the SD Tolerance value set in
the Tolerance database table with the SD value produced by the robot tasks. Using
the Autonomic Manager, the robot is now Aware that there is a fault in the ’wheel
alignment’ functionality. Figure 4.9, shows the path of the robot over a predefined
distance using (a) where both wheels are at optimal performance and (b) where one
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Figure 4.9: Graph (a) shows the path of the robot with both wheels at optimal performance.
Graph (b) shows the path of the robot with one wheel in a damaged state.
The ’Error Offset’ value can be used as part of the parameters required to cal-
culate the angle of error value. The consequences of this fault are that the robot will
not arrive at its expected destination point and thus will inhibit any tasks assigned to
the robot. Now that the robot is slewing away from its expected destination point, to
correct the alignment error, the robot will need to adjust its heading ’angle’ at cal-
culated intervals during its journey. To achieve this, the robot would travel a certain
distance, stop, then turn itself back toward the expected path, then move forward
again.
4.4.2 Wheel Alignment Error Evaluation
Now that an alignment error has been established in Section 4.4.1, analysis is re-
quired to define the extent of the error. In-order to slew the robot back towards its
destination path, then the angle error value is required. The angle error value is












Figure 4.10: The Pioneer P3DX robot with a damaged wheel: this caused to the robot to
slew to the right. A1 to A2 represents the expected distance the robot should
be from the wall. B1 to B2 represents the average distance the robot was offset
from the expected destination point.
Using the values take from Test Scenario B (see Table 4.1), an average distance
from which the robot was from the expected destination is calculated. Using a
Right-Angled Triangle equation (see (4.1)), the angle between the Hypotenuse side
and the Opposite side is calculated (see Figure 4.10). The angle of error value



















Robot path (with damaged wheel) 
P 
Figure 4.11: Represents how the angle of turn is calculated for robot alignment error com-
pensation.
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The angle of turn calculation is established using the values represented in Fig.
4.11. The R1, R2 and R3 represent the robot’s position during its journey. When
the robot reaches the position I (interval), the robot is commanded to stop. Angle
AE represents the angle of the wheel alignment error calculated in Fig. 4.10. The
AE angle value is then doubled. The reasoning behind this is that twice the AE
values are required to bring the robot back to the expected path. The (2*AE) value
is then divided by the number of intervals at which the robot is required to stop. The
angle AA represents the angle of turn needed to allow the robot to re-establish the
expected journey path marked as P. The robot heading angle is then adjusted, the
robot is turned on its axis according to the angle of turn AA, see equation (4.2).






The more intervals (when the robot stops and adjusts its direction of travel),
the more accurate the robot journey will be in terms of keeping to the original path.
In equation (4.3), the interval distance is represented by ID and total distance is





There is now enough data collected in Section 4.4.2 and Section 4.4.3 to com-
pose an compensation algorithm for implementation. Algorithm 1, shows the robot
task parameter data required (distance and number of intervals). If the robot ’error
offset’ value is greater than the tolerance range then the value of the ’angle error’
is calculated. As the robot is running its tasks, the robot will stop at the predefined
interval value and then rotate towards its original destination path. This will repeat
until the robot has reached its destination point.
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ALGORITHM 1: Robot Wheel Alignment Fault Compensation
Input: offsetValue = how far the robot is from expected destination point.
toleranceRange = if this value is exceeded, then an error has
occurred
ni = number of required intervals
dis = distance for robot to travel
id = interval distance
Output: The angle of adjustment required (AngleO f Ad justment) to turn
the robot when an interval.
cd = current distance traveled by robot
id = dis/ni
if (o f f setValue >toleranceRange) then
AlignmentErrorAngle (ae) = sinθ(RightAngle− equation);
Angleo f Ad justment (aa) = 2∗ae/ni;
end
while cd <dis do
Adjust the Robot direction at interval setting (id);







4.4.4 Wheel Alignment Data Trending
The Awareness Layer (discussed in Section 4.3.1), is not only responsible for de-
tecting wheel alignment errors but also to highlight alignment data that may suggest
that there could be possible wheel fault in the future. The Awareness Layer initi-
ates the Proactive control loop to handle this process (see Fig. 4.6). If action can
be taken before a fault actually occurs in real-time, then this could have a positive
effect on mission objectives and resources.
Using a slightly damaged wheel on the Pioneer P3-DX, it is possible to create
wheel alignment data that is significantly different to the normal wheel alignment
data (no wheel damage) but still within tolerance levels.





Figure 4.12: This chart shows the how wheel alignment data for a slightly damaged wheel
can be used to signify a possible impending fault.
Figure 4.12 shows wheel alignment experiments carried out on the P3-DX
robot. Experiments 1 and 2 are conducted using two fully working wheels with no
reported damage. Experiment 3 is conducted with a slightly damaged wheel fitted
to the robot. There are significant changes in the alignment data for experiment 3
compared to experiment 1 and 2 - but not severe enough to signify a tolerance fault
warning.
As part of the Autonomic Manager (Awareness Layer), evaluation of this wheel
alignment data provides Users (mission operations), the ability to decide if a course
of action is required in terms of mission objectives or indeed to replace hardware
components.
4.5 Demonstration (testing)
In Section 4.4 the implementation of the Autonomic Wheel Alignment process
showed how analysis was able to calculate the extent of the alignment fault and
how further calculation performed (see Algorithm 1), provided a means for com-
pensating for the fault. This Section shows how the wheel alignment compensation
algorithm affects the performance of the mobile robot tasks.
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4.5.1 Using intervals in the fault compensation policy
When the mobile robot has engaged the fault wheel alignment compensation policy,
then strategy needs to be formulated for how many intervals are required for the
robot to complete its tasks. An interval is defined as the point where the robot
is stopped and turned on its axis back towards its expected route path. In Table
4.2, the number of intervals will dictate the value of the Adjustment angle and the
maximum offset value.
Table 4.2: Comparing offset values using a given number of intervals
Pioneer P3-DX wheel alignment testing.
Distance to travel Number of
intervals
Adjustment Angle Maximum offset
error value
2000mm 1 12° 44mm
2000mm 2 6° 26mm
In figure 4.13, results using the wheel alignment compensation algorithm,
show that the more intervals employed, then the greater the accuracy of the robot
to track its expected path. This could be vital if the robot is required to drive down
a narrow channel, where the error offset value is within the limits of the terrain.
However, although a greater number of intervals gives greater accuracy, the more
times the robot stops and rotates, then this will have an impact on resources like
power consumption. Furthermore, the more intervals employed will also increase
the time it will take for the robot to complete its tasks, as each interval requires the
mobile robot to stop.
In Section 4.4, Test Scenario B (see Table 4.1) showed how the wheel align-
ment fault caused the robot to veer off course and therefore triggered the SD (stan-
dard deviation) value to rise above the tolerance value. Table 4.3 shows how the
wheel alignment compensation algorithm has resulted in the robot now operating
within tolerance values.
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Figure 4.13: Using the wheel alignment compensation algorithm, the robot journey accu-
racy is increased when the number of intervals is also increased. (a) Robot
journey uses one interval. (b) Robot journey uses two intervals.
Table 4.3: Pioneer P3DX wheel alignment testing - the numbers represent the amount in
millimetres (mm) that the robot was from its required destination point, after
each task.
Pioneer P3DX Wheel Alignment Testing
Test Scenario C: a Robot with damaged wheel using compensation algorithm. SD
-7 8 6 -5 4 -15 -7 3 6 -1 7.91
4.6 Evaluation
This case study posed a problem of how to detect a wheel fault on a mobile robot
and then how to compensate for that wheel fault. In earlier experiments conducted
around ’wheel alignment’ [15], the X80 robot was used along with ’indoor’ GPS
to track the movements of the robot. GPS data was used to evaluate the wheel
alignment data and algorithms where then implemented (Arc and Wave methods),
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to compensate for the alignment error. The Arc Method [15], used the wheel align-
ment error data to point the robot in a direction that would take into account the
reported slewing error. The Arc Method was only effective if there where no ob-
jects in the path of the robot. The Wave Method [15], used a tacking routine, where
the robot’s direction is periodically adjusted back towards the intended route path.
This method allowed the robot to stay close to the expected journey path and there-
fore could avoid any potential obstacles. Although these methods had some success,
the accuracy of the GPS was sporadic and unreliable. The wheel alignment com-
pensation algorithm results showed improvement, but they where still far from the
’perfect alignment’ value that was required, see Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: This chart shows the how the Arc Method and the Wave Method compensation
algorithms improved the wheel alignment error on the X-80 robot [15].
The Pioneer P3-DX robot (equipped with the LMS 200 laser), was then intro-
duced to the case study. The accuracy of the laser provided a reliable source for
wheel alignment data. The wheel alignment experiments where first tested against
the robot with no wheel damage. This was a useful experiment as it verified the
accuracy of the laser readings and tested that the ’proportional drive’ system on
the robot was working as expected. Experiments with a damaged wheel fitted to the
robot initially worked well but the main issue was that the robot was slewing consid-
erably away from its expected path before the compensation algorithm could adjust
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its heading back towards the expected path. To overcome this, intervals where in-
troduced to the robot task. At each interval, the robot is stopped and then using the
compensation algorithm, its heading is adjusted back towards the expected path.
This reduced the slewing or error offset value and therefore improved how the robot
followed its expected route path.
Using the AIFH architecture a Reactive and Proactive control loop was in-
tegrated into the system using an Autonomic Manager. The Autonomic Manager
worked alongside the System Manager, so that the robot tasks are constantly mon-
itored. The Autonomic Manager consisted of three layers - Awareness, Analysis
and Adjustment. Self-awareness has the ability to detect and report on component
faults within a robot. Self-awareness is more than just monitoring the system data.
Self-awareness can interpret the data and inform Users of possible impending faults
rather than just reacting to a ’alarm’ type fault. Self-analysis is key to determine the
extent of a fault. This information is crucial to determine if the fault can be com-
pensated for. Self-adjustment allows the robot to continue to function even when
operating with a faulty component.
4.7 Summary
The Autonomic Self-Adaptive Robot Wheel Alignment case study set out to demon-
strate how an Autonomic Management System can be implemented to handle com-
ponent errors within a mobile robot such as the Pioneer P3-DX. The System De-
velopment Life Cycle (SDLC) was implemented as a research model to describe a
sequence of activities including requirements, design, implementation and testing.
The Research question posed for this case study stated - if the AIFH architecture
(derived from the MAPE-K autonomic model and IMD model) can be applied to
detecting wheel alignment faults on a mobile robot and if possible, compensate for
those faults? Can the mobile robot adapt to its changed environment and continue
to function even with a wheel alignment fault?
The AIFH ’Knowledge Base’ was used to store ’task’ data from the mobile
robot and to provide ’tolerance’ checking against the ’wheel alignment’ results.
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By comparing historical data and current data, the Autonomic Manager Aware-
ness Layer flagged up that there was a fault with the wheel alignment on the robot.
The Awareness Layer is also capable of determining if the wheel alignment results,
which are within tolerance limits, are significant enough to alert Users or Mission
Control that there could be possible wheel fault in future robot tasks. The Aware-
ness Layer then passes all wheel alignment fault data to the Analysis Layer. The
Autonomic Manager Analysis Layer was then able to establish the extent of the fault
and provide fault data to the Autonomic Manager Adjustment Layer. A compensa-
tion algorithm was implemented to adjust the robot ’task’ parameters and therefore
compensate for the fault. Although the compensation algorithm was implemented
successfully, there where consequences regarding the operation of the mobile robot
in terms of power consumption and journey time.
The research carried out in this case study provides a valuable experience in
providing data in the implementation of a Generic Autonomic Architecture for fault
handling in a mobile robot (see Chapter 7).
Chapter 5
Autonomic Sonar Sensor Fault
Management for Mobile Robots -
Case Study
5.1 Introduction
This case study is concerned with how the Autonomic Model (discussed in Chapters
2 and 3 ), can be applied to dealing with a sonar sensor faults on a mobile robot.
Ultrasonic range sensors are common on research robots like the Pioneer P3-
DX. Sonar sensors are used to detect objects which are in the same plane as the sen-
sor itself. This is referred to as the 2D assumption. The sonar sensor is mounted in
such a way that their acoustic axis is parallel to the floor [98]. Although traditional
ultrasound sensors do not operate in a vacuum environment, they can be adapted to
work on planets such as Mars, if the mechanism for generating the acoustic wave is
effective in a thin atmosphere [99]. Mobile robots that operate in remote locations
have a high demand on hardware reliability. Planetary rovers use both camera and
sensors to navigate environment around them. Sensor failure would mean a severe
impact on mission objectives. Planetary rovers such as SR2 described in [100],
use range finders to help the robot detect nearby objects. Traditional fault toler-
ance techniques have been employed by researchers in [101], using adapter sensor
analysis. Further studies have shown that by comparing the known state and the
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actual sensor feedback of a collections of sensor nodes, can lead to the detection
of single sensor drop-outs. If sensor failure is identified, then compensation could
be possible by using known values instead of measured ones [102]. Detection of
abnormal behaviour in sensors can also be achieved by comparing sensor data with
neighbouring sensor data [79]. In this research, the authors take input readings of
the sensors and subject them to a correlation test that determines which sensors are
correlated to each other. In this case study, the data from suspected sonar sensors is
checked by using adjacent sonar sensors. If the results between the sonar sensors do
no match, then the sensor is flagged as requiring detailed analysis. Although previ-
ous research has been conducted on the performance of sonar sensors, no published
research has dealt with the consequences of losing sonar sensing ability. If a mobile
robot loses part of its object detection ability, then research is needed to investigate
how it is possible to compensate for the loss of some of the sonar sensors.
If a fault occurs in a sensor, then there is no realistic way of retrieving the
remote robot for to repairs. For mobile robots to navigate within their environment,
they rely on object detection sensors. When an object is detected, then the mobile
robot can adjust its drive system to avoid the object. Types of sensors used to detect
objects are sonar, laser and camera sensors. For the purpose of this case study, sonar
sensors are utilized for experimental purposes. If a sonar sensor on a mobile robot
becomes faulty, then the robot’s ability to detect objects is greatly reduced. This
case study explores how detection of a faulty sonar sensor(s) is achieved and how
self-adaption can be implemented to compensate for the fault.
In Chapter 4, the basic AIFH architectural design was implemented to handle
wheel alignments faults in mobile robots. However, the Knowledge Base was not
well defined as there was no named attributes such as policies, real-time data and
tolerance values. In this case study, the Knowledge Base is clearly defined as it
presents the role each attribute plays and how they contribute to handling sonar
sensor faults in mobile robots.
This case study is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes how Research
Methods are achieved by utilizing the SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle)
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modal. Section 5.3 presents Conceptual Requirements which describe the Re-
search question, goals and resources needed to complete the case study. Section
5.4 presents the Conceptual Design and describes how the Autonomic Management
System is used to self-adapt when dealing with mobile robot sonar sensor faults.
Section 5.5 presents Implementation of the wheel alignment fault scenarios and
how Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment can used to evaluate and compensate for
a sonar sensor fault. Section 5.6 demonstrates through testing, how the compensa-
tion algorithm for the sonar sensor fault performs. Results from the testing are then
analysed. Section 5.7 is used to evaluate the results in the case study and finally,
Section 5.8 concludes the case study with a summary statement.
5.2 Research Method
Research Methods are based in the SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle)
model - see Figure 5.1. Each stage in the SDLC is used to develop the research
question, design the autonomic architecture used in the Sonar Sensor Fault Man-
ager, implement specialized algorithms to identify and compensate for the fault and
testing to verify the case study goals are achieved.
Requirements  Design  Implementation Testing 
Problem Definition:  can 
Autonomic Management  
be implemented so that 
self-awareness  and self-
adaptive techniques can 
be employed to handle  
sonar sensor faults?   
Monitoring the data 
from the sensors. 
Using the Knowledge 
Base to determine if 
there are sonar sensor 
faults. 
Analyse the fault data 
and recommend a plan 
to compensate for the 




algorithm an observe if 
the robot can self-adapt 
to losing sonar sensor  
ability. Do the 
performance results 
reflect the changes 
made?.   
Further enhance the 
AIFH architecture. 
Expand the use of 
Knowledge Base 
attributes to develop the 
generic architecture. 
Implementation of a 
State Machine to assist 
on the detailed design.    
Figure 5.1: SDLC Model used in the research methodology for Sonar Sensor Fault Man-
agement.
• Requirements - is a detailed investigation of the system and is carried out in
accordance to the objectives proposed. The requirements are concerned with
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defining research question and what resources are required to complete the
case study. To develop the research question, physical components such as
the Pioneer P3-DX robot fitted with a Sonar Sensor forward array is required.
A ’bumper’ component is also required to prevent the robot being damaged
when coming into contact with an object.
• Design - based on the information collected at the requirements stage. For
this case study, the design is concerned about applying the Autonomic Archi-
tecture to handle how the robotic system can self-adapt to the discovery of
a component fault. The design phase will incorporate the AIFH architecture
(Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment) and further develop it to handle the
Sonar Sensor fault scenario. The design phase will also incorporate a State
Machine. The State Machine implemented using MRDS and CCR (Concur-
rency Co-ordination Runtime) [58], which can handle recording of sensor
data, analyses of sensor data and initiate sensor fault adjustment if required.
• Implementation - the system design needs to be implemented to make it a
workable system. To create the sonar sensor fault experiment, each sonar
on the sensor array is tested. Readings from each sensor are verified against
measurements taken with a physical tape measure. Adjacent sonar sensors
are tested to check for correlation. Implementation includes designing cus-
tom algorithms to identify multiple sonar sensor fault scenarios. Finally, a
specialized algorithm will be required to compensate for sonar sensor faults.
In this case study, the AIFH architecture is employed: Awareness - to identify
any faults with the sonar sensors, Analysis - to evaluate the extent of the fault
discovered and finally Adjustment - to implement a compensation strategy to
deal with sonar sensor faults.
• Testing - involves system integration and system testing of the programs and
procedures coded at the implementation phase. Testing is a method of testing
the system against the requirements and design. In this case study, testing
will involve verifying the sonar sensors are working as expected. Testing
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the Analysis programming so that faults are identified and finally testing the
compensation algorithm can still provide the robot the ability to detect an
object even with some sonar sensor faults. Test Strategy:
1. Test that the sonar sensors are reporting the correct distance readings.
2. Do neighbouring sonar sensors report similar distance readings?
3. The Pioneer P3-DX robot will report a default sensor reading of value
5000, if a sonar sensor becomes unresponsive. If a sonar sensor reading
equals a value ’5000’, the robot will halt its current task.
4. Does the Analysis Layer knowledge-based policies indicate what sonar
sensors need to be flagged as being disabled?
5. Does the Adjustment Layer knowledge-based policy (compensation al-





Using the Pioneer P3-DX robot fitted with a Sonar sensor array: in laboratory con-
ditions, the sonar sensors on the array are tested to confirm that the distance readings
they report are accurate when measured using traditional measuring tape. Adjacent
sonar sensors are also tested to check that their readings are accurate. The main
experiment involves sonar sensors that are disabled and how the mobile robot can
compensate for the loss of its object detection ability.
5.3.1.2 Goals
Can the AIFH architectural model be further developed to detect/compensate for
faulty sonar sensors?
• Awareness - can monitoring past and present experimental data, allow the
Autonomic Manager the ability to decide if there is a sonar sensor fault?
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• Analysis - can analysis provide the means to establish the extent of the fault?
• Adjustment - can the fault data provided by analysis, be used by a knowledge
base policy, to provide a means to compensate for the fault in the sonar sensor
array?
5.3.2 Resources required
For this case study, the Pioneer P3-DX research robot is used. The P3-DX is
equipped with an array of Polaroid sonar sensors. The array comprises of 8 electro-
static transducers and a sonar ranging module - see Figure 5.2 (b). The individual
transducers are controlled by the ranging module. The ’echo’ signals captured by
the transducers, allows the module to calculate ranges from 6” to 35ft [93]. For the
purposes of this case study, only the 6 forward facing sonar sensors will be used in
the experiment - see Figure 5.2 (a). Each sonar sensor is placed on the array as part
of an octadecagon shape - see Figure 5.3.
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.2: (a) P3-DX with its 6 forward facing sonar sensors. (b) Each sensor comprises
a Polaroid transducer.
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Figure 5.3: The sonar sensors are arranged 1-6 on the array, with a 20 ° angle between each
sensor.
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To access the data reported from each sonar sensor, a custom-built User Sonar
Interface was required. The User Sonar Interface was developed using Microsoft’s
MRDS and .Net C# programming language in Microsoft Visual Studio - see Figure
5.4. The User Sonar Interface can display distance readings for each sonar on the
sensor array mounted on the P3-DX robot - Sonar 0 to Sonar 7. Any disabled sonar
sensors are marked in red on the interface display. The P3-DX robot can also be
controlled using the User Sonar Interface for forward/backwards movement and
rotating.
Figure 5.4: User Sonar Interface (developed by the author), for displaying sonar data from
the Pioneer P3-DX robot.
5.4 Conceptual Design
This Section details the design and architecture for this case study.
5.4.1 Developing the AIFH Architecture for sonar sensor fault
handling
In Chapter 4, a case study showed how the AIFH Architecture was developed for
handling wheel alignment faults in a mobile robot. In this case study, the AIFH
architecture will be further developed for detected Sonar Sensor Faults in a mobile
robot, with particular emphasis on the use of the Knowledge Base. This Autonomic
Manager contains three layers, Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment. The System
Manager is responsible for initiating the ’control’ loops. The main feedback control
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loop (Reactive Loop), will feed data through each layer. The secondary control loop
(Proactive Loop), will operate in the Awareness and Analysis Layer. The AIFH
architectural model for the Sonar Sensor Fault handling is shown in Figure 5.5.
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Execute Compensation Policy (part 1) – to establish 
‘angles’ of rotation that are needed to compensate 
for the sonar sensor faults. 
Figure 5.5: Autonomic Management System for the Sonar Sensor Fault Handling case
study.
1. Awareness Layer - the main function of the Awareness layer is to establish
if there is a failure within the sonar sensors. If a failure is detected, then the
data gathered within this layer is passed to the Analysis layer. The Aware-
ness Layer can also detect if there are unusual readings between adjacent
sonar sensors. Those sonar sensors that are showing unusual readings, are
flagged as requiring investigation. Task data from the sonar sensors is pro-
cessed and updated to the Knowledge Base. As each task is performed by
the mobile robot (Pioneer P3-DX), the sonar sensor data is recorded. These
records will then collate to form the historical data within the Knowledge
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Base. The Knowledge Base Real-time sonar data is compared to the stored
Dynamic Tolerance value, which will in turn, identify if any sonar sensors are
disabled. The Pioneer P3-DX robot reports a default reading of value 5000,
if a sonar sensor is unresponsive (this value is stored in the Knowledge Base
as a dynamic tolerance value). If a sonar sensor reports a reading of ’5000’,
then it is immediately marked as being disabled. The Reactive control loop is
responsible for reporting ’disabled’ sonar sensors to the Analysis layer.
The Proactive Control loop is responsible for evaluating readings between ad-
jacent sonar sensors. If the robot is facing an object, then each of the sonar
sensors will report a slightly different reading to its adjacent sensor. This
is due to the fact that the sonar array fitted to the robot is octadecagon in
shape - see Figure 5.3. The Awareness Layer must establish what the current
tolerance range value is between adjacent sonar sensors. A policy from the
Knowledge Base is used to calculate the tolerance range value. This will be
explained in more detail in Section 5.5.3. This policy is enforced to prevent
the Proactive Control loop being ’oversensitive’ in declaring a possible fault,
if readings between two adjacent sonar sensors are not the same. The toler-
ance range is dynamic, and therefore can be updated in the knowledge Base
by the Proactive control loop. However, if readings between adjacent sonar
sensors is above the acceptable tolerance range, then the Proactive Control
loop will mark these sensors as ’suspect’. Data relating to ’suspected’ sonar
sensors is passed to the Analysis Layer for further investigation.
2. Analysis Layer - the Analysis Layer uses data received from the Awareness
Layer to establish the extent of the sonar sensor failure. This layer will map
out what sonar sensors have been declared as ’disabled’ and pass this informa-
tion to the Adjustment layer. The Analysis layer will also check sonar sensors
that have been identified in the Awareness layer as requiring further investi-
gation. When a sonar sensor is reporting a different reading from its adjacent
sensors, then analysis is required to established that the sensor is operating
correctly. The Check Sonar Reading policy (from the knowledge base), is
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then executed. This policy (algorithm), uses neighbouring sonar sensors to
verify that the suspected sonar sensor is indeed reporting valid data. If it
is established that the sonar sensor is reporting invalid data, then that sonar
sensor is marked as being disabled. If, however, adjacent sonar sensors are
reporting valid data, then the Proactive control loop will declare a ’no fault’
and report back to the Awareness Layer.
3. Adjustment Layer - the Adjustment layer receives data from the Analysis layer
that identifies what sonar sensors are currently disabled. Depending on the
number of sensors that are marked disabled, will influence the amount of ad-
justments required to handle the fault. First, the Adjustment layer needs to
establish how many sonar sensors are disabled. If all sonar sensors are dis-
abled then no adjustment policy can be applied in-order to compensate for the
fault. If there one or more sonar sensors are still functioning, then the Adjust-
ment Layer will execute Compensation policy (part 1), to establish how many
rotations the robot will have to make to compensate for the disabled sensors.
This is explained in greater detail in Section 5.5.3. When all the ’rotation’
angles have been calculated, this data is then passed to Compensation policy
(part 2). Compensation policy (part 2), will then execute ’rotation’ commands
via the System Manager, in-order for the P3-DX robot to locate any objects
in its path during while executing a task - (see Figure 5.5). All compensa-
tion polices are stored in the Knowledge Base. The Knowledge Base is also
updated with the current state of each sonar sensor.
5.4.2 State Machine
Software development for this case study was carried out using MRDS framework.
MRDS is a service-oriented programming model that allows the creation of asyn-
chronous and state-driven applications [94]. Code implementation is carried out
using the C# language in Microsoft Visual Studio. Database work was engineered
using Microsoft SQL Server and User defined stored procedures. To create the
robot tasks for the case study, required the design of a event driven and state-based
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Figure 5.6: State Machine Design for the case study - Sonar Sensor Fault Management.
In the MRDS framework, as each state is executed, transitions are added.
These transitions are triggered by notifications received from Partner services [95].
The System Processing ’state’ (see Figure 5.6), is executed after the robot has mon-
itored and analysed the sonar sensor data. If necessary, the System Processing can
initiate the ’Adjust Robot Rotation’ state.
5.5 Implementation
5.5.1 Sonar sensor fault Scenarios
Ranging sensors like sonar, are widely used in research and industrial robotics.
They allow a robot to see an object without actually coming into contact with it.
However, sonar sensors are limited to a relatively low range distance compared to
a sensor such a a laser. Sonar sensors can also suffer from ’Ghost’ echoes, where
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there is a dense obstacle distribution and complex surfaces [103]. When a sonar
sensor becomes faulty it can impact a robot’s ability to navigate its surrounding
environment. A single sonar sensor fault would result in a minor reduction in the
robot’s ability to detect objects as its neighbouring sensors can compensate for the
failure. However, if the one or more sonar sensors fail, then this severely impacts
the robots object detection abilities.
5.5.2 Sonar Sensor Failure States
Sonar sensors faults in this case study are classed as failure states. Each failure
state represents a fault level that can occur on the P3-DX mobile robot. Sonar
Sensor Failure States (see Figure 5.7):
• IsNormal - all sonar sensors are working as expected - Figure 5.7(a) .
• IsMinor - one or two sonar sensors are either disabled or reporting erroneous
data - Figure 5.7(b).
• IsMajor - a loss of 3 or more (but not all) sonar sensors. Provides only limited
sensing ability - Figure 5.7 (c).
• IsCatatrophic - all forward facing sonar sensors are disabled. No ability to








Figure 5.7: Failure states for the sonar sensors on the P3-DX mobile robot.
5.5.3 Detecting Sonar Fault - Awareness
Using the architectural model discussed in 5.4.1, the Awareness Layer is part of
the process that detects any anomalies within the sensors. Through monitoring and
knowledge gained from previous robot tasks; the robot can become Aware that there
is a possible fault with the sonar sensors. Using the failure states described in 5.5.2,
various test scenarios where performed to establish if there was a possible fault
within the P3-DX sonar array.
5.5.3.1 IsNormalState
All sonar sensors where tested under normal conditions. Using the User Sonar
Interface program, the IsNormalState (see Figure 5.7 (a)), proved that each of the
sonar sensors where able to detect objects correctly. Measurements where taken
between the object and each sonar sensor using a measuring tape - see Figure 5.8
(b) and (c). These values where then compared to the values being reported by the
sonar sensors using the User Sonar Interface program (discussed in Section 5.3.2) -
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see Figure 5.8 (a).
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5.8: IsNormalState Test - checking that the sonar readings reported by the robot are
accurate.
5.5.3.2 IsMinorState
When a sonar sensor becomes faulty (due to impact or electrical issues), then it
reports via the System Manager, as a value of 5000 (disabled state). Autonomic
Manager (Awareness process) will pick this value up during the Reactive control
loop check. If a sonar sensor reports a reading of ’5000’, then the sonar sensor is
marked as disabled. If a sonar sensor is reporting significantly different ’distance’
data to its neighbouring sensors, then an assessment is required to confirm its valid-
ity. For example: on the robot sensor array, Sonar 4 is reporting a value of ’415’,
Sonar 5 a value of ’245’ and Sonar 6 a value of ’417’. Sonar 5 needs checking as its
value is considerably lower than Sonar 4 and Sonar 6. However, Sonar 5 could be
detecting an object and reporting a correct reading; this can be verified by using the
adjacent sensors to check the reading is valid, see Figure 5.10 (object marked as
d). When comparing the values of neighbouring sonar sensors, we need to consider
the location of the sonar sensors within the sonar array. The forward- facing sensors
on the sonar array (1-6), are arranged as part of an octadecagon design. If a sonar
sensor is detecting an object square-on, then its neighbor senor will also detect this
object but will be reporting the distance value as slightly higher - see Figure 5.9.
This difference value needs to be considered when comparing neighbouring sonar
sensors. Figure 5.10 shows how the tolerance range is calculated between neigh-
bouring sonar sensors. Equations 5.1 and 5.2 used to calculate tr the tolerance
value. These calculations contribute to the logic used in Algorithm 2.
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As sonar sensors 2, 
3 and 4 scan the 
same object, their 
readings are slightly 
different due to the 
shape of the sonar 
array on the P3-DX 
robot. 
Figure 5.9: IsMinorState Test - readings for adjacent sensors are slightly different to the
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Figure 5.10: The difference value between two adjacent sensors is calculated to allow for




ALGORITHM 2: Disparate Readings Between Adjacent Sonar Sensors
Input: sonarReadings sr[] = readings from 1-6 sonar sensors
toleranceRange tr = tolerance value allowed between adjacent
sensors
sonarPostion sp = position of specific sonar sensor
Rotation Angle ra = 20°
Output: differenceValue = is greater than the tolerance range, then that
particular sonar sensor is marked as disabled.
for (each sonar(sn) in sonar array ) do




differenceValue = (reading2− reading1);
end




differenceValue = (reading2− reading1);
end






differenceValue = (reading1− (reading2+ reading3/2));
end




Algorithm 2: - a tolerance range tr value can now be applied to Algorithm 2,
where all the sonar sensors are checked for any unusual values. Adjacent sonar
sensors are rotated towards the same target. Sonar distance readings from each
sensor are recorded. Logic contained in Algorithm 2, can identify what readings are
significantly different from their immediate neighbours. The Awareness Layer has
access to the Algorithm 2 policy via the Knowledge Base. If a sonar sensor requires
checking, then this information is passed to the Analysis Layer for processing.
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5.5.3.3 IsMajorState
When two or more sonar sensors become faulty (see Figure 5.7 (c)), then the robot’s
ability to detect objects in its path is greatly reduced. If the robot loses 50 percent of
its sonar sensors, it can be completely blind on one side. Monitoring of the sensor
data would indicate that there was a fault in several sonar sensors in the array i.e.,
each of the faulty sonar sensors would be reporting a ’5000’ value (disabled state).
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.11: The User Sonar Interface program (a), shows Sonar sensors 0-3 with a ’5000’
reading = disabled state. The object in (b), cannot be detected.
In Figure 5.11, the mobile robot has lost sonar sensors 0 - 3. The object ahead
of the robot is currently undetected. The if the robot continues this trajectory it will
hit the object. However, the P3-DX is also equipped with a ’bumper’ sensor. If the
’bumper’ sensor is triggered, then the robot automatically comes to a stop. When
a sonar sensor becomes disabled, the autonomic Awareness process is employed
to identify what sonar sensors are faulty (see Figure 5.5). The the disabled state
’5000’ value is stored in the Knowledge Base as a ’fixed’ tolerance value. As the
Awareness layer processes the sonar sensor data, it can use this ’fixed’ tolerance
value in the Knowledge Base, as a trigger to detect a faulty sensor. All ’fault’ data
is then passed from the Awareness layer to the Analysis layer for further processing.




In Figure 5.12, the Awareness layer reports that all sonar sensors are disabled. Us-
ing the Knowledge Base ’fixed’ tolerance value for a disabled state ’5000’ sonar
sensor, the Awareness layer is able to determine (become aware), that the robot has
no object detection sensors available. When all sonar sensors are reported as dis-
abled, the robot is automatically stopped by the System Manager. If all the sonar
sensors in the array become disabled at the same time, the P3-DX ’bumper’ sen-
sor (see Figure 5.12(c)), will also stop the robot from further movement; this is to
prevent any unnecessary damage to the body of the robot. In this state, the robot
is unable to detect objects in its path. No compensation algorithm can be applied
when the robot is in this state.
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5.12: IsCatastrophicState - all the sonar sensors are reported as ’disabled’ (a). The
sonar sensors can no longer detect objects in the path of the robot (b). The P3-
DX ’bumper’ sensor will cause the robot to stop, when coming into contact
with an object (c).
For testing the different sonar sensor states, the User Sonar Interface program,
was developed for this purpose. Many hours where spent by the author to develop a
software solution, that converted the raw data from the sonar sensor device drivers,
into readable data and presented as a User Interface (see Appendix B2).
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5.5.4 Processing Sonar Fault - Analysis
If during the Awareness Layer, a Sonar Sensor (sonar[x]) is identified for checking,
then this data is passed to the Analysis Layer for processing. In the Analysis Layer,
the (Check Sonar Readings) policy from the Knowledge Base, is then executed -
see Algorithm 3. The Check Sonar Readings algorithm will issue commands to
the robot to use the sonar sensors adjacent to the sonar[x], to check if the readings
reported by sonar[x] where indeed correct.
Algorithm 3: - the process performed by Algorithm 3, involves using two
neighbouring sonar sensors to be rotated to the original position of sonar[x] - see
Figure 5.13. If the readings reported by both sonar sensors are different from
sonar[x], then sonar[x] will be tagged as being disabled. If sonar[x] is at position
one or six on the sonar array, then it will have only one neighbouring sonar sensor
available for checking. If the reading reported by this one sonar is different from
sonar[x], then sonar[x] will be tagged as being disabled. All sonar sensors tagged
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Figure 5.13: Sonar[x] has been flagged for checking by Awareness layer. Adjacent sen-




ALGORITHM 3: Check Sonar Readings
Input: sonarCheck[][] contains the sonar position and readings
sr[] = current reading from the sonar sensor array
sc = 0 - track each sonar processed
col = 0 - array column track
tr = tolerance range calculated in Algorithm 2
ra = 20° Rotation Angle
Output: sonarCheck[][] is marked disabled if error is found.
for (sc < number of sonarCheck rows ) do















di f fValue = (checkingReading - sonarCheck[sc][col +1])
if (di f fValue >tr) then
sonarCheck[sc][col] = disabled;
end
sc = sc + 1
end
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5.6 Demonstration (testing)
5.6.1 Compensation for Sonar Fault - Adjustment
5.6.1.1 Fault scenarios
If the Analysis Layer has identified a fault in the sonar sensor array, then the Ad-
justment Layer will implement a compensation policy. The compensation policy
deals with fault found in the six forward facing sensors only (see Figure 5.2). The
compensation policy will adopt a ’stop’ and ’rotate’ strategy in-order to compensate
for faulty sonar sensors. A fully operational sonar sensor will be rotated to position
in the array of a faulty sonar sensor. The more sonar sensors that are disabled, then
the more ’stop’ and ’rotation’ commands will be required in order for the robot to
detect objects in its path.
Using the six forward sensors in the array, there are 64 possible combinations
of sonar values (enabled/disabled), using binary notation. Binary notation 000000
describes all sensors are working as designed (no action required). Binary notation
111111 means all sensors are disabled (the robot is unable to detect an object -
IsCatastrophicState); this leaves 62 possible sonar fault combinations that can be
dealt with using the compensation policy.
Table 5.1 shows an example of how much the robot needs to rotate (clockwise
or anti-clockwise), in order to compensate for the loss of one or more sonar sensors.
There is an angle of + or - 20° between each sonar sensor on the array. A single
sonar fault will only require one rotation of the robot to compensate for the missing
sensor. A loss of three or more sonar sensors could require the robot to rotate at
three different stages in order to compensate for the missing sensors. It must be
noted, that if the robot is required to rotate a certain degree value to compensate
for a disabled sonar sensor, after the sonar reading has been checked, the robot will
be rotated back to its original position. This guarantees that the robot is always
pointing to its original heading angle.
Figure 5.14, shows a representation of Scenario 4 from Table 5.1. The robot
has lost 3 sonar sensors and is unable to detect any object within the field of those
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sensors. The robot is therefore rotated -60° so that the 3 remaining working sonar
sensors can detect the object.















required (+ or -)
Scenario 1 - the sonar sensor at position 3 has become disabled
2 30° 3 (10°) -20°
Scenario 2 - the sonar sensor at position 3 and 2 have become disabled
4 -10° 3 (10°) +20°
1 50° 2 (30°) -20°
Scenario 3 - the sonar sensors at position 2, 4, 5 and 6 have become disabled
1,3 10°, 50° 2 (30°), 4(-10°) -20°
3 10° 5 (-30°) -40°
3 10° 6 (-50°) -60°
Scenario 4 - the sonar sensors at position 4, 5 and 6 have become disabled







Figure 5.14: (a) Sonar sensors (4-6) are disabled. (b) The P3-DX robot is required to rotate
-60° so that the object can be detected (using sonar sensors (1-3)).
5.6.1.2 Fault Compensation Algorithms
When the disabled sonar sensors are first discovered, the P3-DX robot is stopped,
and analysis takes places to evaluate the extent of the fault. If there are multiple
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sonar sensor faults, then the number of rotations will increase. Table 5.1 shows
the sonar fault scenarios including the number of rotations required to compensate
for the disabled sensors. Utilizing the autonomic Monitor and Analysis processes,
the ’disabled’ sonar sensors are identified. This information is then passed to the
Adjustment process. The Adjustment process engages a policy that can utilize the
autonomic self-adjustment algorithm. The compensation policy for disabled sonar
sensors is presented in Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5. Algorithm 4: - is used to
work out the position of the disabled sonar sensors; it then calculates how much
rotation is required for the remaining enabled sonar sensors to take the place of the
disabled sonar sensors. Algorithm 5: - is used to work out the minimum number
of robot rotations required to compensate for the faulty sonar sensors. Finally, all
rotation values are sent from the (Adjustment layer [array]), to the Operation Policy
in the System Manager, to execute the physical robot rotation commands required
to compensate for the faulty sonar sensors.
Figure 5.15 shows how scenario 4 (sonar fault) from Table Table 5.1, can be
dealt with using the compensation algorithms. The compensation strategy allows
the robot to detect an object (see Figure 5.15 (a), Sonar 4 reading) and therefore
will be able to take action to avoid collision. When Algorithm 5 has been executed,
it will return the ’rotation’ values required to compensate for the fault.
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.15: Example: when applying the compensation algorithm, Sonar 4 (a) is able to
detect the object (b), after a ’rotation’ command to the robot has been imple-
mented.
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ALGORITHM 4: Compensation For Disabled Sonar Sensors (Part 1)
Input: sonarArray[] = enabled/disabled sonar sensor positions
disabledArray[] = disabled sonar ’angle’ position values
enabledArray[] = enabled sonar ’angle’ position values
lsa = -50° (lowest sonar sensor angle)
hsa = 50° (highest sonar sensor angle)
ia = 20° (incremental angle value)
av = 0° (angle value initialized for each sonar sensor)
Output: The combinationArray[] = di f f erence value required for an
’enabled’ sonar array to take the place of a ’disabled’ sonar array.
i = 0
for (av = lsa; av < hsa + 1; av = av + ia) do
if (sonarArray[i] == ’disabled’) then
disabledArray[i] = av;
end
if (sonarArray[i] == ’enabled’) then
enabledArray[i] = av;
end
i = i + 1
end
ii = 0 (inner index)
oi = 0 (outer index)
av = 0 (reset angle value)
for (dv < disabledArray count) do
for (av = ia; av < hsa + 1; av = av + ia) do
if (enabledArray[ii] == (disabledArray[oi] + (-av))) then
combinationArray[ii] = av;
end
if (enabledArray[ii] == (disabledArray[oi] + (av))) then
combinationArray[ii] = -av;
end
ii = ii + 1
end
oi = oi + 1
end
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ALGORITHM 5: Compensation For Disabled Sonar Sensors (Part 2)
Input: calcArray[] = the ’sorted’ angle values needed for compensation.
combinationArray[] pre-populated (See Algorithm 3).
Output: rotateArray[] = this array will contain the rotation values the
robot needs to perform to compensate for the sonar sensor fault
var nearestValue = 0; (find the nearest position value)
var sonarResultCount = combinationArray.Count;
for (int index = 0; index ¡ sonarResultCount; index++) do




int eSi = 0; (enabled array index);
foreach ( int calc in calcArray) do














5.6.1.3 Fault Compensation Testing
By introducing a compensation policy to handle sonar sensors faults, the Pioneer
P3-DX robot can still detect objects. The robot now must make changes in how it
executes its tasks. In Figure 5.16, the robot has lost half of the sonar sensors (1-
3). However, sonar sensors (4-6) are still functioning. In this example, the robot is
instructed to stop every at every 200mm interval. The robot will then rotate (using
the compensation policy), so that the sonar sensors that are still functioning, will
be able to detect any objects within the robot’s path. Although the compensation
policy is effective in detecting objects using limited sensor ability, there is a impact
on executing the task set out for the robot. The time to complete the task will
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increase as the robot has to stop and check for objects. There is also an increase in
demand for more power resources, as the robot will be taking longer to complete
the task and executing multiple ’movement’ commands in order to detect objects








Path direction of P3-DX  Robot 
Rotation of the Robot performed at intervals 
Object is seen, when detection threshold is reached  
Disabled Sonar Sensors  
Object 
Figure 5.16: When a sonar fault is detected, the Robot is stopped at selected intervals. The
robot is then rotated to check for possible objects.
As with Chapter 4 (Wheel Alignment Fault Handling), the importance of his-
torical data is key to understanding fault scenarios. Comparing current data with
data recorded from previous tasks, helps us to establish if a fault has occurred and
what impact it has on the performance of the mobile robot. Using this knowledge
we can then make calculations for compensating for the fault. We also discovered
in this case study that setting fixed threshold values for detecting objects could not
always be applied. The sonar sensor is octadecagon in profile, therefore each sensor
can be at a slightly different distance from an object. For example: if sensor A is
5.7. Evaluation 118
nearer to an object than sensor B, then the distance values they report back will be
different. If we use a +- 10mm threshold value to detect an object for sensor A, then
sensor B’s distance calculation would lie out of that threshold and could wrongly be
flagged as a possible faulty sensor during the Awareness process. This is described
as a threshold being ’over sensitive’; we therefore have to allow for the physical dif-
ference between two adjacent sensors before applying a threshold value (see Figure
5.10).
5.7 Evaluation
Using the AIFH architecture a Reactive and Proactive control loop was integrated
into the system using an Autonomic Manager. The Autonomic Manager worked
alongside the System Manager, so that the robot tasks are constantly monitored.
The Autonomic Manager consisted of three layers - Awareness, Analysis and Ad-
justment. Self-awareness has the ability to detect and report on component faults
within a robot. Self-awareness is more than just monitoring the system data. Self-
awareness can interpret the data and inform Users of possible impending faults
rather than just reacting to a ’alarm’ type fault. Self-analysis is key to determine the
extent of a fault. This information is crucial to determine if the fault can be com-
pensated for. Self-adjustment allows the robot to continue to function even when
operating with a faulty component.
However, the more sonar sensors that are at fault, then the greater impact it
will have on the operational efficiency of the robot. Figure 5.17 shows a selection
of possible fault combinations (odd numbered fault scenarios), of 31 in total, from
a possible 62 (as discussed in Section 5.6.1.1). The greater number of ’disabled’
sonar sensors on the array, then the greater number of robot rotations are required
to compensate for the faulty sensors. This ultimately will have an impact on task
time and power required. When a fault occurs in the sonar sensor array, then the
mobile robot self-adapts to the changes in its sensor state.
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Figure 5.17: The increased in the number of sonar sensor faults will also increase the num-
ber of rotations required to compensate for the fault.
5.8 Summary
Autonomic Sonar Sensor Fault Management for Mobile Robots case study set out to
demonstrate how an Autonomic Management System can be implemented to handle
sonar sensor hardware failures in a mobile robot such as the Pioneer P3-DX. The
System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) was implemented as a Research Model
to describe a sequence of activities including requirements, design, implementation
testing and evaluation. The Research question posed for this case study stated - if
the AIFH architecture (derived from the MAPE-K and IMD autonomic models),
can be applied to detecting sonar sensor faults on a mobile robot and if possible,
compensate for those faults? Can the mobile robot adapt to its changed environment
and continue to function even with a sonar sensor fault?
The AIFH Knowledge Base is used to gather ’task’ data from the mobile robot
and to provide ’tolerance’ data for sonar sensor information. Using the Reactive
Control feedback loop, the Awareness Layer can report directly to Analysis Layer
if any of the sonar sensors are displaying a disabled state. Using the Proactive
Control feedback loop, the Awareness Layer is also capable of detecting unusual
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readings between neighbouring sonar sensors. Those sensors under investigation
are then passed to the Analysis Layer for further processing. The AIFH Knowledge
Base contains a policy to allow the Analysis Layer to determine if there is any faults
with those sensors under investigation. If a fault is detected, then this information
is passed to the Adjustment Layer. In the Adjustment Layer, two policies from the
Knowledge Base are required to calculate how the remaining enabled sonar sensors
can be implemented to compensate for the disabled sonar sensors; a further policy is
then used to send ’movement’ commands (rotation, forward motion) to the System
Manager.
This case study shows how autonomic principles can be employed so that a
mobile robot can self-adapt to changes to its sonar sensor functionality. Not only
can faults be identified but also a compensation strategy can allow the robot to
continue to function. However, laboratory experiments showed that as the number
of disabled sonar sensors increased, then the time for the robot to complete its task is
also increased. This can also have an impact on the power resources available to the
robot. Research carried out in this case study provides valuable data for generating
a Generic Autonomic Architecture for handling component faults in a mobile robot
(see Chapter 7).
Chapter 6
Autonomic Management for Mobile
Robot Battery Degradation - case
study
6.1 Introduction
This case study is concerned with how the Autonomic principles (discussed on
Chapters 2 and 3) can be applied to managing mobile robot power resources when
experiencing battery degradation.
Lead-acid batteries which contain a lead-calcium grid structure, are vulnerable
to an aging process due to the fact they are repeatedly cycled [104]. This aging pro-
cess is known as battery degradation. Various models for battery degradation have
been investigated in [105], to determine the degradation curve for any lead-acid
battery. Data provided from degradation curve can assist researchers in predicting
when battery degradation will affect the system operations. With the vast improve-
ments in computer technology, the need for improved battery design and a reduction
in battery degradation, are in demand more than ever [106]. In research conducted
in [107], the Smart Battery System (SBS) offers the ability to adjust the charging
profile in response to actual requirements i.e., charging voltage and charging cur-
rent. SBS can also monitor various charge states and raise Alarms if a damaged bat-
tery is detected. Although SBS is aware of charge states, it has no formal processes
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to deal with battery degradation. Prognostic-enabled Decision Making (PDM), is
a research area that aims to integrate prognostic health data and knowledge of fu-
ture operations, into the decision making when selecting a particular action within
the System [108]. Health checks include reporting battery capacity faults and other
operations including heavy load capacity and temperature variations. PDM is em-
ployed as a fault reporting tool rather than a tool that can react to identifying battery
degradation.
This case study employs a simulated battery configuration based on the actual
lead-acid battery contained in our laboratory robot (Pioneer P3-DX). The research
will concentrate on how battery degradation can affect how a mobile robot performs
basic tasks, like moving from one location to another. Task management is impor-
tant especially if the robot is operating on remote environments. Investigations will
also focus on the importance of how the battery charging is maintained. Research
in this case study will also focus on how to compensate for battery degradation so
that the mobile robot can still complete its allocated tasks. Although some con-
siderable research has been carried out in applying autonomic principles with fault
detection in robots, there is very little evidence of any research carried out in auto-
nomic power management in mobile robots. Robot sensors and effectors are vitally
important in the operation of mobile robots, but they rely heavily on the power sup-
ply within the robot. If power supply is degraded or compromised, then this will
have a detrimental effect on the performance of sensors and effectors.
In Chapter 5, the AIFH architecture was further developed by using Knowledge
Base attributes (within the Autonomic Manager), to handle sonar sensor faults in
mobile robots. However, the use of both reactive and proactive feedback loops
where limited. In this case study, the proactive loop takes an important role in
alerting the User/Mission Control of an impending fault. This describes the AIFH
having self-awareness and the ability to make decisions when faced with a changing
environment.
This case study is organized as follows: Section 6.1.1 describes how the Re-
search Methods is implemented by utilizing the SDLC (Software Development Life
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Cycle) model. Section 6.2 presents Conceptual Requirements which describe the
Research question, goals and resources needed to complete the case study. Section
6.3 presents the Conceptual Design and describes how the Autonomic Management
System has been adapted to use the AIFH architectural model to handle mobile
robot power management faults. Section 6.4 presents Implementation of the bat-
tery degradation fault scenario and how Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment have
been used to evaluate and compensate for a fault. Section 6.5 demonstrates through
testing, how the compensation algorithm for the battery degradation fault performs.
Results from the testing are then analysed. Section 6.6 presents an evaluation of the
case study. Section 6.7 concludes the case study with a summary statement.
6.1.1 Research Method
The SDLC model approaches solving a given problem in well-defined steps. Figure
6.1 shows how the SDLC Model can be applied to the Autonomic Robot Battery
Degradation Fault case study.
Requirements  Design  Implementation Testing 
Research Question:  can 
Autonomic Management  
be implemented so that 
self-awareness and self-
adaptive techniques can 
be employed to be 
aware when battery 
degradation occurs?   
Designing the current 
robot System to 
integrate with the AIFH 
Autonomic model  and 
further develop  the 
Generic architecture .     
Monitoring the data from  
the mobile robot power 
management system -  
Use the  Knowledge Base 
to determine if there are 
anomalies. Analyse  
power system parameters  
and recommend a plan to 
compensate for the any 




algorithm an observe if 
the robot can self-adapt 
to when dealing with 
battery degradation. Do 
the performance results 
reflect the changes 
made?.   
Figure 6.1: SDLC Model used in the research methodology for Autonomic Wheel Align-
ment
For the purpose of this case study, the SDLC model from Figure 6.1 is em-
ployed. SDLC model ensures that all the work carried out within the case study is
documented and results generated.
• Requirements - lays out the broad research objectives of the particular case
study. It is a detailed investigation of the system and is carried out in ac-
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cordance to the objectives proposed. It involves a detailed study of various
operations performed by the system and their relationships within and outside
the system [92]. To develop the research question successfully, a simulated
robot battery environment is required to emulate the characteristics of the Pi-
oneer P3-DX robot.
• Design - based on the information collected at the requirements stage. The
logical system design is arrived at as a result of system analysis and how it
is converted into physical system design. The SDLC process moves from the
what in the requirements phase to the how in the design phase [92]. For this
case study, the design is concerned with applying the Autonomic Model to
handle how the power management system in the robot can adapt to the dis-
covery of a battery fault. In Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3, the initial concept of
the AIFH architecture was introduced. In this case study, the findings accu-
mulated in the autonomic battery degradation research, will provide a means
to further develop the AIFH architectural model. The layers contained in the
AIFH architecture are Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment. Self-Awareness,
is the most important, as it is an indicator to the mobile robot autonomic man-
ager that there is a fault within the system. Self-Analysis is used to evaluate
the extent of the fault. Self-Adjustment takes the analysed data and applies a
specialized algorithm to compensate for the fault.
• Implementation - the system design needs to be implemented to make it a
workable system. To create the battery degradation experiment, a simulation
of the P3-DX robot is employed. The properties from the ’actual’ P3-DX
robot battery are used as parameter values in the experiment. Using the P3-
DX robot DOD (Depth of Discharge) chart, then the battery degradation pro-
cess can be simulated within the programming. In this case study, program-
ming is implemented to allow the Autonomic Manager access to the power
management data in the AIFH Knowledge Base. Further programming is im-
plemented to evaluate any fault data that supplied by the Monitoring process.
The Analysis process is used to investigate the extent of the fault. When the
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fault has been analysed, then additional programming is required for formu-
late a possible compensation strategy.
• Testing/Evaluation - involves system integration and system testing of the
programs and procedures coded at the implementation phase. Testing is a
method of testing the system against the requirements and design. For this
case study, testing will involve evaluating the how the simulated P3-DX bat-
tery performs when the battery is in optimal condition and when the battery
is exposed to degradation.
Test Strategy:
1. Using the simulation program for the P3-DX robot, run a robot task over
a fixed distance, including speed and power requirement in watts (W).
2. Set the battery cycle value of the robot to represent the battery at optimal
charge capacity.
3. Use the battery properties (taken from the actual P3-DX battery), to
include parameters such as Watt Hours (WH), battery rating (Ah) and
voltage (V).
4. Record the amount of battery charge needed to complete the task.
5. Is there enough battery change to complete the robot task?
6. Repeat the simulated task for the mobile robot with the same parameter
values.
7. Set the battery cycle value to represent the battery when it is near its
’end of life’ state.
8. Record the amount of battery charge needed to complete the task.
9. Is there enough battery change to complete the robot task?
10. If there is not enough battery charge to complete the task, then declare a
fault.
11. How did the battery degradation compensation algorithm perform, when
applied to the simulated robot task?
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6.2 Conceptual Requirements
The Requirements phase in a SDLC model is the most crucial step in creating a suc-
cessful case study. Requirements define the problem, objectives and the resources
needed to complete the study.
6.2.1 Research Question
6.2.1.1 Goals
Using AIFH model (see Fig. 3.2), as a baseline, the AIFH architecture is further
developed in this case study to establish if an autonomic architecture can be used to
detect and compensate for robot power management faults.
• Awareness - can processing past and present experimental data, allow the
Autonomic Manager the ability to decide if there is a power fault on the robot?
• Awareness - can processing past and present experimental data highlight any
trends that the capacity of the robot is reduced as the battery cycle count
increases?
• Analysis - can analysis provide the means to establish the extent of the fault?
• Adjustment - can an adjustment strategy be provided that will compensate
for the battery degradation?
6.2.1.2 The Experiment
A robot simulation program (see Figure 6.3), is used to render the Pioneer P3-DX
robot. The battery values are taken from the actual P3-DX battery properties (see
Section 6.2.2.3). The first part of the experiment shows how the battery performs
using a chosen DOD (Depth of Discharge) strategy (see Section 6.2.4). The second
part of the experiment simulates a series of robot tasks. The battery properties and
task instructions supply the parameter values used in each robot task. These values
are then integrated into equations to establish battery capacity required for each task
(see Section 6.4.1). Depending on the ’charge’ cycle used, then battery degradation
will start in influence the task result. Finally, if battery degradation has been flagged
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by the Autonomic Manager, then a compensation strategy is employed within the
task to handle the battery degradation fault (see Section 6.5.1).
6.2.2 Resources required
6.2.2.1 Battery Degradation in Lead-Acid Batteries
Battery degradation is unavoidable in lead-acid batteries; however, the rate of degra-
dation can be predicted depending on how the battery is managed during its lifetime.
However, the rate of degradation can be managed depending on some known factors
[104].
6.2.2.2 Battery Degradation Factors
• Loss of active material from positive plates.
• Loss of capacity due to the physical changes in the active material of positive
plates.
• Temperature elevated temperatures reduce battery life.
• Cycle service discharge cycles reduce battery life.
6.2.2.3 Pioneer P3-DX Robot - battery properties
Experimentation in this case study with real batteries is unrealistic, as battery degra-
dation can take many months to occur. However, to accurately simulate the battery
performance, the properties of the actual Pioneer P3-DX robot battery is imple-
mented. The Pioneer P3-DX uses the YUASA NP Series (NP7.5) battery. The
NP7.5 data sheet provided all the necessary battery capacity and charge ratings
[109].
The life of a battery can be described as the number of ’charge’ cycles it can
produce before being discarded. The number of charge cycles available greatly
depends on how the battery is charged/discharged during its lifetime [110]. DOD
(Depth of Discharge) is used to describe how deeply a battery is discharged. The
less a battery is discharged then the greater the number of ’charge’ cycles you will
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get from the battery over its lifetime. Fig. 6.2 shows the DOD characteristics of








































Figure 6.2: The DOD (Depth of Discharge) characteristics for the lead-acid battery used in
the Pioneer P3-DX robot [16].
If a battery is discharged at nearly 100 %, then the number of battery cycles
available during the its lifetime is greatly reduced. If the battery is only discharged
to 30 %, (see Fig. 6.2), then numbers of charge cycles available will increase.
Battery degradation can be managed by applying basic principles when charging
the battery.
• A lead-acid battery should never be discharged below 80 %, otherwise over
time the battery will be damaged [111].
• To prevent sulfating and stratification, a lead-acid battery needs an Equalizing
Charge. The battery is charged at a higher voltage and this is required every
10 charge cycles [111].
• The Pioneer Robot battery supply should be maintained above 11 VDC (Volt-
age Direct Current). If it falls below 10 VDC, the battery warning signals.
6.2.3 Simulated Battery Performance
Experimentation with real batteries in a mobile robot is unrealistic as battery degra-
dation can take many months to occur. For this case study, the Pioneer P3-DX robot
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battery is simulated using MRDS (Microsoft Robotics Developer Studio) and SPL
(Simulation Programming Language) editor to provide a graphics environment (see
Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3: Battery simulation program (developed by the author), using (MRDS) and
robot (P3-DX) rendering using (SPL).
6.2.4 Simulated Battery setup task
In the simulated Setup Task, the mobile robot travels from point A to point B, which
is measured at 200 meters. Table 1 shows the DOD rates at 100%, 50% and 30%.
The cycle number represents the number of times the battery has been re-charged.
The following parameters are defined to create a basic battery simulation in-
volving the DOD values (see Table 6.1).
DR depth of charge rate (this is the percentage of dis-charge used before the
battery is cycled). DOD depth of discharge (this is the percentage available in the
battery to discharge). DP discharge percentage (this is the amount of discharge
available at a particular cycle count). BP battery percentage (this is the amount of
battery charge required to complete a task). SU single unit (this unit is calibrated
1% of battery power and will move the robot a distance of 20 meters). DISTU
distance unit (this is the number of SUs required given a distance value).
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Table 6.1: Shows the percentage rate (DR) and depth of discharge (DOD) for the P3-DX
battery. When DOD falls below 60%, then the battery loses its ability to hold a
significant charge and therefore DOD is denoted as ’-’






1 0 100 100 100
2 20 104 101 101
3 40 108 103 101
4 80 110 104 102
5 100 101 107 103
6 120 95 107 103
7 140 91 108 103
8 160 80 108 104
9 180 60 109 105
10 200 - 110 106
11 240 - 103 106
12 280 - 105 107
13 320 - 102 107
14 340 - 98 108
15 360 - 95 108
16 380 - 91 109
17 400 - 86 110
18 500 - 80 110
19 600 - 60 110
20 700 - - 108
21 800 - - 106
22 900 - - 102
23 1000 - - 98
24 1050 - - 95
25 1100 - - 90
26 1150 - - 80
27 1200 - - 60
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The percentage of charge required to complete a task is calculated using Equa-
tion (6.3). This percentage is important, as the mobile robot system manager needs





Figure 6.4 shows the percentage charge required to complete the task when
the battery is at various stages within its cycle. In this example the DOD rate is set
at 50%. The robot task distance = 200 meters. In the early stages of battery life, the
battery charge requirements for the task remain constant. However, after 240 charge
cycles, the percentage of charge increases as the battery degradation increases. This
would have an impact on tasks that required the robot to travel long distances.
Figure 6.4: Shows the percentage charge required to complete a task when the battery is at
various stages within its cycle - using 50 % DOD.
6.3. Conceptual Design 132
6.3 Conceptual Design
6.3.1 Autonomic Battery Management
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the AIFH architecture was developed to handle both
wheel alignment faults and sonar sensor faults. In this Chapter the AIFH model
is further developed to handle power management fault (battery degradation). The
AIFH model contains a System Manger and an Autonomic Manager. The System
Manager is responsible for initiating the ’control’ loop - Reactive and Proactive.
The main feedback loop (Reactive), will traverse through each of the Autonomic
Manager layers - Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment. The secondary feedback
loop (Proactive), will operate in the Awareness Layer. The AIFH architectural
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Figure 6.5: Autonomic Model for Battery Degradation Management
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1. Awareness Layer - this layer is responsible for flagging a potential fault within
the power management system on the robot. The Awareness layer will use the
Knowledge Base data to establish if there is potentially a fault. The Reactive
Control loop will initiate the ’Process Readings’ module. This module will
update the Knowledge Base (Dynamic Parameters), with the current state of
the battery i.e., current charge available and current cycle count. The Reac-
tive Control loop will then execute the ’Check Battery Cycle Count’ module.
Using the Knowledge Base ’historical data’ and dynamic parameters’, this
module can make a decision as to whether there is a potential battery degra-
dation fault. If a possible fault has been identified, then all the collected data
is passed to the Awareness Layer. The Proactive Control loop uses the Knowl-
edge Base ’historical’, ’real-time’ and ’dynamic parameters’ data to establish
if there is a possible pending battery degradation fault. The Proactive Con-
trol loop has access to the DOD (Depth of Charge) value and can match this
with the current battery ’cycle count’. If a possible battery degradation fault
is imminent, a report can be sent to the System Manager User Interface. In
Figure 6.6, the chart shows the pre-degradation phase; the Proactive Control


















Figure 6.6: The cycle lifetime of the P3-DX battery using a DOD of 50 %. The Proactive
Control loop is concerned with the pre-degradation phase.
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2. Analysis Layer - this layer uses data received from Awareness layer to estab-
lish if a there is a fault in the power system within the robot. The Analysis
layer uses a ’Battery Analysis’ policy from the Knowledge Base to check on
the state of the battery. The ’Battery Analysis’ policy uses the Knowledge
Base ’tolerance values’ and ’dynamic parameters’ together with ’real-time’
task data, to establish if there is a battery fault. If the tolerance threshold
limits are exceeded, then battery is now declared as being in a ’degradation’
state. However, if the battery is operating within tolerance limits, then the
Reactive Control loop will initiate the ’Report’ module to inform the System
Manager that ’no fault’ was found - see Figure 6.5.
3. Adjustment Layer - this layer receives data from the Analysis layer containing
information about the battery degradation fault. This layer is used to make
possible adjustments to the robot System Operations in order to compensate
for the fault. The Reactive Control loop initiates the ’Execute Compensation
Policy for battery fault’ module which utilizes the Knowledge Base ’policies’.
This policy can then be used to make adjustments i.e., reduce the speed of the
motors and therefore, reduce the amount of battery power needed to complete
a task. If an adjustment can be made, then the Adjustment Layer will pass the
necessary data to the System Manager to make the adjustment. However, if
no possible adjustment can be made, then the Reactive Control loop will send
a report to the System Manager - see Figure 6.5.
The Autonomic Manager will periodically monitor the data supplied by the
robot sensors and battery monitor. If performance data is within acceptable thresh-
olds, the Autonomic Manager will not intervene. The Autonomic Manager will also
update historical as each task is completed. If similar task is requiring more battery
capacity that it did previously, then this could indicate that the battery is coming
to the end of its life in terms of a useful power source. If a battery cannot retain a
charge of more than 80 %, then it needs to be replaced [104]. Alternatively, the Au-
tonomic Manager could enforce a policy where the DOD rate is changed. Lowering
the DOD rate (at the charging station) can extend the batteries life cycle count.
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6.4 Implementation
6.4.1 Autonomic Battery Power Management
The Pioneer P3-DX robot contains components that require a certain level of power-
input. The lead-acid batteries contained within the robot supply the necessary power
for the components. Research conducted in [17], shows the relative power required
for each of the Pioneer P3-DX components - see Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Power requirements for each component in the Pioneer P3-DX robot [17].
Component Power Percentage
Motion 2.8W ˜ 10.6W 12% ˜ 44.6%
Sensing (sonar) 0.58W ˜ 0.82W 1.9% ˜ 5.1%
Micro-controller 4.6W 14.8% ˜ 28.8%
Embedded Computer 8W ˜ 15W 33.3% ˜ 65.3%
For this experiment in the case study, investigations where carried out in how
battery degradation can affect how much power is available for the ’Motion’ com-
ponent during different stages of the lifetime of the battery. Fig. 6.7 shows how
the research conducted in [17], describes the amount of power needed for the robots




















Figure 6.7: shows the power(W) required for the ’motion’ component in the P3-DX when
driven at various speeds [17].
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The autonomic battery power management design for the mobile robot in-
cludes a System Manager and an Autonomic Manager - see Figure 6.5. The System
Manager accepts input from the User Interface and translates this into commands
which will provide direction and speed for the Pioneer P3-DX robot. The Auto-
nomic Manager monitors and analyses tasks performed by the robot. The Auto-
nomic Manager considers the current battery ’cycle’ value and the current power
(W) utilized by the robot for the ’Motion’ component. If the threshold limits of
the battery in its present state are being exceeded, then the Autonomic Manager
will make the necessary adjustments to the power (W) level that is provided to the
’Motion’ component.
6.4.1.1 Robot Task One - Motion Management
Using data collected by research conducted in [17], battery data from Fig. 6.2 and
the User input values, we can construct parameter and test values - see Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Robot Task One: setup values for robot running @ battery cycle 0.
Parameters Values
RS Robot Speed (mm/s) 600 (0.6 M)
PR Power required (W) 8
DIS Distance to travel (M) 5,000
T Time (hr.) 2.31
WHU Watt Hours used 18.48
WC Watt Hour capacity 25.2
BC Battery Cycle 0
The battery in the Pioneer P3-DX provides 84 watt-hours of power capacity
[112]. When the battery is at cycle 0, then the battery capacity is 100%. The battery
rating is 7000mAh offering 12 volts [16]. The following equation (6.4), is used to
calculate the watt hour value for the battery. (E = Energy, Q = milliamp hours and
V = Voltage). This will give 84 watt-hours as described in [112].





Using the values in Table 6.3, we can establish the value of the ’motion’ com-
ponent in terms of watt hours used.
WHU = PR x T (6.5)
To prolong the life of the battery, a DOD rate of 30% is employed - see Fig.
6.2. When adopting a 30 % DOD rate, this means that the battery is never allowed
to fall below 70% charge capacity. The battery at 100% charge gives 84 watt-hours
of power, however, if 30% DOD rate is used, then only 25.2 watt-hours available for
the Pioneer robot at battery cycle 0 (see equation (6.6) for how watt-hour capacity
WC is calculated at the DOD rate). Using the WHU value from equation (6.5), we
can then calculate the percentage capacity (PC) required for the robot to complete









The PC value is calculated using equation (6.7). For this experiment, the
acceptable threshold (AT) value for how much capacity a robot task uses, is set to
80%. If the PC value is below the AT value, then the task can complete successfully.
If the PC value is above the AT threshold value, then task is under threat as it is
using full power resource from the battery at the present DOD rate.
The initial robot Task (see Table 6.3), requires a battery charge capacity PC
of 73.33%, when employing equation (6.7). The PC value of 73.33% is below the
threshold value (80%) and therefore no adjustment from the Autonomic Manager is
required.
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6.4.1.2 Robot Task Two - Motion Management (with battery degra-
dation)
In this experiment, the same parameters are used from Robot Task one but in this
case, the battery is now in a degradation phase and therefore the amount of charge
capacity is reduced. The robot task is run using cycle 1100 (see Table 6.4), which
results in capacity dropping from 100% to 90% (see Fig. 6.5). We need to re-
calculate the (Ewh) value using equation (6.4). This results in battery capacity
being reduced from 84 watt-hours to 75.6 watt-hours. Using the DOD rate of 30%,
we now have 22.68 watt-hours available for the task. If we apply equation (6.7),
then the task will require 81.48% of battery capacity PC, which is above the accept-
able threshold AT value of 80%.
Table 6.4: Robot Task Two: setup values for robot running @ battery cycle 1100.
Parameters Values
RS Robot Speed (mm/s) 600 (0.6 M)
PR Power required (W) 8
DIS Distance to travel (M) 5,000
T Time (hr.) 2.31
WHU Watt Hours used 18.48
WC Watt Hour capacity 22.68
BC Battery Cycle 1100
Within the Analysis Layer, a battery degradation fault is identified using the
’Battery Analysis’ policy. Algorithm 6 (Battery Analysis Policy), shows how task
input and analysis performed by the Autonomic Manager can establish if the PC
value is within tolerance values. Using the current ’Battery Cycle Charge’ percent-
age and the current ’Battery Cycle Count’, a check is made to see if the battery
has reached its final ’cycle count’ according to its DOD status. If this check re-
turns ’true’ then the battery has expired and no compensation for the fault can be
applied. If the battery is still functioning, then the equations (6.5), (6.6) and
(6.7) are applied in order to establish that the PC Percentage Charge is below the
’charge’ threshold limit (held in the Knowledge Base - in Tolerance values). If PC
is above the ’charge’ threshold limit, then a fault is declared, and the relevant data is
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then passed to the Adjustment Layer to apply a compensation policy - (see Section
6.5.1).
ALGORITHM 6: Battery Analysis Policy - checks that PC is within toler-
ance range.





Output: thresholdExceeded = if this value is set to true, then the
ad justmentBatteryCompensation() algorithm needs to be
engaged.
if (batteryCycleCount > upperCycleValue) then
batteryExpired = true;
end
if (batteryExpired = f alse) then
double RS = robotSpeedInput();
int PR = powerRequiredInput();
double DIS = distanceToTravelInput();
//Calculate the travel time for task;
double T = DIS/(RS/1000);
//Calculate the watt hours used for task;
double WHU = T ∗PR;
//Energy available from battery at cycle count position;
double Q(mAh) = 7ah∗batteryCyclePercentageValue;
double E = Q(mAh)∗ voltage/1000;
//Use the DOD rate, calculate the working battery capacity;
double WA = DOD∗E/100;
//Calculate the percentage capacity required by the robot task;
double PC = WHA/WA∗100;
//Calculate the percentage of battery capacity required for task does not
exceed threshold value;
if (PC > 80%) then
thresholdExceeded = true;
end
//If threshold value is exceeded then call the Battery Adjustment
Algorithm;
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6.5 Demonstration (testing)
6.5.1 Robot Task Three - Motion Management (with battery
degradation) - applying a compensation policy
The Implementation Section (6.4), showed how the robot performed a task with an
optimal battery and a battery that was experiencing degradation issues. The experi-
ment in Section 6.4.1.2 showed that the battery degradation led to threshold values
being exceeded. To compensate for the battery degradation fault, an adjustment pol-
icy is required, so that the robot can complete a task with the threshold limits. To
bring the task performed by the robot at cycle 1100 below the battery usage thresh-
old value of 80%, we need to reduce the speed and power of the robot. If we use
the adjusted values from Table 6.5, the WHU value is now at 18.00 using equation
(6.5). We can then calculate the PC value using equation (6.7). The resulting PC
value of 79.66% is now below the threshold AT value of 80% and therefore the
robot can safely complete the task.
Table 6.5: Robot Task Three: compensation - reduce speed @ battery cycle 1100.
Parameters Values
RS Robot Speed (mm/s) 500 (0.5 M)
PR Power required (W) 6.5
DIS Distance to travel (M) 5,000
T Time (hr.) 2.77
WHU Watt Hours used 18.00
WC Watt Hour capacity 22.68
BC Battery Cycle 1100
6.5.2 Battery Degradation Compensation Algorithm
If the PC value is above the acceptable threshold limit, then Algorithm 7 is initi-
ated. This Policy is stored in the Knowledge Base of the AIFH Autonomic Man-
ager. The Adjustment Layer will use this policy to make adjustments to the power
requirements of the robot so that less battery charge is required. The Compensation
Algorithm 7, will be periodically run until the PC value is below the threshold limit
value.
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ALGORITHM 7: Battery Compensation Algorithm
1: procedure ADJUSTMENTBATTERYCOMPENSATION() . Adjust speed of the
robot Input: robotMotorSpeedValue = UserInputValueForMotorSpeed
2: //Use built in Microsoft Drive functions to update the motor speed value
3: Drive.SetDrivePowerRequest request = new
Drive.SetDrivePowerRequest()
4:





Using the same task configuration used in Section 6.4.1.1, Table 6.6 shows the
parameter values used for the evaluating the Battery Degradation case study. The
equations used in Section 6.4.1.1 are applied to a range of ’Cycle Counts’ that rep-
resents the life of the battery.
Table 6.6: Parameter values used in the evaluation of the battery performance using a DOD
rate of 30 %.
Parameters Values
RS Robot Speed (mm/s) 600 (0.6 M)
PR Power required (W) 8
DIS Distance to travel (M) 5,000
T Time (hr.) 2.31
WHU Watt Hours used 18.48
In Figure 6.8, the percentage charge needed from the battery to complete a
robot task (see Table 6.6), decreases as the battery reaches its mid-cycle range (200-
700). After the battery cycle has reached 800, the percentage charge PC needed in-
creases as the battery starts to experience the effects of degradation. Eventually the
percentage charge required exceeds the Tolerance Limit (1100-1150), and therefore
























Battery Cycle Count 
Percentage Charge (PC) 
required for a robot task at 
each Cycle point (Table 5.6). 
Tolerance Limit 
Figure 6.8: Line chart showing what Percentage Charge is available to a robot task at given
cycle point within the battery lifetime.
In Figure 6.9, the Battery Degradation Adjustment policy is applied when
the battery gradation fault has been identified (battery cycle 1000). In Figure 6.8,
battery cycle 1100 and 1150 where above the tolerance limit. In Figure 6.9, the
























Battery Cycle Count 
Percentage Charge (PC) 
required for a robot task at 
each Cycle point (Table 5.6). 
Tolerance Limit 
Fault Adjustment Policy 
for Battery Degradation 
applied. 
Adjustment Policy = Watt 
output reduced to 6.5 
Adjustment Policy = Watt 
output reduced to 5 
Figure 6.9: Line chart showing what Percentage Charge is available to a robot task at given
cycle point within the battery lifetime.
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Further development of the AIFH architectural model showed a battery degra-
dation fault can be managed using both the robots System Manager and the Auto-
nomic Manager. The three layers in the Autonomic Manager (Awareness, Analysis
and Adjustment), interacted with the Reactive Control and Proactive Control feed-
back loops to handle the battery degradation fault. Using the Autonomic Manager
Knowledge Base, policies where used to analyze the extent of the fault and to make
adjustments to compensate for the fault. Self-adjustment allows the robot to com-
plete tasks even when operating with reduced power availability. Ultimately the
battery in a degradation state will need replaced. The goal in this Cast Study, was
to allow the robot to function as long as possible until even with operating at low
power.
6.7 Summary
Autonomic Management for Mobile Robot Battery Degradation case study set out
to demonstrate how an Autonomic Management System can be implemented to
handle power management faults in a mobile robot such as the Pioneer P3-DX. The
System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) was implemented as a Research Model to
describe a sequence of activities including requirements, design, implementation,
testing and evaluation. The Research question posed for this case study stated -
if the AIFH architecture (derived from the MAPE-K autonomic model and IMD
model), can be applied to detecting power management faults on a mobile robot
and if possible, compensate for those faults? Can the mobile robot adapt to its
changed environment and continue to function even with a battery fault?
The AIFH architecture was expanded in order to handle power faults within a
mobile robot. In this case study, tests where carried out on how battery degradation
can affect the performance of a mobile robot over time. This type of fault scenario is
predictable compared to the Wheel Alignment Fault and the Sonar Sensor fault case
studies, in which a fault can occur at any time during a mission. Battery degrada-
tion is an unavoidable process and therefore the Autonomic Manager must adapt its
policies to handle this type of disability. The AIFH ’Awareness’ process in this case
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study, is knowing when the battery degradation has begun. This relies on knowl-
edge regarding the DOD that is being adapted (Fig. 6.2) and checking the cycle
count of the lead-acid battery in the robot. The AIFH ’Analysis’ process can cross
referencing the cycle count with the percentage of charge available in the battery to
establish if the tolerance threshold has been exceeded. The data from the ’Analysis’
process is then made available to the AIFH ’Adjustment’ process. The ’Adjustment’
policies can then calculate what power reduction in certain components is required
so therefore reducing battery consumption.
The research carried out in this case study and the previous case studies (Chap-
ter 4 and Chapter 5), provides a valuable experience in gathering knowledge for the
implementation of a Generic Autonomic Architecture for fault handling in a mobile
robot (see Chapter 7).
Chapter 7
Generic Architecture for Fault
Detection (AIFH)
7.1 Introduction
In this Chapter, the final design for the autonomic intelligent fault handling archi-
tecture (AIFH) is presented. In Chapter 3, Section 3.3, the initial concept of the
AIFH architecture was introduced with the notion of a 3-layer architecture. The
initial ideas for the architecture where based on a combination of the MAPE-K and
IMD architectural models. The aim of the generic autonomic architectural design is
to handle various types of component faults within a mobile robot. Through a series
of 3 case studies, the architecture has been refined as experience and insight from
the studies was gained. In Chapter 4, 5 and 6, case studies where employed to ex-
plore how different fault scenarios could be used to develop the AIFH architecture.
The generic autonomic architecture or AIFH, is a triple layer model consisting of
an Awareness Layer, Analysis Layer and Adjustment Layer. These three layers are
controlled by an Autonomic Manager. The Autonomic Manager contains feedback
loops that traverse through each of the layers. The System Manager controls the
flow of data from the robot’s sensors and effectors. The High-Level AIFH architec-
ture is introduced in Section 7.3. The Low-Level detailed architecture is presented
later in Section 7.6. The following Sections explain the roles and responsibilities
of a number of the architectural components prior to seeing them within the overall
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design architecture (Fig. 7.8). Evaluation of the generic architecture is presented
in Section 7.8, through a further case study which explores the utility of the evolved
AIFH architecture.
7.2 Overview - Generic Architecture (Fault Han-
dling)
The design of software systems requires the ability to describe, create, and evaluate
systems at an architectural level. Designing a reliable system involves integrat-
ing failure responses within the system. Failure responses can be categorized by
stages. It is important that the architectural system design provides a response for
each stage. Stages include Fault Detection, Fault Diagnosis, Recovery and Repair
[113]. Faults occurring in systems often don’t limited themselves to one compo-
nent. Research carried out in [114], incorporates a generic fault tolerance architec-
ture (GFTSA), to handle faults by using error recovery mechanisms in Distributed
Systems. Their architectural fault tolerance proposal is designed so that it can be
re-used at different levels within the Distributed System. This re-usable design is
important within the AIFH architecture. If a fault occurs in the robot’s sensors sys-
tem, drive system or power management system, the AIFH architecture needs to
be adaptive to handle these faults from multiple systems within the mobile robot.
In designing a generic architecture, basic elements need to be incorporated such
as re-usability, adaptive (reacting to requirement changes without the need for re-
structuring) and low complexity (complex systems require more maintenance and
are more difficult to understand and use). Research in Generic Architecture in [115],
proposes their GeRDI (Generic Research Data Infrastructure), that uses policies that
can adapt to shifting requirements. By extrapolating requirements, they in-turn cre-
ate domains that contain features that are self-contained. In designing the AIFH
generic architecture, each fault scenario has its own set of requirements. If a fault is
contained within a particular robot sensor, then the architecture needs to be flexible
in identifying, analyzing and if possible, compensating for the fault. Equally, if the
fault occurs in the ’power’ system of the robot, a new set of requirements needs to
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be processed using the same generic model. During a mobile robot’s lifetime, it
may receive various types of hardware upgrades i.e. new sensors etc. The AIFH
Knowledge Base needs to flexible to incorporate new policies to handle these new
components. Therefore, if a fault occurs in a relatively new component (sensors),
the AIFH can adapt to its changed environment.
7.2.1 Comparative analysis of the architectural model used in
each case study
The case study in Chapter 4 introduced a 3-layer concept to describe the AIFH
architecture. The Awareness Layer would process the sensor data and identify fault
patterns, the Analysis Layer would analyse the data to establish the extent of the
fault, finally, the Adjustment Layer would then determine if a compensation strategy
could be applied to the fault data, so that the robot could continue to function in
some capacity. Chapter 4 also introduced a basic feedback loop, that transported
the data between each layer and to the System Manager. The case study in Chapter
5 introduced the autonomic Knowledge Base, which contains different data types,
that can be used by each of the three layers within the AIFH architecture. Compared
to the previous case study in Chapter 4, the architecture in this case study can call
on policies and historical data to handle faults. When a component failure occurs,
the Autonomic Manager will select the appropriate recovery policy to compensate
for the fault. The Knowledge Base also contains dynamic parameters that can be
adjusted if environmental changes occur. The final case study (Chapter 6), explores
the use of reactive a proactive feedback loops. This allows the Autonomic Manager
the ability to report possible pending faults by comparing historical and real-time
data.
7.3 High-Level AIFH Architecture
When building an Autonomic Architecture, certain characteristics are required to
define the autonomic system. The autonomic system is required to hold self-
knowledge and therefore acquire knowledge of the surrounding environment. The
autonomic system is required to detect and recover from component failure and
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therefore, maintain a level of independence. In Figure 7.1, the basic AIFH archi-
tecture consists of an autonomic manager with connections to hardware systems
via the system manager. Within the autonomic manager, the self-healing module is
responsible for initiating the feedback loop that transports data through each of the














































Figure 7.1: AIFH architecture (High-Level view).
7.4 AIFH architectural components
7.4.1 System Manager
The System Manager is responsible for controlling the sensors and effectors of the
mobile robot. The System Manager feeds data from the sensors to the Autonomic
Manager. The Autonomic Manager can then process the sensor data and also update
the Knowledge Base module - see Figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: AIFH architecture - System Manager modules.
The Task Module within the System Manager, is used to process ’task’ data in-
putted from the User Interface and to execute commands taken from the Operating
Policies. The Task Module initiates the robot sensors and sends command opera-
tions to the effectors. Data from the robot’s sensors is processed using the Sensor
Processing Module. The Sensor Processing Module is responsible for sending data
to the Autonomic Manager; this data contains sensor readings accumulated during
the task operations. The Autonomic Manager, if required, can update the System
Manager operating policies via the AM’s adjustment policies. These adjustments
would be in response to a fault status, within the mobile robot. If a fault status is
apparent, then the Autonomic Manager needs to make adjustments to the current
task by changing the behavior of the operating policies within the System Manager.
The System Manager also contains an Output Module which is used to relay data
supplied by the Autonomic Manager’s (Knowledge Base module), to Users or Mis-
sion control, regarding fault diagnosis, symptoms of possible impending faults and
fault recovery information.
7.4.2 Autonomic Manager
The Autonomic Manager implements the feedback loops and makes use of domain-
specific knowledge to process task data supplied by the System Manager [49]. The
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Autonomic Manager makes use of monitored data from sensors and combines this
with stored knowledge to plan and implement tasks. The Autonomic Manager, if
required, is responsible for initiating behavioral changes regarding the execution of
tasks. Behavioral changes are usually the result of an environmental change i.e. a
fault status is declared. The Autonomic Manager would then relate these changes
or adjustments, to the System Manager’s operating policies. In terms of fault man-
agement, the Autonomic Manager benefits from using previous experiences or his-
torical data, to identify trends in component behaviours. When a fault occurs within
a component, it may not necessarily be represented as a straightforward fail state.
Some faults within components may not be discernible to begin with, but over time,
the failure gradually becomes more evident. The Autonomic Manager must not only
report (via the Output Module - see Figure 7.2), if a component suffers catastrophic
failure but also report on the behavior of a component that is under performing or
showing a gradual downwards trend.
7.4.2.1 Self-Healing Module
Within the Autonomic Manager, the Self-Healing module is responsible for moni-
toring, detecting and diagnosing system malfunctions. It achieves this by initiating
the feedback controls loops. In the AIFH architecture two control feedback loops
are employed (Reactive and Proactive). Research developed in [116], shows that
coordinated parallel control loops can be used to carry out separate operations as
long as each control loop does not violate the objective of another controller. The
Reactive Control loop passes data between each of the 3 Layers (Awareness, Anal-
ysis and Adjustment). The Reactive Control loop is part of the Autonomic Manager
that immediately identifies a component failure. There is no requirement for adapt-
ing experience or historical data in this instance, as identifying and analyzing the
fault needs to be carried out quickly. The Proactive Control loop operates within
the Awareness and Analysis Layer. The Proactive Control loop will use past experi-
ence and historical data to investigate component anomalies. The Proactive Control
loop is part of the Autonomic Manager that reports any particular trends in a com-
ponent’s performance. The Autonomic Manager also contains the Knowledge Base
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module. The Knowledge Base module is available to all 3 Layers within the Auto-
nomic Manager.
7.4.2.2 Knowledge Base Module
The information stored in the Knowledge Base can be used to extend the knowledge
capabilities of an Autonomic Manager. The Knowledge Base Module provides each
layer in the AIFH architecture with tolerance values, polices, historical data, dy-
namic parameters, real-time data and symptoms.
• Tolerance Values - task performance is measured against expected result
markers. Tolerance values are used so that tasks are completed within an
established level of accuracy. If a Tolerance value is exceeded, then the task
has failed.
• Policies - an Autonomic System requires a method for defining polices that
allows the Autonomic Manager to make informed decisions [47]. Implement-
ing policies in a standard way, means the whole autonomic system can be
managed using a common set of policies. In the AIFH architecture, aware-
ness, analysis and adjustment policies are stored within the Autonomic Man-
ager. The System Manager stores the operating policies that used for com-
mand routines for the sensors and effectors.
• Historical Data - as each robot task is performed, the sensor data is recorded
into the Knowledge Base. The Autonomic Manager uses historical data to
identify any significant changes in the performance of sensors over time. His-
torical data is also useful for identifying trends within task data.
• Dynamic Parameters - are sets of parameters that are predefined but can be
updated when required. For example, if the battery cycle count (in the mobile
robot), reaches a certain level, then this is compared to the dynamic parameter
value: if they are equal, then an alert message is sent to the AM.
• Real-Time Data - real-time data is information currently being reported by
sensors during a task. The Autonomic Manager may need to react quickly, if
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a sensor is reporting irregular data, i.e., a sensor is damaged in a collision.
• Symptoms - this is part of the Knowledge Base that records any possible
impending issues with components. Symptoms can be identified within task
performance data. Even though sensor data is within Tolerance limits, reports
can show a downward trend that might indicate a possible fault in the future.
The Knowledge Base Module is dynamic and is constantly updated with sensor
data supplied by the executing task. Figure 7.3 shows how each attribute within the
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Figure 7.3: Shows how the attributes within the Knowledge Base are used by each Layer
within the AIFH Architecture.
Tolerance values within the Knowledge Base Module can be read by both the
Awareness Layer and the Analysis Layer. The ’tolerance’ value process works on a
number of levels. When a task is being executed by the robot, data from multiple
sensors are being processed by the Autonomic Manager (Awareness Layer). De-
pending on what type of task is being performed and what sensor is being used, will
dictate the type of ’tolerance’ value. In Figure 7.4, tolerance type is described as
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(TT). The sensor/historical data is checked using the Check Tolerance Value (CTV)
algorithm. Depending on the value within data, the CTV algorithm will
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Figure 7.4: (a) - Shows tolerance values compared to real-time sensor data. (b) - tolerance
values compared to historical data.
The tolerance type (TT), can either be ’dynamic’ of ’fixed’. The selected tol-
erance value is then used against the current sensor reading. If the sensor reading
is above the expected tolerance value then action is required, and the sensor data is
’tagged’ for further investigation.
Figure 7.5: Example of ’fixed’ tolerance value - used to identify disabled sonar sensors
An example of a ’fixed’ tolerance value is shown in Figure 7.5. The sonar
sensors on a P3-DX Pioneer robot defaults to a reading of ’5000’ when in a disabled
state. The ’fixed’ tolerance value is also set to ’5000’. If sensor reading equals the
tolerance value, the sensor would be declared as faulty.
Tolerance values can also be used on historical sensor data (see Figure 7.4
(b)). If a robot is performing a repetitive task, the sensor data is recorded into the
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Knowledge Base. As part of the self-healing process, the historical data is periodi-
cally monitored. The historical data is then compared with the accepted ’tolerance’
values. If the tolerance value has been exceeded, then that section of historical data
is ’tagged’ and sent for further investigation to establish the extent of the fault.
An example of a tolerance value being used with historical data, is shown in
Figure 7.6. The mobile robot is expected to arrive at its destination point within
a tolerance value (25mm). If the tolerance value is exceeded, then this is flagged
as a possible fault. This tolerance value can be altered if required and is therefore
described as being ’dynamic’.
Figure 7.6: Example of a ’dynamic’ tolerance value for laser sensor distance readings
The Awareness Layer can also update tolerances if a particular tolerance value
is too sensitive. For example, there is a tolerance value used to check if two sonar
sensors are showing the correct distance reading when detecting an object - as the
sonar array on the robot is octadecagon, this tolerance value may need to change
depending on the angle of the robot to the object.
The ’Policy Selector’ process (see Figure 7.7), is used by all 3 layers in the
AIFH architecture. Some policies are used to check if sensors are operating within
tolerance limits. Other polices involve analyzing data to establish the extent of a
fault. Polices are also available that can adjust the behavior of the robot to com-
pensate for a fault. In Autonomic Computing, policies can be described as action,
utility and goal [54], - explained in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.2. In the AIFH
architecture, the policy selection process depends on the type of fault that has been
identified. If we take an example for a sonar sensor fault (as investigated in Chapter
5), various policies are required to identify and handle the fault process - see Figure
7.7.
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Figure 7.7: Policy Selector - Knowledge Base policies for Sonar Sensor Fault.
In Figure 7.7, the Autonomic Manager (Awareness Layer), contains an Action
policy and Goal policy. The Action policy is required as the Autonomic Manager
needs to react to the current state of the system. The sonar sensor has reported a
fault state, therefore, action needs to be taken quickly. The Goal policy is more
measured. In this case, the exact state is unknown, so this policy executes a number
of checks between adjacent sonar sensors to establish if a particular sensor requires
more investigation. The Autonomic Manager (Analysis Layer), contains a Goal pol-
icy to establish what actual sonar sensors are faulty as identified by the Awareness
layer. The Autonomic Manager (Adjustment Layer), uses a Utility policy to calcu-
late the angle of ’rotation’ required by the robot to compensate for each disabled
sonar sensor. Finally, a further Action policy (see Figure 7.7), is used to make
the adjustments to the robot when executing its tasks and therefore compensate for
any disabled sonar sensors. This action will update the Operating Policy within the
System Manager.
The Knowledge Base Historical Data is constantly updated by the Autonomic
Manager with sensor data supplied by the System Manager. When a robot task is
completed, then the results of the task are recorded for reference purposes. For
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example, a task that was executed by the robot required 15% of the robot’s battery
charge. If a similar task is required, then historical data is useful in deciding if there
is enough power currently in the batteries to complete the task. Historical data is
also important in order to track behavioral changes within the robot’s components.
Some components may degrade over time and this can have an impact on a robot
while its executing various tasks. Dynamic Parameters are used to aid analysis when
checking values against Real-time data. For example, the battery cycle count is a
dynamic parameter that is updated every time the robot’s battery is charged. The
Knowledge Base Symptoms, records unusual readings from selected components.
Symptoms are only recorded if they are within tolerance limits but are showing
a behavioral pattern that may suggest a future impending fault. An example of
’Symptom’ behaviour - when a robot is asked to conduct a series of tasks leading it
to a particular destination, as it reaches the end of the tasks, the distance it is from the
destination marker is progressively increasing. Even though the robot is operating
within tolerance values, this behavior could indicate a progressive ’drive’ system
failure or minor damage to one of its wheel assembly’s, that, when the tolerance
value is eventually reached, will cause the analysis of the wheel alignment to be
conducted with a view to changing the ’operating policy’ for such tasks.
7.4.2.3 Keeping the Autonomic Manager focused
One of the aims in designing an autonomic architecture is to make sure the auto-
nomic procedures themselves do not overwhelm the system that is being monitored.
If the Autonomic Manager takes on vast amounts of sensor data from the robot, then
it will consume the same volume of CPU time and memory capacity as the System
itself [49]. Therefore, the data drawn in by the Autonomic Manager should be op-
timized in a way that the AM can receive the right enough data, so it can make an
informed decision, if it finds the data is showing anomalous behavior.
7.5 Building the AIFH Architecture
In Chapter 2, attributes from both the MAPE-K and IMD architecture where used
to build the AIFH basic architectural design. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the case stud-
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Figure 7.8: Low-Level AIFH Generic Autonomic Architecture.
ies provided methods for detecting and analyzing faults. There was also methods
to adjust for those faults. These experiments provided a foundation to develop the
AIFH architecture in greater detail. In Fig. 7.8, the Autonomic Manager is pre-
sented with the Knowledge Base module and connection to the System Manager,
as a fully formed Generic Autonomic Architecture. The Autonomic Manager (self-
healing module), controls the timing of the Health Check monitoring and initiates
the feed-back loops that traverse each layer (Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment).
The Knowledge Base is shared by each of the AIFH autonomic layers and includes
policies that can be used to detect and adjust for component faults. In this Section,
each of 3 Layers in the AIFH generic architecture are explored in detail, showing
how they interact with each other and how they interact with the Knowledge Base
module.
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7.5.1 Low-Level AIFH Architecture
In Section 7.3 the High-Level AIFH architecture was presented. In this Section, the
AIFH architecture is explored in greater detail at its lowest level. The Autonomic
Manager is largely independent (self-managing), however, it relies on communica-
tion with the System Manager for incoming sensor data. The Autonomic Manager
will also communicate with the System Manager if changes are required to handle
component faults - see Figure 7.8 - (Update Operating Policies). One of the prop-
erties of an autonomic system is self-healing. Self-Healing is presented in the AIFH
architecture as a module that controls the autonomic feedback loops and controls
the data output that the System Manager requires if changes have to be made to
alter system commands for fault compensation. In autonomic terms, self-healing is
the ability to find, diagnose and react to system malfunction. To discover system
malfunctions or possible future faults, the autonomic system must have knowledge
about its own behaviour and knowledge of the local environment [117]. The self-
healing module monitors for any apparent changes to the local environment. It
monitors systems by initiating self-health checks. The data from the robot sensors
is exposed to the Awareness Layer. However, as discussed in Section 7.4.2.3, this
data is selected at intervals to ensure it does not overwhelm the System. This Layer
will either report back to the self-healing module that no faults have been discov-
ered or it will identify component failures and report this data to the Analysis Layer
for further processing. The AIFH architecture has been designed in such a way, that
each layer within the Autonomic Manager has access to the Knowledge Base and
therefore, using appropriate policies, can make decisions in terms of how to manage
system faults.
7.5.2 Awareness Layer
As the mobile robot executes its tasks, the Autonomic Manager will periodically
check on the health and functionality of the hardware components. We define
Awareness as the ability to detect that the data being processed and monitored may
be indicating a possible fault. The Reactive Control loop initiates a health check on
all components that are to be used for the current robot task - see Fig. 7.8. This
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can involve detection sensors, cameras, motor differential drive and power supply.
Tolerance values held in the Knowledge Base Module are used to indicate if there is
a possible issue with a component. If tolerance values are exceeded, then this can
indicate a possible fault. If, for example, a sensor unit is reporting a disabled state,
then the Reactive Control loop will relay this information to the Analysis layer for
further processing. The Awareness layer can also process historical data and com-
pare this with real-time data reported by the current task. The Proactive Control
loop checks this data for patterns that might indicate a possible future fault. For
example, if the robot completes a task that involves traveling from destination A
to destination B, when doing a self-check, it finds that it is not exactly at point B
but is still within tolerance limits. However, if this trend continues in further tasks,
then it might be an indication that a wheel fault is about to occur. The Proactive
Control loop is responsible for reporting unusual data readings to the Self-Healing
module. The Self-Healing module will send these reports via the Output Module (in
the System Manager), to the User Interface or Mission Control. These reports are
vital and could prevent future tasks being compromised. Figure 7.9 shows an UML
Sequence representation of the modules and process routes within the Awareness
Layer.
Figure 7.9: UML diagram showing the relationships within the AIFH ’Awareness’ Layer.
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7.5.3 Analysis Layer
Through analysis, we can establish the extent of a fault indicated in the Awareness
Layer. Depending on the type of component identified, the relevant analysis policy
is selected from the Knowledge Base Module - see Fig. 7.8. The analysis policy
(see Policy Selector - Section 7.4.2.2), will then determine the extent of the fault.
Calculations are performed using the analysis policy, which are then passed to the
Adjustment Layer. For example, if a sonar fault has been identified in the Aware-
ness Layer, then an analysis policy can determine how many of the sonar sensors on
the array are disabled. Specialized policies can determine if the sonar sensor is re-
porting the correct distance data by comparing results with adjacent sonar sensors.
Other examples include wheel alignment policies. If the Awareness Layer deter-
mines there is an alignment fault, then a policy can be used to determine how much
the robot’s alignment is from the expected true alignment. The value returned would
be labelled as the offset value. The offset value can then be passed to the Adjustment
Layer.
Another property of the Analysis Layer is the ability to determine if current
tolerance values are too sensitive. If a tolerance value is set too ’high’, then this
can result in the Awareness Layer reporting a fault during the next Autonomic feed-
back loop process. The Analysis Layer can make the necessary adjustment to the
tolerance values if required. For example, if a wheel alignment tolerance value is
set in the Knowledge Base as 10 meters. Then this might need to change if the
terrain the robot is operating in, prevents the robot arriving at a destination with any
significant accuracy. The wheel alignment tolerance value could then be adjusted to
20 meters.
If tolerance adjustment is required, the Reactive Control loop will re-direct
back to the Awareness Layer for re-evaluation. Once the fault calculations are made
in the Analysis Layer, then the fault parameter data is passed to the Adjustment
Layer. Figure 7.10 shows an UML Sequence representation of the modules and
process routes within the Analysis Layer.
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Figure 7.10: UML sequence diagram showing the relationships within the AIFH Analysis
Layer.
7.5.4 Adjustment Layer
Using the fault parameter data supplied by the Analysis Layer, the Adjustment Layer
will select the appropriate adjustment policy from the knowledge Base module. Cal-
culations are then performed so that a compensation strategy can be employed to
handle the component fault - see Fig. 7.8. Adjustment calculations may determine
if there can be no resolution to the current fault. For example, if all sonar sensors
are reported as being disabled, then the sonar sensor array cannot be used to detect
objects along the robot’s path. In this case, a message is sent to the System Manager
(output module) to report that no compensation can be made to the reported fault.
However, if an adjustment calculation can be made, i.e., if there is at least one sonar
sensor still operable, then an adjustment policy can be deployed.
When the adjustment policy is deployed, the Reactive Control loop will send
the compensation parameters via the Autonomic Manager to the System Manager
(Operating Policy). The Operating Policy will then update the System Manager
(Task Module), which in turn, will direct the effectors/sensors to operate using the
new ’adjusted’ settings. To test the compensation strategy is successful, the Self-
healing module will then re-initiate the Control Loops in the Autonomic Manager
(Awareness Layer). The Component Health Check module in the Awareness Layer
will check the component against current tolerance limits. If the adjustment pol-
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icy is successful, the Reactive Control loop will send data back to the Self-healing
module in the Autonomic Manager to report that no faults are pending. Figure 7.11
shows an UML Sequence representation of the modules and process routes within
the Adjustment Layer.
Figure 7.11: UML sequence diagram showing the relationships within the AIFH Adjust-
ment Layer
7.6 Applying the Generic AIFH Architecture (Stereo
Vision Camera Fault)
7.6.1 Introduction
The first 3 case studies where employed in order to expand our knowledge and ex-
plore the issues involved. In doing so, the AIFH architecture evolved to the extent
that has been documented in this Chapter. In order to attempt some form of vali-
dation on the AIFH architecture, another case study was made. However, on this
occasion, the intention was primarily to evaluate the completeness and feasibility of
the AIFH architecture, rather than to evolve and refine it (as had been the objective
of the first 3 case studies).
To evaluate the design of the AIFH generic architecture (see Fig. 7.8), we
have applied it to a further case study centred on hardware faulting within a Stereo
Vision Camera sensor. The overall objective was to demonstrate the utility of the
generic architecture to a new fault scenario. The aim was to use all the layers within
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the Autonomic Manager (Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment), to establish if a
fault was occurring and if possible, make policy changes and self-adapt the System
to compensate for the fault and thereby provide a first stage of feasibility check on
our architecture.
7.6.2 Stereo Vision Camera - properties
The Stereo Camera can be used to identify obstacles and evaluate their distance
from the robot. Fig. 7.12 shows a PCI nDepth Stereo Vision camera. This stereo
vision camera and processing PCB board provides depth measurements by using a
pair of sensors and a technology called computational stereo vision.
Figure 7.12: The PCI nDepth Stereo Vision Camera
The stereo camera provides real-time 3D depth data for mobile robot naviga-
tion. Evaluating distances is achieved as follows:
7.6.3 Triangulation
Figure 7.13 (a) shows a PCI nDepth Stereo Vision camera mounted on top of a
Pioneer P3-DX. The basis of the technology is that a single physical point in 3-
Dimensional space projects unique images when observed by two separated cam-
eras. Figure 7.13 (b), shows a position P in 3D space and its projection to a unique
location SL in the left image and SR in the right image. If it is possible to locate
these corresponding points in the camera sensor images, the location of point P can
then be established using Triangulation. The value BL represents the Baseline dis-
tance between the two sensors (in this case 6cm) and f represents the focal length
of the sensors.
7.6. Applying the Generic AIFH Architecture (Stereo Vision Camera Fault) 164
P(x,y,z) 









Figure 7.13: (a) The PCI nDepth Stereo Camera mounted on a P3-DX mobile robot. (b)
Shows the Triangulation method for finding point P.
7.6.4 Disparity
Disparity is achieved by observing an object from slightly different perspectives.
The position of an object in one image will be shifted in the other image by a value
that is inversely proportional to the object and the stereo camera baseline [118]. As
the distance from the cameras increases, the disparity decreases, this is useful for
depth perception in stereo images. Points that appear in 2D stereo images can be
mapped as coordinates in 3D space. This method was adapted by NASA’s Mars
Exploration Rover for scanning the surrounding terrain for obstacles. The rover
uses its stereoscopic navigation cameras to capture a pair of images. Disparity
calculations are performed in order to detect objects within the rover’s path [119].
7.6.5 Awareness (finding a potential fault)
To calculate the distance between the camera and a known object, the Triangulation
Stereo Vision method can be implemented [120]. The Stereo image pair consists of
two images (left and right) and both images are combined to establish the disparity
values and from that a Z distance value can be calculated from a selected object.
However, this calculation can be affected by faults with the stereo camera sensor.
Figure 7.14 shows the possible faults that can occur for a sensor in a stereo vision
camera setup. If the stereo camera where to lose both sensors, then this could be
picked up as either, no data being received from the camera or the robot ’bumper’
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Figure 7.14: Stereo Vision Camera Faults. (a) Sensor shutdown, (b) Impact (pitch/yaw)
and (c) De-focus Blur
In the AIFH architecture (Figure 7.8)), Awareness initiates monitoring and
knowledge-based evaluation in order to establish if there is a potential fault with a
hardware component. In Figure 7.14 (a), sensor 2 on the stereo camera is electron-
ically disabled and cannot produce images for depth calculations. In this instance,
we simply pass the status of sensor 2 to the Analysis process, where it will be la-
belled as disabled. In Figure 7.14 (b), the stereo camera has suffered an impact in
the field; this has resulted in sensor 2 losing pitch/yaw relative to the stereo cam-
era plane. Applying equations calculated by research developed in [121], we can
establish that there is a depth error occurring in sensor 2. This is characterized by
the size of the yaw angle between the two cameras. The greater the yaw angle the
greater the depth error. This error data is then sent to the Analysis process. Fig-
ure 7.14 (c), shows how defocus blur can potentially influence the quality of the
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disparity estimate. Research conducted in [122], explains how defocus can lead to
objects appearing blurry in the image. Therefore, we can apply equations calcu-
lated in [122], to establish if a sensor in the Stereo Camera is exhibiting defocus
error characteristics. If this is the case, we can send the error data to Analysis for
processing. In the real world, fault scenarios shown in Figure 7.14 (b) and (c) will
not indicate what sensor has failed. To establish what sensor has failed, will require
in-depth analysis.
7.6.6 Analysing (establishing what sensor is faulty)
From the Awareness process carried out in Section 7.1.5.5, we need to establish the
extent of the fault that has been discovered. The AIFH Architecture (see Figure
7.8), shows how component analysis is carried out using information gathered from
the Awareness process. The Analysis process has specialized algorithms which can
be used to identify the extent of the component fault.
For the fault indicated in Figure 7.14 (a), there is only a requirement to set the
state of the faulty sensor to disabled and then send this information to the Adjust-
ment process. For the faults discovered in Figure 7.14 (b) and (c), then we need to
carry out a calibration process to establish what sensor on the stereo vision camera
is faulty. To carry out the calibration, we need to establish the actual distance be-
tween the stereo camera and the object. As faults can happen in the field, we need
to use the mobile robot to establish this distance value. We can achieve this by
using the Bumper sensor mounted on the front of the mobile robot. To establish the
distance value, we drive the robot towards the object. We record the distance cov-
ered by the robot as it moves (using wheel encoder values). When the object meets
with the Bumper sensor, the robot will automatically stop. Figure 7.15 shows how
the Pioneer P3-DX robot can be used to measure the distance between the stereo
camera and the object.
1. ed - wheel encoder distance (recorded as the robot drives towards the object).
2. bb - bumper baseline (the distance between the differential drive base line
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and the bumper baseline).
3. sb - stereo camera baseline (the distance between the differential drive base
line and the stereo camera baseline).
4. d - distance to object from stereo camera sensor baseline.
Using equation (7.1) we can calculate distance d.
d = (ed +bb) − sb (7.1)
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Figure 7.15: The Pioneer P3-DX Bumper can be used to calculate the distance between the
stereo camera and the object
Now we have established the distance between the stereo camera and the ob-
ject, we need to determine what sensor on the camera is faulty. There are a several
scenarios (see Table 7.1).
From the fault scenario establish in Figure 7.14 (b) and (c), we can assume
that both camera sensors are providing data. Therefore, for this experiment we can
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1 disabled disabled Both camera sensors are
reporting no data
2 disabled data (good) Left camera is disabled,
Right camera is
providing reliable data
3 data (good) disabled Left camera is providing
reliable data, Right
camera is disabled
4 disabled data (bad) Left camera is disabled,
Right camera data is
unreliable
5 data (bad) disabled Left camera data is
un-reliable, Right
camera is disabled
6 data (bad) data (bad) Both cameras are
providing data that is
unreliable
7 data (good) data (bad) Left camera is providing
reliable data, Right
camera data is unreliable
8 data (bad) data (good) Left camera data is
unreliable, Right camera
is providing reliable data
right
concentrate on testing scenarios 6-8, in Table 7.1 only.
To test scenarios (6-8) in Table 7.1, we must evaluate each camera’s sensor
individually. The analysing procedure carried out by the Autonomic Manager in
Figure 7.16, involves using a specialized policy to test each individual camera
sensor. The procedure involves taking a picture with camera sensor SL (see Figure
7.15), then storing this data. We then move the robot so that sensor SL is in the
exact position where sensor SR should be. We then take another picture (current
image). We then apply the Triangulation Stereo Vision method from [120] using
the stored image and the current image to establish the distance to object value.











Left Camera Analysis (SL) Right Camera Analysis (SR) 
Figure 7.16: Shows how each camera sensor can be tested by evaluating two images taken
by the same camera sensor from its original position and from the position of
the opposing camera
Steps required for sensor evaluation - see Figure 7.16
1. Take a picture of the object with one camera only (a) or (b) - see Figure 7.16,
then Store image data.
2. Rotate the robot 90°or -90°depending on what camera sensor is being evalu-
ated (Figure 7.16 (a) or (b)).
3. Move the robot forward a distance equivalent to the Stereo Camera Base Line
value between sensor SL and sensor SR - see Figure 7.15.
4. Rotate the robot 90°or -90°depending on what camera sensor is being eval-
uated (Figure 7.16 (a)) or (b)). Take a picture of the object with the same
camera used in Step 1.
We can then compare the distance to object result of each camera sensor with
the known physical distance d between the camera and object (see equation (7.1)).
If one of the camera sensor distance to object results is not within expected tol-
erances, then this sensor is ’tagged’ as being faulty. If none of the camera sensor
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distance to object results are within expected tolerances, then the stereo camera vi-
sion device will be declared as fully disabled and not capable of detecting objects
within its path. No adjustment can be made for this scenario.
7.6.7 Adjustment (compensating for the stereo camera fault)
If during the Analysis evaluation, it is established that there is at least one working
camera sensor, we can implement an adjustment policy to compensate for the other
faulty sensor (see Algorithm 8). The compensation strategy is similar to the strategy
employed to discover what stereo camera sensor was operating correctly during
the analysis stage - (See Figure 7.16). The adjustment policy implemented by
the Autonomic Manager will then send instructions to the operating policy in the
System Manager, which in turn will update the System Manager (Task Module).
ALGORITHM 8: Stereo Vision Camera Fault Adjustment
Input: Enter the identity of the working camera sensor SL (left camera) or SR (right
camera), enter the Baseline Value of Stereo Camera.
Output: Using the one camera, process stored image with current image to establish the
distance value of an object = ObjectDistance







ObjectDistance = performImageProcessing(currentImage, storedImage);
end







ObjectDistance = performImageProcessing(currentImage, storedImage);
end
7.6.8 Conclusions (compensating for the stereo camera fault)
This case study shows that even with one damaged stereo camera sensor, it is still
possible to locate an object using Stereo Vision processing with the assistance of
suitable adjustments via the AIFH architecture. The AIFH architecture can be em-
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ployed to evaluate mobile robot hardware components if there are specialized poli-
cies available to the Autonomic Manager. The Awareness process can be used to
establish if there is a possible fault within the Stereo Camera component. We can
then utilize the Analysis procedure to evaluate the extent of the fault. Finally, if
there is one fully functional camera sensor available, we can then use an Adjust-
ment algorithm to compensate for the fault.
As with any compensation procedure, there will be an effect on how well the
mobile robot performs its task. With the Stereo Vision Camera Fault Adjustment
algorithm, detecting an object will take a greater amount of time and processing.
For short term tasks, this may not be an issue but for longer scheduled tasks, this
could affect resources like power management.
7.7 AIFH Autonomic Architecture Summary
The AIFH architecture was initially developed using principles found in the MAPE-
K and IMD architectural models [1] [5]. Further development of the AIFH archi-
tecture was achieved by using the research carried out in the case studies performed
in Chapter’s 4, 5 and 6. The final generic AIFH design is presented in Section 7.5,
Figure 7.8. The generic AIFH architecture contains Autonomic Manager (contain-
ing the 3 layers, awareness, analysis and adjustment), a Knowledge Base module
and a Self-Healing module. Autonomic Manager is linked to the System Manager
which responsible for executing commands to the mobile robot via the effectors
and sensors. The Autonomic Manager provides a mechanism for detecting faults,
analyzing faults and providing policies that can compensate for faults. The ’health
checking’ mechanism is provided by the self-healing module. The ’autonomic in-
telligence’ in the awareness layer, not only flags component faults but also provides
a means of monitoring sensor data and reporting to the User/Mission Control, if a
component’s behaviour may indicate an impending fault. Within the analysis layer,
there are policies that can adjust tolerance thresholds. These policies are important
as an over sensitive tolerance value may lead to faults being reported continuously
within the Reaction Loop (between the Awareness and Analysis layers), and there-
7.7. AIFH Autonomic Architecture Summary 172
fore creating an infinite fault state.
In Section 7.6, we employed a case study (Stereo Vision Camera) and applied
the AIFH architectural model to that study. The purpose was to demonstrate that the
AIFH autonomic architecture can apply to other component fault scenarios that can
occur within a mobile robot. This is the first case study where the AIFH architecture
is used to map out an Autonomic solution.
This architecture attempts to integrate the autonomic principles of self-healing,
self-analyzing, self-aware, self-optimizing, as described in research by [47] [123]
[124]. The goal of the generic AIFH architecture, is to provide an autonomic so-
lution that can be implemented for any mobile robot type that provides component
fault handling without human intervention. The types of parameters associated with
a functioning robot that an autonomic manager can use in order to establish aware-
ness, analysis and adjustment for operational problems are virtually limitless. Robot
developers need to consider these types of problems so that robots in the future will
become better adapted to fault handling. Consideration needs to be given to the
amount of processing time afforded to the Autonomic Manager. Each sensor on a
mobile robot produces a sizable quantity of data and if this data is consumed by the
Autonomic Manager (and not regulated), then the System could be overwhelmed.
7.7.0.1 AIFH versus MAPE-K and IMD
Why would a developer/researcher consider using the AIFH architecture rather than
MAPE-K or IMD?
In this work, research was conducted on the MAPE-K (Autonomic Comput-
ing) and IMD (Robotics) models to adopt key features from those architectures,
to formulate a hybrid generic architecture (Autonomic Robotics) that specifically
focuses on mobile robot fault handling. The MAPE-K design offers a single feed-
back loop that monitors for faults whereas the AIFH offers a dual feed-back loop
(reactive and proactive) - this allows, not only to react quickly to fault situations but
also to investigate sensor data and look for downward trends in component behav-
iors. The IMD model can react quickly to a fault but it lacks the knowledge over
time, to establish if a component is under performing. The MAPE-K the feed-back
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loop is one-way (Analysis leads to Plan, Plan to Execute etc.); the AIFH (two-way
feed-back loop), can make a decision within the Analysis Layer to return back to
the Awareness Layer (during its fault analysis), and alert the Awareness Layer that
its fault detection process is over-sensitive and needs re-adjusting. In the MAPE-K,
the Execute process simply carries out the polices from the Plan process without
question, however, in the AIFH model, the Adjustment Layer takes the place of
both MAPE-K (Plan and Execute), in regard to decision making and execution of
compensation policies. In comparison to the IMD model, the Adjustment Layer
has a direct route to the effectors, to implement policy changes. If the IMD (Re-
flection Layer), is used to formulate a policy, it must traverse 3 layers before it can
communicate with the effectors.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter outlines the conclusions and future work of the research presented
in this thesis. Section 8.1 discusses a summary of the research and its outcomes.
Section 8.2 presents the conclusions of the research. Finally, Section 8.3 presents
the possibilities for future development of the research conducted within this thesis.
8.1 Overall Summary
The work presented in this thesis highlights the importance of how autonomic ar-
chitecture can play a role in handling component faults within a mobile robot. It
argues that from the original autonomic model presented by IBM [1] and robotics
model (IMD), presented in [5], that there is scope to expand on this architecture
and use an alternate model (AIFH), that focuses on self-awareness, self-analysis
and self-healing. It argues that a generic autonomic architecture can be employed
to handle a variety of component faults that can be applied to any type of mobile
robot. The proposed generic architecture (AIFH), was developed over time using
the SDLC methodology which was applied to a series of case studies. Each case
study contributed to identifying design patterns which in-turn supplied the tools
to build the generic architecture. After the case studies where completed, the re-
sulting insight provided the means to develop a fully-fledged generic autonomic
architecture (AIFH), for handling faults in mobile robots. To evaluate the AIFH
architecture, a further case study was presented that introduced another component
fault scenario. The AIFH architecture was used to identify the fault (awareness),
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process the fault (analysis) and compensate for the fault (adjustment).
• Chapter 2 introduced the origins of autonomic computing and why it was
relevant to the current state of computer systems. This chapter then discussed
the autonomic manager and the properties of the MAPE-K model. The IMD
model was then investigated and how it could be integrated with the MAPE-
K model. This chapter also discussed Organic computing and how it differs
from autonomic computing. Finally, this chapter explains how authors in
this field had incorporated autonomic computing principles into their research
and how they used the MAPE-K architecture as a base to create their own
autonomic model.
• Chapter 3 described the goals put forward for this thesis and what research
methods would be employed to achieve the specified goals. This chapter
also discussed the concept of a generic architecture and how ’awareness’ (in
autonomic terms), plays a significant role in fault detection in mobile robots.
Finally, this chapter explained the use of SDLC as a methodology and how it
was applied to each case study in the thesis.
• Chapter 4 presented a case study describing how autonomic concepts can be
used to handle a ’wheel alignment’ fault in a mobile robot. This chapter also
described the early development of the generic autonomic architecture for
detecting faults in mobile robots. The concept of ’awareness’ was explored
in how a fault can be detected or, by examining current and historical data,
a fault can be anticipated. Finally, this Chapter presented how an adjustment
strategy can be employed to compensate for the fault.
• Chapter 5 presented a case study that examined the effect faulty sonar sen-
sors would have on a mobile robot being able to detect an object. In this
Chapter, the concepts of Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment where used to
detect, process and compensate for a sonar sensor fault. This Chapter also
highlighted the importance of using a Knowledge Base for manipulating Tol-
erance values, analyzing Historical data and making the use of Policies to
8.1. Overall Summary 176
perform analysis. Finally, this Chapter concluded with testing and evaluating
the adjustment policy, in order to prove the mobile robot could still detect
objects even with faulty sonar sensors.
• Chapter 6 presented a case study to describe how battery degradation can
affect the performance of a mobile robot. Using a simulated battery model,
analysis was performed on how a mobile robot performs with (1), a fully
charged battery and (2), a battery exposed to degradation. In this Chapter,
the use of self-awareness, self-analysis and self-healing concepts (to handle
the battery fault), aided the further development of the generic autonomic
architecture. Finally, this Chapter described how the adjustment policy (algo-
rithm), improved the performance of the mobile robot while using a degraded
battery.
• Chapter 7 describes the fully-fledged generic autonomic architecture for han-
dling faults in mobile robots (AIFH). This Chapter presented a ’high-level’
overview of the AIFH architecture: this includes
(1) - the role played by the System Manager.
(2) - the role played by the Autonomic Manager.
(3) - how both the System Manager and Autonomic Manager interact.
The Chapter then describes the elements found within the Autonomic Man-
ager. These elements include the self-healing module and the knowledge base
module. Further description of the knowledge base module, explains the roles
that polices, tolerance values and historical data play in handling ’fault’ data.
The Chapter then describes the ’low-level’ detail of the AIFH architecture.
The ’low-level’ architecture shows how the Reactive and Proactive feedback
loops transport data through each layer (awareness, analysis and adjustment).
Further description of each layer shows how ’fault’ data is manipulated and
how each layer interacts with the knowledge base module. Finally, this Chap-
ter concludes with describing how a further case study is presented to demon-
strate the AIFH generic architecture and how it handles a new fault scenario.
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8.2 Conclusions
Although autonomic computing has been around since the beginning of the millen-
nium, it is still a relatively new concept. The research in this thesis has offered an
opportunity to investigate an area of computing science that is still evolving and
which possess more questions than answers. Fault handling in mobile robots is not
a new concept and much research has been conducted over the years using fault
tolerance techniques. However, the nature of the autonomic computing offers re-
searchers a fresh approach to dealing with faults in mobile robots.
In this thesis, one of the main goals was to take existing ’autonomic and ’in-
telligent machine’ models and combine them to create a new generic architecture.
This goal was attained by developing case studies that centred around component
faults within a mobile robot. As each case study progressed, ’design patterns’ where
identified that had shared common elements within the case studies. These com-
mon ’elements’ where then grouped together to form 3 layers within the generic
autonomic architecture (AAA - Awareness, Analysis and Adjustment). Building on
design, evaluation and experience, each case study provided further structural con-
tent to the generic architecture. When the case study process was completed, all the
insights gathered from this process, formed the design and implementation of the
final generic autonomic architecture.
The question is - how can this generic autonomic architecture (AIFH), make
a difference to the current research carried out in this area? The AIFH architecture
has been designed so that multiple types of robots (with varied sensors), can be self-
managed. Through developing the AIFH architecture, the research in this thesis
identified autonomic ’awareness’ as one of its goals. This ’awareness’ not only
monitors incoming data but uses intelligent monitoring. If a fault occurs within a
component and it becomes disabled, then a basic standard of monitoring would be
sufficient to alert the system to the fault. However, a component that is exhibiting
slight behavioral changes but is still operating within tolerances, is more difficult
to implicate. Using the autonomic knowledge base in the AIFH architecture, real-
time and historical data can be periodically investigated to check for any anomalies
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within a component. If anomalies are discovered in a component, then a report can
be sent to indicate an impending fault for that particular component.
The development of the generic architecture highlighted limitations in the re-
search in terms of the use of third-party robotic hardware. When attempting to com-
pensate for component faults, not all access is afforded the developer to manipulate
parameters within these components. This can restrict the developer or researcher’s
ability to fully-restore the robot’s functionality if a fault has occurred. There are of
course certain security implications if all access to systems is unrestricted, so there
may have be a requirement to restricted access. However, organizations like NASA,
can allow ’all access’ for their own developers without compromising security.
In this Thesis, a generic autonomic fault architecture is proposed in order to
address deficiencies in identifying not only current faults but more importantly, im-
pending faults. Detailed analyses of real-time and historical data can indicate a
downward trend in a components behavior which can lead to early detection of an
impending fault. However, there are limitations, like handling multiple fault scenar-
ios and the amount of band-width that can be afforded to the Autonomic Manager
to process fault data.
8.3 Future Work
Although the research in this thesis answered the questions that where proposed in
Chapter 3, other questions have emerged. There is also scope for further research
in adding functionality to the generic architecture. The following is a summary of
possible directions for this research:
• Software implementation of the AIFH architecture: the AIFH architecture
has provided a template for autonomic ’fault handling’ in mobile robot sys-
tems but further investigation is required to develop the software that will ’re-
alise’ the AIFH model in practical terms. Although a considerable amount of
software was developed during this research programme, (in terms of manip-
ulating the mobile robot and handling component faults in each case study),
it would require considerable effort and further research to apply the AIFH
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model to an actual ’mobile robot’ system.
• Autonomic Data Filtering: one of the questions that emerged as the research
in this thesis developed (Chapter 7), was how to limit the amount of sensor
data afforded to the Autonomic Manager. If the Autonomic Manager was
simply allowed to consume all the data from the sensors, then system could be
overwhelmed with the amount of processing time required to analyse the data.
Further investigation is required in the development of a ’autonomic’ filter
that can be ’aware’ of the limitations of its environment and therefore regulate
the amount of data taken from the sensors. This would be an interesting
experiment, although complex, in terms of assessing the amount of processing
available in the system against the needs of an Autonomic Manager when
detecting anomalies within the system components.
• Multi-Agent Architecture: the research conducted in this thesis centred on
a single managed robotic unit. Future development could focus on imple-
menting multiple robotic units. If a robot using the AIFH architecture had
been operating in the field for sometime, it would have accumulated a con-
siderable amount of knowledge. This knowledge would include fault history
and polices that where used to process the fault. This knowledge could be
shared with other neighbouring robotic units. Future research could look at
implementing the AIFH model as a multi-tier or multi-dimensional design.
• Further case studies: although a total of four component types within mo-
bile robots where investigated in this research (drive system, sonar sensors,
stereo vision cameras and power supply), further research could be conducted
on alternative complementary components. These components could include
laser sensors, robotic arms, infrared sensors and pan and tilt servos. case stud-
ies conducted around ’faults’ in these components would broaden knowledge
for further enhancement of the AIFH architecture.
Appendix A
Case Study Reference: Wheel
Alignment Fault
A.1 Pioneer P3-DX Robot laser alignment readings
ID Test Type Test Time Start  End Distances Batch Diff. 
44 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:11:30 PM 422 420 250 1001 2 
45 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:12:17 PM 418 409 250 1001 9 
46 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:13:04 PM 418 427 250 1001 -9 
47 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:13:52 PM 417 413 250 1001 4 
48 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:14:39 PM 415 410 250 1001 5 
49 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:15:26 PM 419 426 250 1001 -7 
50 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:16:13 PM 415 437 250 1001 -2 
51 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:17:00 PM 414 407 250 1001 7 
52 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:17:47 PM 412 418 250 1001 -6 
53 Alignment            4/21/2015 3:18:34 PM 418 423 250 1001 -5 
-0.2 
mm 
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ID Test Type Test Time Start  End Distance Batch Diff. 
54 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:22:04 AM 420 428 250 1002 -8 
55 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:22:51 AM 413 426 250 1002 -13 
56 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:23:38 AM 418 431 250 1002 -13 
57 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:24:25 AM 415 426 250 1002 -11 
58 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:25:12 AM 416 430 250 1002 -14 
59 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:25:59 AM 416 420 250 1002 -4 
60 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:26:46 AM 418 431 250 1002 -13 
61 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:27:33 AM 412 410 250 1002 2 
62 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:28:20 AM 413 419 250 1002 -6 
63 Alignment            4/22/2015 10:29:07 AM 412 418 250 1002 -6 
-8.6 
mm 
ID Test Type Test Time Start  End Distance Batch Diff. 
64 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:30:52 AM 425 422 250 1003 3 
65 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:31:40 AM 417 438 250 1003 -21 
66 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:32:27 AM 417 429 250 1003 -12 
67 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:33:14 AM 415 425 250 1003 -10 
68 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:34:01 AM 415 411 250 1003 4 
69 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:34:48 AM 411 421 250 1003 -10 
70 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:35:35 AM 417 408 250 1003 9 
71 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:36:22 AM 415 426 250 1003 -11 
72 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:37:09 AM 416 420 250 1003 -4 
73 Alignment            4/22/2015 11:37:56 AM 416 437 250 1003 -21 
-7.3 
mm 
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ID Test Type Test Time Start  End Distance Batch Diff. 
77 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:35:56 PM 415 390 250 1004 -25 
78 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:36:43 PM 422 392 250 1004 -30 
79 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:37:30 PM 420 387 250 1004 -33 
80 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:38:17 PM 422 378 250 1004 -44 
81 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:39:04 PM 421 376 250 1004 -45 
82 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:39:51 PM 413 393 250 1004 -20 
83 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:40:38 PM 415 382 250 1004 -33 
84 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:41:25 PM 411 372 250 1004 -39 
85 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:42:13 PM 415 393 250 1004 -22 
86 Alignment            4/22/2015 2:43:00 PM 410 351 250 1004 -59 
-35 
mm 
ID Test Type Test Time Start  End Distance Batch Diff. 
87 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:21:35 PM 423 389 250 1005 -34 
88 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:22:23 PM 420 382 250 1005 
-38 
89 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:23:10 PM 421 369 250 1005 
-52 
90 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:23:57 PM 418 375 250 1005 
-43 
91 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:24:44 PM 417 370 250 1005 
-47 
92 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:25:31 PM 415 370 250 1005 
-45 
93 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:26:18 PM 414 360 250 1005 
-54 
94 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:27:05 PM 411 356 250 1005 
-55 
95 
Alignment          
  
4/22/2015 5:27:52 PM 410 341 250 1005 
-69 
96 
Alignment          
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ID Test Type Test Time Start  End Distance Batch Diff. 
97 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:52:44 PM 419 378 250 1006 -28 
98 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:53:31 PM 420 392 250 1006 -49 
99 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:54:18 PM 418 369 250 1006 -45 
100 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:55:05 PM 414 369 250 1006 -55 
101 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:55:52 PM 409 354 250 1006 -64 
102 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:56:40 PM 416 351 250 1006 -54 
103 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:57:27 PM 415 361 250 1006 -20 
104 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:58:14 PM 412 392 250 1006 -51 
105 Alignment            4/22/2015 5:59:01 PM 410 359 250 1006 -69 





Case Study Reference: Sonar Sensor
Fault
B.1 Pioneer P3-DX Robot - sonar sensor fault states
and compensation rotation values
R + 60° 
R + 20° 
R + 40° and R + 40° 
R + 20°  and  R + 20 ° + R + 20 ° 
R - 20° and R + 60° 
R - 20° and R + 60° 
R - 20° and R -20° 
R - 40° 
R - 20° and R - 20°  
R - 20° and R -20° 
R - 20° and R -20° and R -20 ° 
R + 20° 
R + 20° 
R + 40° 
R + 20° 
R + 20° 
R + 40° 
R + 20° 
R + 20° 
R + 20° and R + 20° 
R + 40° 
R + 40° and R - 20° 
R + 40° and R - 60° 
R + 20° 
R + 20° 
R + 20°  
R + 20° and R + 20° 
R + 20° 
R + 20° 
R + 20° and R - 40° 
R - 40° 
R + 20° and  R - 40° 
R + 20° and R - 40° 
R + 20° and R + 20° 
R + 20° and R - 60° 
R + 20° and R + 20° and R + 20° 
R + 20° and R + 20° and  R - 60° and  R - 20°  
R + 20° and R + 20° and R + 20° R + 20° and R + 20° 
Using positive rotation as first priority   
R - 20° 
R - 20° and R + 40° 
R - 20°  
R - 20° 
R - 20° and R + 40° 
R - 20° and R + 40° and R +20° 
R - 20° 
R - 20° and R + 60° 
Using negative rotation as first priority   
R - 20° 
R - 20° and R + 60° 
R - 20° and R + 40° 
R - 20° and R - 20° and - 20° 
R - 20° and R + 40° and +20° (x3) 
R - 40° and R + 60° 
R - 20° and R - 20° and - 20° 
R - 40° and R + 80° 
R - 20° and R - 20° and + 60° 
R -20° and R -20° and R +60° and R +20° and R +20°   
R - 60° 
R - 40° and R -20° and R + 80° 
R -20° and R -20° and R -20 ° and R + 80° and R -20°  
R -40° and R -40° 
R -20° and R -20° and R -20° and R -20° + and R -100°  
R - 20° and R -20° and R -20° R -20° and R -20° 
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B.2 Sonar Sensor Fault - Compensation experiment
Experiment 1: (software written by author) - Sonar Transducers 2, 3, 4 and 5 are
disabled. The remain-
ing sonars have readings greater than the object detection threshold (set at 350 mm).
Using the rotation formula, the lowest position of a disabled transducer is -10
(Sonar 4), the next available transducer is 50 (Sonar 6). If the signs are equal then
simply subtract 10 from 50. The rotation required is +40°
Experiment 2:
The reading for Sonar 6 shows 326, which is below the Threshold and would
indicate that an object has been found. Likewise, the opposite enabled sensors
could be used for detection. In this case the robot would have been rotated
anti-clock wise (-40°).
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